Opinion
No. 36167-1-II.
January 2, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 06-8-02378-9, John A. McCarthy, J., entered February 14, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Bridgewater, J.
RC appeals his juvenile court second degree robbery adjudication. He challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence, arguing that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential element of force. He also argues that we should reverse because the trial court cited an unpublished appellate opinion. We affirm.
Under RAP 3.4, we change the title of the case to the juvenile's initials. Accordingly, this opinion uses initials for the juvenile and his family to protect the juvenile's rights to confidentiality.
FACTS
James Mork was walking to his sales job at Zumiez, a shop in the Tacoma [Mall] He saw RC and another boy grab two jackets each from a rack at the front of the store and run out with the jackets. Mork ran after the boys to retrieve the stolen jackets, and grabbed RC's backpack. RC stopped abruptly, and Mork fell into him. RC dropped the jackets, said, "Get off of me," and punched Mork in the face. Two shoppers tackled RC and restrained him while Mork ran after the other boy.
A Tacoma Mall security officer responded to the scene, handcuffed RC, and helped him off the ground. Underneath RC, he found two jackets with tags. The security officer led RC to the mall security office. A Tacoma police officer arrived and read RC his Miranda warnings. RC told the officer that he had picked up the jackets after his friend dropped them and was walking away when someone grabbed his backpack.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The juvenile court found the State's witnesses credible and RC not credible. It concluded that (1) RC had not abandoned the jackets, (2) he had used force in order to retain possession of the jackets, and (3) therefore, he had committed second degree robbery. The court committed RC to 80 to 100 weeks in juvenile custody, and it ordered RC to pay monetary penalties and to write a letter of apology.
RC appeals.
ANALYSIS I. Sufficiency of Evidence
RC argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that he used force to take or to retain the jackets from Zumiez. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer to the fact finder on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75.
B. Johnson
Robbery occurs when a defendant uses force or the threat of force (1) to take property, (2) to retain unlawfully taken property, or (3) to overcome resistance to the taking of property. RCW 9A.56.190; State v. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d 609, 610, 121 P.3d 91 (2005).
RC relies on Johnson to argue that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he used force in retaining the jackets. In Johnson, our Supreme Court held that the use of force while attempting to escape after theft is not a robbery. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 611. But Johnson is distinguishable from the present case. Johnson abandoned the stolen property before using force in an attempt to escape.
Johnson loaded a television-video cassette recorder into a shopping cart and pushed the cart out of a Wal-Mart without paying for it. After two security guards confronted him, he abandoned the property, started to run away, but then turned back. When one of the guards grabbed his arm, Johnson turned, punched the guard in the face, and ran away, without taking any stolen property with him. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 610. Because Johnson had abandoned the television and was attempting to escape when he punched the guard, the Court held that his use of force did not relate to the taking of property or the retaining of stolen property. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 611.
In contrast, here, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that RC did not abandon the stolen property: (1) RC never attempted to escape from the mall without the jackets in his arms; (2) Mork testified that he tried to detain RC by grabbing onto RC's backpack and that RC let the jackets fall to the ground only after Mork had grabbed the backpack; and (3) the jackets were on the floor near RC when he punched Mork. These facts provide sufficient support for the juvenile court's finding that, although RC dropped the jackets, he did not intend to abandon them.
We hold, therefore, that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding the essential elements of the charged second degree robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Citation of Unpublished Opinion
RC next contends that the juvenile court committed reversible error when it referred to an unpublished opinion in its oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. This argument fails.
We agree with RC that "unpublished opinions have no precedential value and should not be cited or relied upon in any manner." Skamania County v. Woodall, 104 Wn. App. 525, 536 n. 11, 16 P.3d 701, review denied, 144 Wn.2d 1021 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980 (2002). Nevertheless, trial courts unavoidably view unpublished opinions as instructive, even though those opinions have no precedential value. State v. Sanchez, 74 Wn. App. 763, 765, 875 P.2d 712 (1994), review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1022 (1995). Here, although the juvenile court briefly discussed an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion, the court relied on published opinions, including Johnson, for its conclusions of law. We find no reversible error.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
HOUGHTON, C.J.
BRIDGEWATER, J.