Opinion
No. 28722.
April 21, 1953.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, WARREN COUNTY, GLOVER E. DOWELL, J.
Peterson Nelson, Paul M. Peterson and Will L. Nelson, Columbia, for appellants.
Alvin H. Juergensmeyer, Warrenton, for respondents.
Quo warranto at the relation of certain residents and taxpayers of Reorganized School District R-1 of Warren County against Reorganized School District R-3 of Warren County, the members of the board of directors and clerk of District R-3, challenging the jurisdiction of District R-3 over certain territory which formed a part of District R-1 on the ground that the proceedings by which that territory were released from District R-1 and annexed by District R-3 were illegal and void.
The pleadings raised these issues: (1) Whether section 165.300 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. is the proper statutory procedure for the release by a school district of two separate parts of its territory for annexation by two other school districts; (2) whether the form of the ballot was proper; (3) whether District R-3 accepted the territory as required by law; and (4) whether the acceptance of the territory by District R-3 was timely.
The trial court held that § 165.300, supra, was properly invoked under the facts; that the proceedings were legal and valid; and that the territory of District R-1 involved was properly released and annexed to and that it now forms a part of District R-3. Judgment was entered for respondents and against relators, who now prosecute this appeal.
District R-1 consists of a long, narrow strip of territory across the entire south side of Warren County, ranging from 1 to 3 miles in width. The high school, located at Marthasville, in the eastern end of the district, did not offer vocational agriculture and vocational home economics. The west end of the district was close to Hermann School District No. 3, Gasconade County, and the middle part of District R-1 adjoined Warrenton School District R-3. Both these cities had good high schools which offered these courses. It was practical from a transportation standpoint to join the western end of District R-1 to the Hermann District and the central section of District R-1 to the Warrenton District. Certain patrons and taxpayers of District R-1 filed a petition with the board of education of that district under § 165.300, supra, requesting that part of the territory of District R-1 be released for annexation to the Hermann District and another part released for annexation to District R-3, and that the remaining portion of District R-1 be permitted to remain as an elementary school district. Acting under the statute the board called an election in District R-1 for the purpose of voting upon the propositions submitted in the petition. The notice of election and ballot followed the form of the petition. The ballot read:
"Proposition to release part of District R-1, Warren County, Missouri, so that it may request annexation to the Hermann District No. 3, Gasconade County, Missouri, and also to release another part of District R-1, Warren County, Missouri, so that it may request annexation to R-3, Warren County, Missouri,
"Boundaries described as follows:
"To be released to Hermann District No. 3, Gasconade County, Missouri, the following described part of District R-1, to-wit: (here followed a metes and bounds description).
"To be released to District R-3, Warren County, Missouri, the following described part of District R-1, to-wit: (here followed a metes and bounds description).
* * *
"For Release
"Against Release
"Scratch out the clause you do not favor."
The election was held on February 25, 1952. Six hundred eighteen voted for and 156 voted against the release. The polling places at Hopewell and Holstein were the only voting places within the area to be annexed to District R-3. Hopewell voted 39-14 against release, and Holstein voted 71-63 against release. Gore, the only polling place in the western end of District R-1, voted 59-17 in favor, and the three polling places in the eastern end of District R-1 voted 482-29 in favor of releasing the territories for annexation. On February 26 the board of education of District R-1 notified the board of District R-3 of the results of the election. That notice was received by the board of District R-3 prior to February 29. Following receipt of this notice the board of District R-3 held meetings on March 10, 12, 18, April 3 (two meetings on this date, one by the old and one by the new board), April 14 and May 2. At the March 12 meeting, which was held jointly with the board of the Hermann District, the president of the board of District R-3 demanded that District R-1 turn over to District R-3 a portion of the money and property belonging to District R-1. However, on May 14 the board of District R-3 voted unconditionally to accept jurisdiction over the area in question, and notice of acceptance was received by the board of District R-1 on May 15. District R-3 assumed jurisdiction over the area and continues to exercise jurisdiction over it. On May 15 the Hermann School District notified District R-1 that it accepted jurisdiction of the territory released to it, and assumed jurisdiction over it. The remaining portion of District R-1 not released and annexed has continued as a school district.
