Because resolution of this issue involves a question of constitutional law, we must determine whether the District Court's interpretation of the law is correct. State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 21, 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 21, 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 21. ¶ 26 Double Jeopardy.

In reviewing constitutional challenges to legislative enactments, the "`constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 21, 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 21, 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Lorash (1989), 238 Mont. 345, 347, 777 P.2d 884, 886, quoting T W Chevrolet v. Darvial (1982), 196 Mont. 287, 292, 641 P.2d 1368, 1370). Thus, the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and, if any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the statute.

¶ 51 The statutory definition of a "crime of violence" is clear. "Where the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself." State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 19, 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 19, 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 19. Thus, whether or not Kern's crime falls under the definition is a question of fact to be answered by the trial court.

Thus, in contrast to § 45-9-110, MCA, the terms of § 45-9-132, MCA, are narrower in scope and address conduct that is collateral to the production of dangerous drugs. ¶ 15 In State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 32, 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 32, 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 32, we determined that individuals convicted of different offenses are not similarly situated for purposes of equal protection. We observed that while persons convicted of the same offense cannot be subjected to disparate sentences without a compelling justification, "it is quite another [thing] to hold that persons convicted of different criminal offenses . . . must be punished equally."

The State responds that good time credits are not a fundamental right and that this Court, and the majority of courts, apply the rational basis test to equal protection claims regarding statutes that provide sentence reducing credits. ¶ 34 McDermott does not explain how § 53-30-105, MCA (1993), implicates either his inalienable rights or his right to individual dignity. Physical liberty is a fundamental right which would normally trigger either a strict scrutiny analysis, State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 26, 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 26, 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 26, or, in the case of prisoners, application of the "reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest" standard. However, we have already determined that McDermott has no liberty interest in good time credits that might reduce the term of a constitutionally imposed sentence.

Strict scrutiny requires the government to show a compelling state interest for its action. See Henry, ¶ 29; State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 23, 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 23, 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 23; Davis, 282 Mont. at 241, 937 P.2d at 31. ¶ 18 Second, where the right in question has its origin in the Montana Constitution, but is not found in the Declaration of Rights, we employ a middle-tier scrutiny.

¶ 33 The WCC determined that Goble/Gerber's equal protection claim failed due to the lack of similarly situated classes. The WCC's determination was based largely on State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, 294 Mont. 527, 983 P.2d 893.Renee dealt with a statute which required a court to consider sentencing alternatives for non-violent felony offenders. Renee, ¶ 14.

See Matter of S.L.M. (1997), 287 Mont. 23, 32, 951 P.2d 1365, 1371. Holt's equal protection claim fails because he-a felon with a wholly suspended sentence-is not similarly situated to those felons who are incarcerated. In State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, 294 Mont. 527, 983 P.2d 893, we held that misdemeanor and felony offenders are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes and that it was not a denial of equal protection to deny misdemeanor offenders sentence review. Renee, ¶ 38. While Holt's suspended sentence subjects him to some loss of liberty, he is not similarly situated to those felons who are actually incarcerated.

¶ 22 The first prerequisite to a meritorious equal protection claim is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 27, 57 St.Rep. 545, ¶ 27. Under the requirements as here interpreted by DOR, an applicant need not be a property owner; the applicant need only have identified a location where the license will be used. Because Kiser has not described a manner in which similarly situated classes receive different treatment under the location requirement for beer/wine license applicants, he has not made a case for violation of his right to equal protection under the law. Nor has he shown it unreasonable to require an applicant for a liquor license to specify a proposed or existing location for purposes of determining whether the business will serve public convenience and necessity.