Opinion
111,974.
07-10-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Delen REYNOLDS, Appellant.
Johnathan M. Grube, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Gerald R. Kuckelman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Johnathan M. Grube, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Gerald R. Kuckelman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., HILL and ARNOLD–BURGER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Delen Reynolds pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine found in the trunk of a car in which he was a passenger. Before sentencing, Reynolds moved to withdraw his plea, alleging he did not understand what the State would have show to prove that he legally possessed the methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Reynolds understood the nature of the charge and only wanted to withdraw his plea because he has misgivings about his possible sentence. Because we agree with the district court and do not find that Reynolds has shown that the district court abused its discretion, we affirm.
On November 1, 2013, an Atchison County Sheriff's deputy found Reynolds asleep—or at least pretending to be asleep—in the backseat of a car found parked in a rural part of Atchison County where a rash of recent thefts had been reported. There were two other passengers in the front seat. After it was learned that the car had been reported stolen in Oklahoma, it was searched by deputies who had come to the scene. In the trunk of the car, a bag containing two scales with white powdery residue, a container with white crystal residue, numerous small plastic bags within larger plastic bags, a handgun, and a sawed-off shotgun were found. Reynolds—who was on felony bond in a case in Sedgwick County at the time—resisted arrest, resulting in injury to one of the deputies.
The State ultimately charged Reynolds with a single count of possession of methamphetamine, a drug severity level 5 felony in violation of K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5706(a). In exchange for a plea to this charge, the State agreed not to file additional charges against him arising out of the other items found during the search of the vehicle or arising out of the arrest. At the plea hearing, the district court conducted a lengthy colloquy, during which Reynolds acknowledged that he understood the charge against him as well as the constitutional rights he would be giving up by entering his plea. Thereafter, the district court found Reynolds' plea to be “freely and voluntarily made, with full knowledge of the rights and consequences.”
Before he was sentenced, however, Reynolds moved to withdraw his plea. In support, Reynolds alleged he “did not fully understand the situation” and “was misled and/or misunderstood that the facts [regarding possession of the drugs] could be disputed” at trial. The district court held two hearings on the motion to withdraw his plea. At the first hearing, Reynolds' counsel informed the court that he believed his client “was under a false understanding of what perhaps possession was” and Reynolds told the judge he did not understand how he could be convicted of possessing the methamphetamine found in the trunk because the two other occupants of the car had already been convicted for possessing the same drugs. The judge explained that possession did not have to be exclusive. Reynolds then changed his reasoning for seeking to withdraw his plea, telling the judge he did not think the substance found was actually methamphetamine. In response, the district court continued the hearing to allow the State to locate the reports regarding the substance found during the search of the car.
During a second hearing on the motion to withdraw plea, the State presented test results that were positive for methamphetamine. Reynolds then told the district court he still wanted to withdraw his plea because he did not understand the possession element of the charge. At the close of the hearing, the district court found Reynolds failed to establish good cause to withdraw his plea. Specifically, the district court found that during the plea colloquy “it sound[ed] to the court like [Reynolds] just didn't like the bargain or didn't know maybe what the end result was going to be.” The judge then explained to Reynolds, “[T]hat's not grounds to withdraw the plea, because you don't like what the sentence is going to be.” Accordingly, the district court denied the motion and imposed a presumptive 34–month prison sentence.
Analysis
On appeal, Reynolds contends the district court erred in concluding he failed to establish good cause to withdraw his plea. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1) provides that “[a] plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged.” Accordingly, we review the denial of Reynolds' motion to withdraw his plea for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). A district court abuses its discretion when: (1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the judge; (2) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial competent evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion is based. State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941, 960, 318 P.3d 140 (2014).
As the party asserting an abuse of discretion, Reynolds carries the burden of proof in this appeal. See Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 836, 268 P.3d 1201. To the extent Reynolds attempts to meet this burden by challenging the district court's factual findings, we are not to disturb those findings as long as they are supported by substantial competent evidence. See State v. Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 855, 249 P.3d 425 (2011). Notably, we cannot reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility in reviewing for substantial competent evidence. 291 Kan. at 855, 249 P.3d 425.
