Opinion
No. 108,684.
2013-11-8
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Felipe D. HERNANDEZ, Appellant.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge. Janine Cox, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge.
Janine Cox, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., McANANY and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Felipe D. Hernandez appeals the district court's denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to K.S.A, 21–2512. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the district court's judgment.
In June 2003, a jury convicted Hernandez of one count of domestic battery, one count of rape, two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, two counts of aggravated criminal threat, and one count of aggravated battery. The charges stemmed from allegations made by his minor daughter, C.H., and the convictions rested mainly on her testimony. At trial, Hernandez asserted a general denial defense and claimed that C.H. fabricated her story. Hernandez pursued a direct appeal, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, but this court affirmed his convictions and sentence and our Supreme Court denied review. See State v. Hernandez, No. 91,434, 2005 WL 81492 (Kan.App.2005) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 279 Kan. 1008 (2005).
In 2006, Hernandez filed a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the motion, and the district court's judgment was affirmed on appeal. Hernandez v. State, No. 99,921, 2009 WL 1858244 (Kan.App.2009) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 290 Kan. 1093 (2010).
On August 22, 2011, Hernandez filed a pro se petition pursuant to K.S.A. 21–2512(a) requesting an order for DNA testing of items identified only as blankets and sheets, towels, and a box of new condoms. The district court appointed counsel to represent Hernandez and held a hearing on June 11, 2012. At the hearing, Hernandez' attorney focused on the request for DNA testing of the sheets and argued that they should be tested to determine whether Hernandez', his wife's, or C.H.'s DNA was present. The State argued that there was no reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence. The State noted that because C.H. had testified that Hernandez wore a condom, the probative nature of DNA on the sheets was significantly diminished. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court agreed with the State and denied Hernandez' petition. Specifically, the district court concluded that the requested testing could not produce exculpatory evidence. Hernandez timely appealed.
In his sole issue on appeal, Hernandez argues that the district court committed reversible error when it denied his K.S.A. 21–2512 petition for DNA testing. As he did in district court, Hernandez limits his arguments on appeal to DNA testing of the sheets. Specifically, Hernandez argues that the district court erred (1) when it stated that because no DNA evidence was used at trial, testing the DNA now would make no sense; (2) by applying State v. Smith, 34 Kan.App.2d 368, 119 P.3d 679,rev. denied 280 Kan. 990 (2005), which is inapplicable; and (3) by misunderstanding and misapplying Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 88 P.3d 214 (2004). The State maintains that there is no reasonable probability that DNA testing would lead to noncumulative, exculpatory evidence.
“The summary denial of a request for DNA testing under K.S.A. 21–2512 presents a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. [Citation omitted.] Additionally, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Lackey, 295 Kan. 816, 819–20, 286 P.3d 859 (2012).
K.S.A. 21–2512 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person in state custody, at any time after conviction for murder ... or for rape ... may petition the court that entered the judgment for forensic DNA testing (deoxyribonucleic acid testing) of any biological material that:
(1) Is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the conviction;
(2) is in the actual or constructive possession of the state; and
(3) was not previously subjected to DNA testing, or can be subjected to retesting with new DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results.
“(c) The court shall order DNA testing pursuant to a petition made under subsection (a) upon a determination that testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim of the petitioner that the petitioner was wrongfully convicted or sentenced.”
Hernandez contends that the district court erroneously believed that because there was no DNA evidence presented at trial, DNA testing now would have no value. Specifically, the district judge said the following at the hearing:
“First of all, it's important to note for the record that the conviction is not based on any DNA evidence, and so this is not a case where there was some suggestion that there was some testing of materials and his DNA was on it, it was presented to the jury, and he's stating, no, it wasn't me; it was some other guy, but it's not me. That's not what we've got here. We don't have any DNA evidence that was submitted to the jury that could form a basis for the conviction.
“But here, again, there was no DNA evidence presented to the jury. And so what we've got left is, well, okay, since the jury didn't rely upon DNA evidence anyway, how does the absence—let's just assume that it was tested—help the defendant, in terms of showing his innocence or getting a not guilty or a different verdict from the jury? And it seems to me that it's—it's of—it's of no help because that's what you would assume would happen, would be the case that would—we assume why he would want it tested is the DNA would be on it. Well, that doesn't help him because there were no DNA results presented to the jury.”
Hernandez asserts that these statements show the district court believed that DNA testing under K.S.A. 21–2512 should occur only when DNA evidence was admitted at trial. Hernandez cites Lackey, in which our Supreme Court discussed three requirements for DNA testing under K.S.A. 21–2512:(1) that the material be related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the conviction, (2) that the material is in the State's possession, and (3) that the material was not previously tested for DNA or can be retested with new techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results. Lackey, 295 Kan. at 821–22. Hernandez contends that the material he wanted tested was related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the convictions and the fact that DNA evidence was not introduced at trial is irrelevant.
Hernandez' argument mischaracterizes the district court's statements. The district court did not deny Hernandez' motion because it found that the material was not related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in Hernandez' convictions. Nor did the district court find that the lack of DNA evidence at trial categorically prohibited postconviction testing. Rather, the district court denied Hernandez' petition because the court found that test results showing that Hernandez' DNA was not on the sheets could not possibly help Hernandez; it would not provide noncumulative, exculpatory evidence.
Next, Hernandez argues that the district court erred in relying on Smith and in misapplying Bruner. We need not analyze Hernandez' arguments in detail as they relate to the district court's application of caselaw. The district court's discussion of the Smith and Bruner cases was not central to the court's decision to deny Hernandez' petition for DNA testing. Ultimately the district court concluded that testing for DNA on the sheets would not tend to prove or disprove any fact at issue that was material to Hernandez' guilt or innocence. If a district court reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied upon the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. See State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 870, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012).
We agree with the district court that a review of the record here conclusively shows that the requested testing could not produce exculpatory evidence. Hernandez asked that the sheets be tested for his DNA, his wife's DNA, and C.H.'s DNA. The discovery of Hernandez' DNA on the sheets would have been detrimental to his defense. But the absence of Hernandez' DNA on the sheets would not tend to prove or disprove any fact at issue that was material to his guilt or innocence. Likewise, the presence or absence of C.H.'s DNA or the wife's DNA on the sheets would not have disproved C.H.'s allegations against Hernandez. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Hernandez' request for forensic DNA testing.
Affirmed.