This proceeding was filed by certain dissatisfied residents living in the area voted to be released to District R-3.
Appellants' first point is that the court erred in holding that § 165.300, supra, provides the proper statutory procedure for the release of two separate portions of a school district for annexation to two other school districts. The pertinent provisions of paragraph 1 of that section follow: "Whenever an entire school district, or a part of a district, * * * which adjoins any city, town, consolidated or village school district, * * * desires to be attached thereto for school purposes. * * *" a special election shall be called by the board of directors upon petition of ten qualified voters of such district. Appellants urge that by clear and unambiguous wording § 165.300, supra, is limited to the annexation of either all or only one part of one school district to another school district, for the reason that the words "a part of a district" and "district, which adjoins", and all other pertinent words appearing in the statute, are used in the singular and not in the plural; that the section is not workable when applied to a proceeding in which two or more portions of a given district are to be released for annexation to two or more other districts; and that the legislative intent that the section apply only to cases where no more than two school districts are involved is clearly made evident. Appellants further assert that section 165.170 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. provides the proper procedure to be followed when it is sought to release two or more parts of one school district for annexation to two or more other districts.
At the outset, we think it clear that § 165.170 supra, is not the appropriate procedural statute under the facts of this case. That section provides that "When it is deemed necessary to form a new district, to be composed of two or more entire districts, or parts of two or more districts, to divide one district to form two new districts from the territory therein, to divide one district and attach the territory thereof to adjoining districts, or to change the boundary lines of two or more districts, * * *" an election shall be held in each interested district upon the filing of a petition, etc. If the districts affected vote favorably, each voting separately, "the district or districts shall be deemed formed or the boundary thus changed from that date", but if one or more votes for and one or more votes against the change, the matter may be referred to the county superintendent of schools, who would appoint a board of arbitration to finally decide the matter. We have italicized the clauses which appellants contend are applicable. Section 165.170, supra, however, applies to common school districts and not to consolidated school districts, except insofar as it is made applicable thereto by section 165.293 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. which confines its application to the provisions relating to boundary lines. There is no basis therefore for the contention that the first italicized clause of § 165.170, supra, is applicable to consolidated school districts. See State ex inf. Conkling ex rel. Hendricks v. Sweaney, 270 Mo. 685, 195 S.W. 714. Nor does the second clause italicized, supra, apply to this case, for the reason that section 165.190, subd. 3, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. provides that "* * * districts or parts of districts lying in another county, but adjoining a district that contains a city, town or consolidated school district, may become a party of said city, town or consolidated school district in the same manner as provided in section 165.300." The Legislature having expressed the method by which a part of a district lying in one county but adjoining a school district located in another county may be attached to the latter, all other statutory methods are excluded.
It appears to us that § 165.300, supra, is the appropriate statutory procedure to accomplish the release of two separate portions, but not all, of the territory of a school district for annexation by two other school districts, where the initiative is taken by qualified voters of the district containing the territory to be released or annexed, as in this case. The objection that § 165.300, supra, is worded in the singular is not well taken. Sections 1.020 and 1.030, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. admonish us "to so construe statutory words importing the singular number as to include the plural" unless otherwise specially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the Legislature or to the context. State ex inf. Gentry v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 321 Mo. 461, 12 S.W.2d 64, loc. cit. 80. There is no other special provision, nor is there any such repugnancy. The intention of the Legislature is to provide a method whereby all, or any part or parts less than all, of a district may be attached to adjoining school districts, on the petition of ten qualified voters of the district to be released or annexed. Parenthetically, in cases arising wholly within one county, it is obvious that § 165.170, supra, made applicable to consolidated school districts by § 165.293, supra, insofar as changes of boundaries are concerned, provides the method for the attachment of two parts of a school district to two or more other school districts, where the initiative comes from both the attaching and the releasing districts, i.e. where petitions are filed and elections called in each district interested. That was not the situation, however, in the instant case. The only petition filed was the petition filed by the voters of District R-1. If the voters of a district determine that the release of a part of their territory to one adjoining district and the release of another part to a different adjoining district is required by the circumstances of the case, and if the governing bodies of the other districts consider it advisable to receive the territory thus proffered, the purpose of the statute has been served. The converse of the situation is represented by the case of Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, 57 Iowa 144, 10 N.W. 330, in which a statute authorizing cities by ordinance to divide the city into sewerage districts was construed to entitle the city to create itself into one district and not to require that there be two or more sewerage districts. Instead of being repugnant to § 165.300, supra, the construction which we have adopted is consistent therewith, and tends to harmonize the whole body of the school laws.
