It appears that the court simply ordered the jury impaneled for the purpose of trying the charge of speeding, and the evidence was offered on the question of speeding, which count was submitted to the jury as though there had been a consolidation of all four counts. In the case of S. v. Rice, 202 N.C. 411, 163 S.E. 112, the defendant was indicted in two separate bills: (1) murder; and (2) assault with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill. The defendant was placed on trial on the first bill and pleaded not guilty. The jury was selected and impaneled. Near the conclusion of the testimony of the first witness for the State, the trial judge announced that he was consolidating the two bills for trial at the same time. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill.
His motion was to consolidate in medias res pending the taking of testimony in the instant case. S. v. Rice, 202 N.C. 411, 163 S.E. 112. The trial court was of opinion that the jury, as then selected and impaneled, would not be authorized to try the defendant on the other indictments. For this reason and in its discretion the motion to consolidate was denied. We cannot say there was error in the ruling.
Exception No. 9 is directed to that portion of his Honor's charge as follows: "Now, gentlemen of the jury, to this bill of indictment and to these degrees of unlawful homicide, the defendants and each of them pleads not guilty." This exception was taken because the record herein does not show that the defendants entered a plea to the bill of indictment. Therefore the defendants contend the judgment is void, citing S. v. Cunningham, 94 N.C. 824; S. v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604; and S. v. Rice, 202 N.C. 411, 163 S.E. 112. We think the facts here, as to the plea, are substantially like the facts presented in the case of S. v. Harvey, 214 N.C. 9, 197 S.E. 620, in which Devin, J., speaking for the Court, said: "In his brief defendant further assails the judgment on the ground that the record does not affirmatively show defendant's arraignment and plea.
In the first place, defendant has not challenged the consolidation of the two indictments for trial. The offenses charged are of the same class, relate to an assault upon the same person, and appear to be so connected in time and place as that evidence at the trial upon one of the indictments would be competent and admissible at the trial of the other. In such cases there is statutory authority for consolidation. C. S., 4622; S. v. Combs, 200 N.C. 671, 158 S.E. 252; S. v. Rice, 202 N.C. 411, 163 S.E. 112; S. v. Chapman, 221 N.C. 157, 19 S.E.2d 250, and numerous cases there cited. In S. v. Combs, supra, it is said: "The court is expressly authorized by statute in this State to order the consolidation for trial of two or more indictments in which the defendant or defendants are charged with crimes of the same class, which are so connected in time or place as that evidence at the trial of one of the indictments will be competent and admissible at the trial of the others."
The defendant contends that the consolidation was prejudicial. The case of S. v. Rice, 202 N.C. 411, 163 S.E. 112, holds: "C. S., 4622, regulates the consolidation of criminal actions. This statute has been construed in many decisions of this Court. In S. v. Combs, 200 N.C. 671, 158 S.E. 252, it is written: `The court is expressly authorized by statute in this State to order the consolidation for trial of two or more indictments in which the defendant or defendants are charged with crimes of the same class, which are so connected in time or place as that evidence at the trial of one of the indictments will be competent and admissible at the trial of the others.
In this ruling there was no error. C. S., 4622, authorizes the consolidation of two or more bills "when there are several charges against any person . . . for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more transactions of the same class of crimes or offenses." State v. Brown, 182 N.C. 761; State v. Rice, 202 N.C. 411. Defendant's exception to the denial of his motion for judgment of nonsuit cannot be sustained.