Kansas courts have identified three factors, commonly referred to as the “Edgar factors” that can aid in the determination of whether a defendant has good cause to withdraw a plea: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made. State v. Freeman, 292 Kan. 24, 28, 253 P.3d 1 (2011) (quoting State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 [2006] ). In addition, other factors may be duly considered in determining good cause to withdraw a plea. State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511–13, 231 P.3d 563 (2010).
Here, Reynolds argues that the district court's decision was based on an error of fact—or was unreasonable—because he was misled into agreeing to enter a plea. He also argues that his attorney was ineffective and “exhibited lackluster advocacy” before the district court. Lastly, Reynolds argues that the district court's decision is based on an error of law.
According to Reynolds, he “only accepted the plea agreement because he did not fully understand the meaning of the word ‘possession’ in relation to the charge of possession of methamphetamine.” In support, Reynolds cites us to caselaw discussing the right of defendants to notice of the nature of the charge against them. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). In State v. Harned, 281 Kan. 1023, 1045, 135 P.3d 1169 (2006), the Kansas Supreme Court noted that a guilty plea “is not knowingly and voluntarily made under constitutional due process standards where the defendant does not understand those elements as they relate to the facts.” Similarly, in Edgar, 281 Kan. at 37, 127 P.3d 986, it was recognized that “[a] keystone of an intelligent plea is for the defendant to be informed of the nature of the charges.”
Reynolds candidly acknowledges the duty to explain the elements of a crime does not necessarily fall upon a judge taking a defendant's plea. Rather, he argues that his attorney failed to sufficiently explain the nature of the charge. In Henderson, the United States Supreme Court found that even without an express representation from defense counsel that he or she explained the nature of the offense to the accused, “it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.” 426 U.S. at 647. According to Reynolds, however, no such inference can be made in this case because nothing in the record indicates that either the district court or his attorney “fully explained the term possession and how it applied to [him] when law enforcement found methamphetamine in the car in which he was a passenger.”
Reynolds' second argument—that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made due to ineffective assistance of counsel—is mostly an extension of his first argument. More specifically, Reynolds contends:
“Because [he] was unable to fully understand the meaning of possession, it is likely that he and his trial attorney did not discuss possible trial strategies affecting [Reynolds'] ability to make an informed and understanding decision of whether accepting a plea agreement was in his best interest.”
To the extent Reynolds is now suggesting for the first time on appeal that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea due to the ineffective assistance of his counsel, the Kansas Supreme Court recently made it clear that appellate courts should not consider issues not raised below in the absence of any explanation for why it is appropriate to do so. See State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. ––––, –––P.3d ––––, No. 109,086, 350 P.3d 1068, 2015 WL 3439127, at *2–3 (2015) ; Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 40). In the present appeal, Reynolds offers no such explanation.
Regardless, our review of the record did not reveal any basis from which we could conclude that Reynolds did not fairly and voluntarily enter his plea. It is important to note that the district court did not find credible Reynolds' testimony that he did not understand the nature of the charge to which he pled. We cannot disturb that credibility assessment. Moreover, the contrary finding is supported by the evidence. This is particularly true in light of the plea colloquy and defense counsel's testimony that he had discussed the nature of the charge as well as the facts of the case with Reynolds before he decided to enter a plea.
Finally, Reynolds argues the district court “did not apply his inability to fully understand the plea agreement and the nature of the charge against him ... when it failed to find the testimony that he was misled good cause to withdraw his plea.” But Reynolds never alleged below that he did not understand the plea agreement as a basis for withdrawing a plea and he has not explained why he can raise that argument here for the first time. Accordingly, the district court simply found that Reynolds testimony in that regard was not credible, and we are not to revisit that finding.
Affirmed.