Opinion
2111005390
05-23-2024
STATE OF DELAWARE v. JEFFREY BONIFACIO REED, Defendant.
Colleen E. Durkin, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
Submitted: May 16, 2024
Colleen E. Durkin, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING DEFENDANT JEFFREY BONIFACIO REED'S SECOND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT, TREATED AS A SECOND MOTION UNDER SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL RULE 61.
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
This 23rd day of May, 2024, upon consideration of the second Motion to Vacate Sentence ("Motion") filed by Defendant Jeffery Bonifacio Reed ("Reed") and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. Reed was indicted in an eight count indictment on the charges of Strangulation, two counts, Unlawful Imprisonment Second Degree, Assault Third Degree, Terroristic Threatening, Unlawful Imprisonment First Degree, Assault First Degree, and Non-compliance with Conditions of Bond. On May 15, 2023, Reed entered a guilty plea to the Non-Compliance with Conditions of Bond charge, a class G felony. He was sentenced immediately to two years at Level V, effective November 24, 2021, suspended for one year at Level III. Special conditions of probation included no contact with Karen Clark, mental health and Domestic Violence Coordinating Council ("DVCC") approved evaluations and, if necessary, treatment. The State entered nolle prosequis on the reaming charges.
2. The Motion essentially incomprehensible. It consists of an unnotarized five-page "affidavit" that appears to allege that Reed's attorney was ineffective in connection with Reed's entry of his guilty plea.
D.I. 24.
3. To the extent Reed seeks to set aside a judgment of conviction, his exclusive remedy is through a motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.Therefore, the Court treats this motion as a Rule 61 postconviction relief motion.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(a)(1) and (2).
4. Before addressing the merits of a defendant's motion for postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
4. Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for post-conviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, procedural default, or former adjudication. A motion exceeds time limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the right was first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme Court. A second or subsequent motion is considered successive and therefore barred and subject to summary dismissal unless the movant was convicted after a trial and "pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that the movant is actually innocent" or "pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction ... invalid."Grounds for relief "not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction" are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show "cause for relief' and "prejudice from [the] violation." Grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including "proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing" are barred.
Super. Ct. Crim. R, 61 (i).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 6l(i)(1).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i)(3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i)(4).
5. The bars to relief do not apply either to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual innocence, or that a new retroactively applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid. The bars remain applicable here because the Reed has not claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction, nor has he met the pleading requirements of Rule 61 (d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(h), 6. The motion is barred under Rule 61 (i)(2)(i) as a second or subsequent motion. His previous motion seeking to vacate his judgment of conviction was denied on August 15, 2023. Reed has not argued that the bar is inapplicable.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (d)(2)(i) and (ii).
7. It appears that Reed is not incarcerated, but because his motion is barred, the Count need not determine whether Reed is a person "in custody" and, thus, eligible to seek relief under Rule 61.
8. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief. It is plain from the Motion and the record in this case that the Reed is not entitled to relief. THEREFORE, Defendant Jeffrey Bonifacio Reed's second Motion to Vacate Judgment is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
IT IS SO ORDERED.