The court elaborated: “It appears that under Washington state law, the attorney general has the power to obtain documents from non-party state agencies. See State v. Reed, 429 F.2d 870, 872 (Wash. 1967) (en banc) (stating “since the attorney general of the state is the legally-constituted adviser on legal matters to the [non-party] superintendent of the state hospital and the director of institutions (RCW 43.10.030, 040), a request-upon notice to the defendant-to the attorney general to instruct and advise the superintendent may have [obtained the evidence]”).” Id.

It appears that under Washington state law, the attorney general has the power to obtain documents from non-party state agencies. See State v. Reed, 429 F.2d 870, 872 (Wash. 1967) (en banc) (stating "since the attorney general of the state is the legally-constituted adviser on legal matters to the [non-party] superintendent of the state hospital and the director of institutions (RCW 43.10.030, 040), a request-upon notice to the defendant-to the attorney general to instruct and advise the superintendent may have [obtained the evidence]"). The United States has not cited any New Mexico law showing that the New Mexico Attorney General has the power to compel other state agencies to produce documents.

See Dkt. 113 at 7-9, citing Wilson v. State of Washington, No. C16-5366 BHS, 2017 WL 518615, at *3 (W.D.Wash. Feb. 8, 2017), State v. Reed, 429 P.2d 870, 872 (1967); and Dkt. 118 at 4, citing to United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 1:10-cv-04496, 2011 WL 13073683, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011); Colorado v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. III, Ltd., No. 05-2182, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C.May 8, 2007). In this Court's view, where the plaintiff is the State of Washington, discovery addressed to the State of Washington includes its agencies.

The court has inherent power to order a psychiatric examination when mental condition is in issue. Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112 (1960); State v. Reed, 71 Wn.2d 550, 429 P.2d 870 (1967). Gerdau nevertheless contends that the procedure was basically unfair since a psychiatric examination conducted during the time of trial is unreliable because of the emotional stress under which any defendant labors during trial and also because it deprived him of the opportunity to research the background of such expert witness.

In resolving the legal problems presented in this issue we are almost brought to grips with serious questions facing our criminal courts today: (1) does the superior court have inherent power to order a cooperative psychiatric examination on behalf of the state when a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and, (2) if the defendant does not choose to cooperate with the psychiatric examination, what should the court do to assure a fair trial to the state as well as to the defendant? Our Supreme Court has made no resolution of these questions, but by way of dictum in State v. Reed, 71 Wn.2d 550, 429 P.2d 870 (1967) stated: "where a plea of mental irresponsibility is entered or where it is asserted by the defendant that he is incompetent to stand trial, the court has the inherent power to order the defendant examined by psychiatrists." Our jurisdiction has not had the occasion to determine whether the defendant must cooperate with the examination and if he does not, what sanctions may be imposed.

It would appear that the State had no other means of obtaining this report than by the motion procedure it followed at trial. Compare State v. Reed, 71 Wn.2d 550, 429 P.2d 870 (1967). There is no showing from the record that the disclosure of this report in any way constituted a violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.