Opinion
KENCD-CR-2022-,237
04-06-2023
STATE OF MAINE v. QUINONES REMBERT, Defendant
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
BRENT DAVIS CHIEF JUDGE
Defendant is charged with Domestic Violence Assault, Class C, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1). On January 3, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress. This motion came before the Court on March 9, 2023, for an evidentiary hearing. The Court heard evidence and argument on the issues and reviewed written submissions from both parties.
Defendant argues that statements made to law enforcement officers should be suppressed because he was placed in custody before administration of Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). Defendant argues that statements made after waiving his Miranda rights should also be suppressed, because the statements were not voluntary. The State argues the statements are admissible because defendant was not in custody and all statements were voluntary.
FACTS
On July 8, 2022, Detective Derrek Daley of the Augusta police department was assigned the investigation of an allegation that Quinones Rembert committed domestic violence assault days earlier, on July 4, 2022. The Detective went to defendant's last known residence on July 8, then later left defendant a message asking him to come to the Augusta Police Department to discuss a different case involving defendant's property. Defendant agreed to come to the Augusta Police Department to meet with Detective Daley. Defendant drove himself to the police department and walked freely with a detective escort into the interview room. Another detective, Christopher Gay, was already in the interview room. The interview was recorded and entered into evidence. (State's Ex. 2.)
Detective Daley explained that he was closing the door for privacy, asked if defendant goes by a nickname, and introduced his colleague. Detective Daley then said,
[s]o, we've got the issue with the case of your property but also another reason that I want to talk to you is about an issue on the fourth, between you and Anne. I have a feeling just by your reaction coming in here, I had a feeling that you had a feeling I had some questions about what happened on the fourth.
(State's Ex. 2.) Defendant then stated, "I got drunk and made a mistake." (State's Ex. 2.)
At this point, Detective Daley said that it seemed like defendant was a good guy and he wanted to get defendant's side of the story. (State's Ex. 2.) Detective Daley testified that defendant looked upset, like he was about to cry. Defendant began to speak, "I wish I could tell you..." when Detective Daley interrupted that he wanted to get to what defendant remembered, and wanted to hear what defendant had to say, but first he had to read defendant his rights. Detective Daley read the Miranda rights to defendant and defendant both verbally agreed and signed a waiver of his Miranda rights before continuing. (State's Ex. 1.)
The time between when defendant entered the interview room and when Detective Daley said he had to read defendant's rights before continuing was brief, fewer than two minutes. The tone of Detective Daley was polite and compassionate, not aggressive. While the door to the interview room was closed, defendant had an unobstructed path to the unlocked door and was not physically restrained.
DISCUSSION
A statement made to a law enforcement officer is not admissible as evidence if the defendant is in custody and subject to interrogation without receiving a warning of the defendant's rights against self-incrimination. See State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶¶ 52-53,1. A.3d 455, 464; see also Miranda at 478-479. Whether or not a Miranda violation has occurred, once a defendant waives his Miranda rights, subsequent statements are admissible only if given knowingly and voluntarily. See State v. Smith, 675 A.2d 93, 97 (Me. 1996) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985)).
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The Law Court held in State v. Holloway that "a person not subject to formal arrest may be 'in custody' if 'a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave' or if there was a 'restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746, 750 (quoting State v. Holloway, 2000 ME 172, ¶ 14, 760 A.2d 223, 228). In State v. Michaud, the Law Court outlined ten factors that, viewed in totality, may determine whether the defendant was in custody, including:
1. The locale where the defendant made the statements;
2. The party who initiated the contact;
3. The existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);
4. Subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
5. Subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
6. The focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);
7. Whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
8. The number of law enforcement officers present;
9. The degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect;
10. The duration and character of the interrogation.State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746, 750-751 (quoting State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222,1226) (citing Holloway at ¶ 19).
The factors that weigh in favor of a reasonable person in defendant's shoes feeling free to leave include: defendant was not in handcuffs or otherwise physically restrained; the detective explained the door was closed for privacy; two detectives were in the room but only Detective Daley conversed with defendant; the portion of the interview before Miranda warnings were given lasted fewer than two minutes and the detective was polite and conversational. The defendant drove himself to the police department and walked through the front door to attend the interview. Further, once in the room, defendant had a clear path to leave through the unlocked door. Lastly, the detectives did not mention probable cause to arrest or state any evidence related to the allegations that would cause a reasonable person to think they were in custody. Cf. State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 27-33, 829 A.2d 247, 255-57 (custodial interrogation when officers made false and misleading statements about evidence while defendant was without shoes or means of transportation).
The factors that weigh against a reasonable person in defendant's shoes feeling free to leave include: the interview was conducted at a police station; the detective initiated the interview; and the defendant entered the police station with a belief that the focus of the interview concerned a property issue of which he was the victim but was then told the officers also wanted to discuss the alleged domestic violence assault. While Detective Daley initiated contact with defendant, defendant drove himself to the police station to cooperate with the officers. Cf. State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶¶ 19-22 (defendant not in custody when defendant was required to report to the probation officer but was cooperative).
In totality, the factors weigh in favor of a reasonable person in defendant's shoes feeling free to leave. Defendant was not physically restrained in any way, defendant drove himself to the police station to cooperate with the officers and was met with a brief, calm, non-confrontational conversation with the detective. Defendant's Miranda rights were not violated.
II. VOLUNTARINESS
While no Miranda violation occurred, defendant nevertheless argues that the statements made after waiving Miranda rights were involuntary and should be suppressed. In determining if a statement is voluntary, and therefore admissible, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement made was voluntary. See State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 24, 97 A.3d 106, 113; Me. Const, art. I, § 6. A voluntary statement "is the result of defendant's exercise of his own free will and rational intellect, as opposed to one that results from threats, promises, or inducements made to the defendant." State v. Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d 1104, 1109-10.
The court must look at a totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of the confession, including:
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police
Any false pretenses to have the defendant go to the police station for an interview on a different matter do not amount to trickery or coercive tactics. Cf. State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶¶ 8,11, 755 A.2d 1075, 1078-79 (law enforcement officer mislead defendant stating information provided was confidential). When the detective politely and non-confrontationally directed the conversation to the fourth of July, defendant was fully aware of the interview's focus, and the officers actions did not motivate defendant to confess. The State proved that defendant's statement was an exercise of his own free will and rational intellect despite the defendant's emotions. See State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 12, 704 A.2d 387, 391 (statements made while a defendant was upset and crying during interrogation were voluntary).
In sum, this court finds that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's confession was made voluntarily.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds defendant's Miranda rights were not violated because he was not in custody. Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated as the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statements were voluntary.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's statements are admissible as evidence and the pending Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED. The Clerk may incorporate this order into the docket by reference.