Nor is any insurmountable obstacle encountered which makes the statute unworkable as a result of this construction. Appellants claim that a complication would arise if, after a favorable vote on the proposition of releasing two areas to two districts, the board of directors of one district accepted the territory released to it and immediately took over the expense and obligation of maintaining and operating that area, and thereafter the other district refused to accept the territory released to it. In the event of a favorable vote on two propositions to release two different areas of a district to two other districts the proceedings would of course fail if the board of either of such other districts rejected the released territory. From this appellants argue that an unworkable situation would result in that the directors in the annexing district who had accepted and spent money in the annexed territory would be personally liable therefor. The answer to this argument is that there would be no legal obligation upon the annexing district to assume the financial burden of operating the schools in the newly acquired area until the acquisition thereof was finally consummated, i. e. until after both districts had acted favorably on the proffer of additional territory. The directors of the annexing districts could easily avoid such a situation by withholding the acceptance and expenditure of money until unanimity of action as between them could be obtained. Although the section does not specify the length of time within which the board in the annexing district must act the law would supply the deficiency and require the board of directors to meet within a reasonable length of time to consider the advisability of accepting the released territory, so that no extended hiatus would occur in any event between the action of one board and the action of the other. In the meantime the original district in which the vote took place would be obligated to continue to maintain the schools, so that the provision of educational facilities would not be interrupted.
Appellants next contend that the form of the ballot was improper, for the reason that it united two separate and distinct propositions in one submission to the voters so as to permit and require the acceptance or rejection of both propositions. Respondents, contra, say that the proposition submitted was the single proposition of the release of all of the district west of a certain line.
The vice of doubleness in submissions at elections and the rule prohibiting it is stated in State ex rel. Becker v. Smith, 335 Mo. 1046, 75 S.W.2d 574. If the ballot submitted two separate and distinct propositions for the voters to pass judgment upon jointly, the proceeding should be declared void. 29 C.J.S., Elections, § 170, p. 246. The test is whether the several parts of the proposition are plainly and naturally so related or connected that, united, they form in fact but one united, rounded whole, and may be logically viewed as parts or aspects of a single plan. If so, or if they are dependent one upon the other, they may be grouped together and submitted as one propositions: if not, and if they have to do with different subjects which are so unrelated and incongruous and their association so artificial as to constitute logrolling and a fraud upon the voter, separate submissions are required. Hart v. Board of Education of Nevada School Dist., 299 Mo. 36, loc. cit. 39, 252 S.W. 441, 442; Willis v. School Dist. of Sedalia, 299 Mo. 446, 253 S.W. 741; State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Hall, 335 Mo. 1097, 75 S.W.2d 578; Kellams v. Compton, Mo.Sup., 206 S.W.2d 498.
