¶ 4 Interpreting the statute, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on an alternative ground. See State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 233-34 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). Focusing on the statute's reference to dead bodies "buried or otherwise interred," the court held that this phrase required proof that the body had been intentionally deposited "into a place designated for its repose." Redd, 954 P.2d at 234.
It reasoned that the statute refers only to dead bodies "buried or otherwise interred" and that this meant that one element of the crime was proof that the body had been intentionally placed "into a place designated for its repose." State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). The court of appeals held that the State had failed to prove that element of the charged crime. The State petitioned for a rehearing, contending that the court should have taken judicial notice of the fact that midden areas were used as burial grounds by the Anasazi.
" Gull Lab., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). "When a statute fails to define a word, we rely on the dictionary to divine the `usual meaning.'"State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (quoting Gull Lab., 936 P.2d at 1084). ¶ 10 Webster's Dictionary defines "gas" as "a fluid that has neither independent shape nor volume but tends to expand indefinitely."
Only speculation, ungrounded in the evidence, points to his intention to actually facilitate Cardon's securing cocaine. Cf. State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 236 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (affirming dismissal of charges where prosecution failed to present enough evidence at preliminary hearing to permit reasonable inference that unearthed bones were intentionally buried). ¶ 15 The State is correct in its assertions that at a preliminary hearing all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and that the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor.
We find defendant's argument that this language meant to exclude an expansive category of family members unpersuasive, especially in light of the "who have been living in the household" language. See State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) ("[A]ny interpretation of statutory language that would nullify other statutory provisions is improper."). In addition, the specification of persons presumed to occupy a position of special trust is not exclusive, as indicated by the phrase "includes, but is not limited to," and can apply to anyone not explicitly excluded.
See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) ("The statutes . . . and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."); State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) ("[A]ny interpretation of statutory language that would nullify other statutory provisions is improper."); Ferro v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (rejecting interpretation that would "rewrite the Act and impermissibly render [another section] a complete nullity"). Without the requirement that the claims be substantially the same, a lazy plaintiff could easily avoid the diligence that statutes of limitation are meant to promote by filing an action at the eleventh hour against anybody; then filing a notice of dismissal before service or obtaining a dismissal for failure to prosecute, using the extra time to figure out who to sue; and then filing a new complaint a year later.