Opinion
A21-1051
08-23-2022
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Eugene Richardson Jr., Appellant.
Redwood County District Court File No. 64-CR-20-363
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Theodora Gaïtas Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant David Eugene Richardson, Jr., appeals his convictions for first-degree witness tampering and threats of violence, arguing that multiple trial errors require a new trial and that the district court improperly calculated his sentence. Respondent State of Minnesota agrees that Richardson is entitled to a new trial. Because the district court prejudicially erred by admitting the complainant's out-of-court statements as prior consistent statements, we reverse Richardson's convictions and remand for a new trial.
2. In May 2020, the complainant, S.R., reported to authorities in Redwood County that Richardson had threatened her life because she was cooperating in a Wisconsin prosecution. Based on S.R.'s allegations, Richardson was charged in Minnesota with first- degree witness tampering, Minn. Stat. § 609.498, subd. 1(a) (2018), and threats of violence, Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018).
3. Richardson had a jury trial in March 2021. Although S.R. testified at the trial, she initially "plead[ed] the fifth" and then stated that she could not remember the May 2020 threats. After the prosecutor reminded S.R. of her statements to police, S.R. testified that those statements "sound[ed] crazy" and that she had "probably been delusional."
4. Following S.R.'s testimony-and over Richardson's hearsay objection-the district court permitted a police officer to testify about the substance of S.R.'s out-of-court statements in May 2020. Additionally, the district court allowed the prosecutor to play the unredacted audio recordings of two statements that S.R. gave to the police officer in May 2020. During those recordings, S.R. stated that Richardson had threatened her for participating in the Wisconsin case; Richardson had gotten angry when S.R. alerted authorities that Richardson "violated his bond monitoring program" in the Wisconsin case; Richardson strangled S.R. the same day Richardson was offered probation in the Wisconsin case; Richardson was "pretty violent" and called her a "whore;" Richardson had been reported for violating a domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO) in northern Minnesota, but hid in S.R.'s trunk to evade state troopers and "got away;" and it was "not good" that Richardson knew her address because his "buddies" would do things to her when he went to prison. The police officer also made statements during the recordings, which included that the county had "quite a few incidents involving" Richardson; Richardson was a "violent person" and would one day "fly off the handle and hurt" S.R.; Richardson has "a couple warrants out for his arrest;" S.R. and Richardson's relationship had been "toxic" from the beginning; based on prior reports, S.R. should not let Richardson "hang around" and should conceal her address from him; and that Richardson had been arrested and was in the county jail.
Richardson objected to one of these recordings as "cumulative." There is no record of an objection to the second recording.
5. The district court admitted S.R.'s out-of-court statements because it concluded they were prior consistent statements that would "help the jury evaluate the credibility of [S.R.], particularly given the . . . rollercoaster . . . nature of her testimony."
6. "Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). "A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). "A defendant claiming error in the district court's reception of evidence has the burden of showing both the error and the prejudice resulting from the error." Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009)
7. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Under the rules of evidence, hearsay is inadmissible unless a hearsay exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802; State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 502 (Minn. 1999). Any error in the admission of a hearsay statement is harmless if the statement would have been substantively admissible at trial on other grounds. See State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407-10 (Minn. 2006) (finding that the district court's erroneous admission of a statement under the medical exception to the hearsay rule was harmless because it would have been admissible under the residual exception).
8. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence provides that a prior statement by a witness is not hearsay if: "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant's testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant's credibility as a witness."
9. Before a prior consistent statement "can be admitted, the witness' credibility must have been challenged, and the statement must bolster the witness' credibility with respect to that aspect of the witness' credibility that was challenged." State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. 1997). Then, the district court must determine "whether the prior statement and the trial testimony are consistent" by comparing each prior statement with the witness's trial testimony. State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn.App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 2000). The purpose of this latter step is to prevent inclusion of inadmissible inconsistent statements that may be coupled with admissible consistent statements in a "multi-statement interview." Id.
10. Here, the district court failed to conduct this analysis. S.R.'s out-of-court statements were inconsistent with her trial testimony. The statements were not admissible as prior consistent statements under rule 801(d)(1)(B). And the state concedes that no exception to the hearsay rule applies. Moreover, the recorded interview that was played for the jury included multiple statements-made by both S.R. and the police officer-that clearly were not admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B) and were likely inadmissible under other evidence rules. See Minn. R. Evid. 402 (defining relevant evidence), 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value), 404 (stating that character evidence and evidence of another crime or act is generally inadmissible to prove action in conformity with the character trait or other action). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the police officer to testify about S.R.'s out-of-court statements and by permitting the prosecutor to play the unredacted recordings of S.R.'s statements to the officer.
11. The state concedes that the district court's error prejudiced Richardson, observing that "[a]bsent that improperly admitted evidence, the jury would have had no evidence upon which to find [Richardson] guilty." We agree that the inadmissible statements-which provided the only evidence that Richardson committed the charged offenses-substantially influenced the jury's verdicts. See Holt, 772 N.W.2d at 483.
12. Because the district court abused its discretion by admitting S.R.'s prior statements, and the errors prejudiced Richardson, he is entitled to a new trial.
13. Richardson's brief to this court alleges additional unobjected-to trial errors and a sentencing error. Given our decision to order a new trial, we decline to specifically address those errors. But we note our concern about the overall fairness of Richardson's jury trial. We trust that the parties and the district court will work to ensure that any retrial comports with the law.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Richardson's convictions are reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.