The submission of propositions containing more than one project has been approved in a number of cases. The typical situation is a proposition to issue bonds. The following submissions of bond issues have been held to be single and therefore permissible: to erect and furnish two school buildings, one on one site and one on another, State ex rel. Becker v. Smith, supra; to erect and construct athletic field bleachers, a 16 room high school building and a 4 room elementary school, Kellams v. Compton, supra; to construct, maintain and operate or purchase an electric light plant, State ex rel. Town of Canton v. Allen, 178 Mo. 555, 77 S.W. 868; to purchase schoolhouse sites, erect schoolhouses and furnish the same, and building additions to and repair old buildings, Willis v. School Dist. of Sedalia, supra; to purchase a site for a new school building, erect a building thereon, provide furniture and heating plant therefor, provide heating plants for old school buildings, purchase a site, and erect a school building for Negroes, State ex rel. Carrollton School Dist. No. 1, Tp. 53, R. 23 v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 547, 133 S.W. 44; to build a new schoolhouse and for additions and repairs to the old schoolhouse, Robinson v. Wiese, Mo. Sup., 210 S.W. 889; to repair, remodel and equip the school building, Beauchamp v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 4, Livingston County, 297 Mo. 64, 247 S.W. 1004; to build new buildings and additional buildings, Hart v. Board of Education of Nevada School Dist., 299 Mo. 36, 252 S.W. 441; to build a courthouse, to equip and furnish it and to purchase more ground if more ground were needed for a suitable site, State ex rel. Wahl v. Speer, 284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655; to build a schoolhouse in the first ward and furnish the same and to build an addition to and improve the schoolhouse in the second ward, State ex rel. School Dist. of Memphis v. Gordon, 223 Mo. 1, 122 S.W. 1008. See also 4 A.L.R.2d 617, loc. cit. 624. In these cases, as in cases wherein the several propositions contained in a single submission were interdependent, e.g. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Hall, supra, it is held that the rule prohibiting doubleness is not violated.
We have concluded that the submission in the instant case does not violate the rule. The question of the release of the western end and middle section of District R-1 involves propositions which are plainly and naturally related and connected. They both involve detachment of territory from the same district, for the same purpose. Inherent in both is the common question of the adequacy of high school facilities in District R-1 and in the proposed annexing districts, as well as the matter of transportation of students to convenient and suitable high schools. Taken together they from one proposition, namely, the question whether all of the territory west of a certain line in the district shall be released for annexation to other districts. Logically the separate proposals may be viewed as aspects of a single plan, parts of a general scheme. Furthermore, the two proposals of necessity are interlocked and interdependent. The question of the release of the western end of District R-1 was dependent upon the question of the release of the middle section of District R-1. Likewise the question of the release of the middle section of District R-1 would have been dependent upon how the vote resulted on the proposition to release the western end of the district. A favorable vote on the former could not have stood unless a favorable vote had resulted on the latter proposition. If the two propositions had been submitted on separate ballots and the proposition to release the middle section of the district had carried and that territory had been accepted by the board of directors of District R-3, while the proposition had failed as to the release of the western end of the district, an anomalous and irreconcilable situation would have resulted, for in that event the district would have been divided into two separate and non-contiguous areas. In proceedings to release parts of school districts for annexation to other districts, the law does not contemplate that two portions of a district should be left entirely segregated from each other. See Howell v. Kinney, 99 Ga. 544, 27 S.E. 204, and Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. v. Town of Oconto, 50 Wis. 189, 6 N.W. 607. Paraphrasing the dissenting opinion in State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Callaghan v. Maitland, 296 Mo. 338, 246 S.W. 267, loc. cit. 275, (which dissent was declared to be the law in the later case of State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Hall, supra, 75 S.W.2d loc. cit. 581), sound public policy required that the proposition to release the two areas be linked inseparately, and the very reasons which argue against doubleness in submitting proposals argue for the submission of these two questions in one proposition and one ballot. To submit them separately would surely invite an administrative and procedural impasse.
The cases of State ex rel. Pike County v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 321, 188 S.W. 88, and State ex rel. City of Joplin v. Wilder, 217 Mo. 261, 116 S.W. 1087, cited by appellants, may be distinguished on the ground that the proposition to erect two courthouses in the former case and to construct a sanitary and a storm sewer system in the latter, were not inextricably woven together in such a manner as to make the one dependent upon the other.
