Ellison v. State, 313 Ga. 107, 110 (868 S.E.2d 189) (2022). Just as we accept a jury's conclusion with respect to a defendant's self-defense claim at trial if there is competent evidence supporting that determination, in reviewing the grant of immunity, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations "if there is any evidence to support them." State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 298 (3) (840 S.E.2d 385) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis added). In doing so, . . . we may consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such as facts indisputably discernible from a videotape.
A trial court "may dismiss criminal charges without prejudice for want of prosecution." State v. Remy , 308 Ga. 296, 301 (4), 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020). That authority is a corollary of "the trial court's power to control proceedings within its jurisdiction."
("[U]nder [OCGA § 16-11-138], if the jury believed that Appellant was acting in self-defense when he shot [the deceased], the jury was required to acquit him of felony murder based on felonin-possession.") (citing State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 300 (3) (b) (840 S.E.2d 385) (2020); Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. 141, 145 (839 S.E.2d 521) (2020)). Whether Brundage illegally possessed a firearm before or after the shooting is simply not relevant to his claim of self-defense as to the murder and felony murder charges against him.
"Prior to 2014, a felon in possession of a firearm generally could not assert a claim for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 for crimes involving the use of deadly force." State v. Remy , 308 Ga. 296, 296, 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020). However, at the time of Pope's crimes in December 2014, a felon like Pope, who was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131, was "no longer categorically precluded by the final clause of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 from seeking immunity from criminal prosecution under that statute," Remy , 308 Ga. at 297, 840 S.E.2d 385, and Pope's status as a convicted felon would not preclude a finding of immunity as a matter of law.
Thus, under this statute, if the jury believed that Appellant was acting in self-defense when he shot Ortiz, the jury was required to acquit him of felony murder based on felon-in-possession. See generally State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 300, 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020) (stating that under OCGA § 16-11-138, if defendant, who was convicted felon, was acting in self-defense at the time of the shooting, "it cannot be said that he was committing a felony when he shot [the victim]." (cleaned up)).
And we have held that a trial court errs when it refuses to consider before trial an immunity motion that was filed before trial. State v. Remy , 308 Ga. 296, 297 (2), 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020).
On appeal, "we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we accept the trial court's findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them." State v. Remy , 308 Ga. 296, 298 (3), 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted). And "a trial court is not required to credit testimony merely because it is unrebutted.
This Court has previously recognized as much. See State v. Remy , 308 Ga. 296, 301, 840 S.E.2d 385 (2020) (stating that trial courts "may dismiss criminal charges without prejudice for want of prosecution" (citing State v. Bachan , 321 Ga. App. 712, 742 S.E.2d 526 (2013) )); In the Interest of M.D.H. , 300 Ga. 46, 52, 793 S.E.2d 49 (2016) (citing Court of Appeals decision "holding in the criminal context that before jeopardy attaches, the remedy for failure to prosecute a case is dismissal without prejudice"). Moreover, the State and its amici point to no statute that purports to eliminate or limit this longstanding practice, and we see no compelling reason to disturb the well-established law in this area.
As a result, when the State elected to retry Hamilton, she was free to seek immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 before any new trial was conducted. Id. at 565–66; see State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 840 S.E.2d 385, 388–89 (2020) (reiterating that a defendant may file a motion for immunity after a mistrial is declared because a mistrial is the equivalent of no trial at all). Although the defendants in both Hamilton and Remy had not previously had immunity hearings, the court in each found the mistrial restarted the clock on the defendant’s ability to request immunity.
Id. at 565-66; see State v. Remy, 840 S.E.2d 385, 388-89 (Ga. 2020) (reiterating that a defendant may file a motion for immunity after a mistrial is declared because a mistrial is the equivalent of no trial at all). Although the defendants in both Hamilton and Remy had not previously had immunity hearings,