Moreover, in State v. Reaves, this Court held that a criminal contempt adjudication does not constitute a "prior conviction" for purposes of the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act. 142 N.C.App. 629, 633, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001). We stated, "Had the General Assembly intended that criminal contempt adjudications as well as misdemeanors be considered ‘crimes,’ so as to qualify as ‘prior conviction’ under G.S. § 15A–1340.11(7), it would have been a simple matter [for it] to [have] include[d] th[at] explicit phrase within the statutory amendment."
This Court has previously held that "the General Assembly did not intend an adjudication of criminal contempt to constitute a `prior conviction' for sentencing purposes under G.S. § 15A-1340.21." State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 633, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001). This Court reasoned that "[h]ad the General Assembly intended that criminal contempt adjudications as well as misdemeanors be considered `crimes,' so as to qualify as `prior conviction' under G.S. § 15A-1340.
"Criminal contempt . . . `is a term applied where the judgment is in punishment of a? [completed] act . . . tending to interfere with the administration of justice[.]'" State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 632, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001) (citation omitted). As such, "`criminal [contempt] proceedings are those brought to preserve the power and to vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its processes or orders.'"
The State concedes the trial court erred when it counted Defendant's criminal contempt adjudication as a prior misdemeanor conviction to determine Defendant's prior record level. See State v. Reaves , 142 N.C. App. 629, 633, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001) ("we conclude the General Assembly did not intend an adjudication of criminal contempt to constitute a ‘prior conviction’ for sentencing purposes under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 15A-1340.21."). The trial court counted Defendant's prior criminal contempt adjudication as a prior Class 1 misdemeanor conviction.
But, the disobedience of the court and its business can occur during recess or may not necessarily occur while the court is in session. State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 633, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001). Finally, Defendant argues the record is devoid of the particulars of the offense and contains only conclusions that Defendant's actions were contemptuous. Defendant relies on the case of Rose's Stores v. Tarrytown Center, 270 N.C. 206, 154 S.E.2d 313 (1967).
“ ‘[C]riminal [contempt] proceedings are those brought to preserve the power and to vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its processes or orders.’ " State v. Reaves, 142 N.C.App. 629, 633, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001) (quoting Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 123, 84 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1954) ). “Direct criminal contempt is ‘committed within the sight or hearing of a presiding judicial official [,]’N.C. Gen.Stat. § 5A-13(a)(1) (2005) , while indirect criminal contempt ‘arises from matters not occurring in or near the presence of the court, but which tend to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice.’ " State v. Simon, __ N.C.App. __, __ 648 S.E.2d 853, 855 (2007) (quoting Atassi v. Atassi, 122 N.C.App. 356, 361, 470 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1996) ).
"Accordingly, `criminal [contempt] proceedings are those brought to preserve the power and to vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its processes or orders.'" State v. Randell, 152 N.C. App. 469, 473, 567 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2002) (quoting State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 632-33, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001)). Direct criminal contempt is "committed within the sight or hearing of a presiding judicial official[,]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13(a)(1) (2005), while indirect criminal contempt "arises from matters not occurring in or near the presence of the court, but which tend to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice. "
"As a criminal sentencing statute, the Act must be strictly construed." State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 632, 544 S.E.2d 253, 255 (2001). The trial court sentenced defendant for his convictions of larceny of a firearm, larceny of an automobile and breaking and entering an automobile, before recessing for lunch.
A defendant has been adjudged guilty when the jury returns a guilty verdict. State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 544 S.E.2d 253 (2001) (citing State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App. 418, 420, 268 S.E.2d 879, 881, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980)). Thus, defendant was adjudged a habitual felon when the jury returned its guilty verdict.
]" Accordingly, "[c]riminal [contempt] proceedings are those brought to preserve the power and to vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its processes or orders."State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 632-33, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2001) (citations omitted). North Carolina has not dealt with the question of whether a refusal to rise while court is adjourning and leaving the courtroom is sufficient grounds for contempt. While federal courts have taken differing positions, see, e.g.