Next, appellants contend that the court erred in holding that the offer of the board of directors of District R-3 to accept the territory only upon condition that it receive certain property and money from District R-1 did not constitute a rejection of the territory and divest the board of power to thereafter accept and annex the territory. It is urged that "a proposal to accept an offer on conditions not stated in the offer constitutes a rejection of the offer, and that the offered cannot thereafter, without the consent of the original offerer, withdraw his conditional acceptance and accept the original offer." This principle is not applicable in this situation. School districts concerned with release and annexation of territory are not free agents empowered to bargain to best advantage under the rules and principles applicable to contract law. Release and annexation of territory can be accomplished only in accordance with the statutory formula prescribed by the Legislature, § 165.300, supra, which in paragraph 3 specifically provides for the relinquishment by the part of the district annexed of all claim and title to any part of the school property and money on hand belonging to the original district. Section 432.070 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. provides that no school district shall make any contract unless the same shall be within the scope of its powers or expressly authorized by law. Any purported conditional acceptance by District R-3 of the territory released to it therefore was a nullity.
The only question remaining in the case is whether District R-3 was estopped to accept the territory for annexation and, if not, whether its acceptance was timely. Appellants assert an estoppel on the ground that District R-3 delayed its acceptance for more than two and one-half months and until after the annual school election required by law was held, as a result of which appellants and the taxpayers of District R-1 were adversely affected. It is urged that the delay prevented appellants from participating in the election of the board of District R-3 and prevented them from voting on the proposition to increase the levy which was passed at the annual school meeting. It is also urged that the delay in the acceptance caused District R-1 additional expense in the holding of the annual school elections in the areas later taken from it.
It is the policy of the courts to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to municipal corporations with great caution. State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. City of California v. Missouri Utilities Co., 339 Mo. 385, 96 S.W.2d 607, 106 A.L.R. 1169. Under § 165.300, subd. 2, supra, the board of directors exercises a governmental function in deciding in favor of annexation, and ordinarily the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked against a municipal or public corporation as to the exercise of governmental functions. See Missouri cases cited in 31 C.J.S., "Estoppel", § 141 b. footnote 96. While exceptions are sometimes made where justice and right demand it, Town of Montevallo v. Village School Dist. of Montevallo, 268 Mo. 217, 186 S.W. 1078; Consolidated School Dist. No. 2 of Pike County v. Cooper, Mo.App., 28 S.W.2d 384, certiorari quashed State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2 of Pike County v. Haid, 328 Mo. 729, 41 S.W.2d 806, the case at bar does not come within the exception to the rule. Since § 165.300, subd. 2, supra, fixes no particular time within which the board must act, a reasonable length of time is allowed. Until a reasonable length of time expired the board of directors had the absolute right to accept or reject jurisdiction over the territory, and no estoppel could be asserted on account of the failure of the board to act prior to the expiration of a reasonable length of time. The fact that annual meetings and tax levies are required by law to be held and submitted during the interim cannot be held to work an estoppel.
Appellants assert that the board delayed its action too long. We cannot say as a matter of law that the length of time between the notification and the acceptance was unreasonable. The board was notified sometime between February 26 and 29. The board accepted jurisdiction over the area on May 14. There were good reasons for delaying the acceptance until the end of the school term. The election was held in the last half of the school term. An immediate acceptance would have raised problems concerning the transfer of high school students from the Marthasville to the Warrenton and Hermann high schools and the payment of their expenses. District R-1 had collected taxes for the operation of the school for the entire school year and if the students had been transferred to Warrenton and Hermann only about fifteen or twenty pupils would have remained in the Marthasville High School. As pointed out by respondents, "The accepting districts did not set the date of election and should not be estopped because they acted in the best interest of the high school students."
The judgment of the circuit court sustaining the propriety, legality and validity of these proceedings and holding that the territory of District R-1 involved was properly released and annexed to and now forms a part of District R-3 was correct and proper in all respects, and the Commissioner recommends the affirmance of the judgment.
The foregoing opinion of HOUSER, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
The judgment of the circuit court is, accordingly, affirmed.
BENNICK, P. J., and ANDERSON and RUDDY, JJ., concur.