The judge must charge the essential elements of the offense. S. v. Gilbert, 230 N.C. 64, 51 S.E.2d 887; S. v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397, 162 S.E. 899; S. v. Eunice, 194 N.C. 409, 139 S.E. 774; S. v. McDonald, 133 N.C. 680, 45 S.E. 582. When a judge undertakes to define the law, he must state it correctly, and if he does not, it is prejudicial error sufficient to warrant a new trial.

By the terms of the statute an essential element of the crime charged was that it be done willfully and wantonly or for a fraudulent purpose. S. v. McDonald, 133 N.C. 680, 45 S.E. 582; S. v. Morgan, 136 N.C. 628, 48 S.E. 670; S. v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 793, 108 S.E. 756; S. v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397, 162 S.E. 899; S. v. McLean, 209 N.C. 38, 182 S.E. 700. True, the court at the outset of his charge stated generally the language of the bill of indictment, but nowhere else was any reference made to the elements of the offense necessary to be found by the jury before they could convict, and at the close of the charge the jury was clearly and pointedly instructed that there were "just two things" for them to find, that the house was burned and that it was burned at the instance and request of the defendant.

Such intent may be shown by direct evidence, or by evidence of facts and circumstances from which it may reasonably be inferred. State v. Lancaster, 202 N.C. 204; State v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397; 20 C. J., 487. We find no error in the refusal of the court below to permit the defendant to answer the question "whether or not the Central Carolina Oil Company, Inc., got value received for every dollar represented for that check."

The intent to defraud is no more implied in a case of embezzlement than the felonious intent is from the act of taking in a case of larceny. . . . It follows, therefore, from what we have said that if the mere act of taking will not raise the presumption of a felonious intent in a prosecution for a larceny, there can be no valid reason why the act of conversion should do so in the trial of an indictment for embezzlement." See S. v. Morgan, 136 N.C. 628; 48 S.E. 670; S. v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 793, 108 S.E. 756; S. v. Grace, 196 N.C. 280, 115 S.E. 399; S. v. Lancaster, 202 N.C. 204, 162 S.E. 367; S. v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397, 162 S.E. 899. In order to secure evidence of corrupt intent or fraudulent purpose the State went into the defendant's camp.

" Where the intent is an ingredient of the crime, the rule is different. It is said in S. v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397 (399): "The fraudulent intent in this case was a question of fact for determination by the jury and not an inference of law for the decision of the court." The jury rendered a verdict of guilty. The verdict was a general one.

PER CURIAM. The case is controlled by S. v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397, 162 S.E. 899, where a similar instruction, which failed to include the element of fraudulent intent, was held for error. New trial.

On this appeal it was held that defendant was entitled to a new trial for error in the instructions of the court to the jury. S. v. Rawls, 202 N.C. 397, 162 S.E. 899. The action was again tried at April Term, 1932, of the Superior Court of Pitt County.

Intent is a question of fact for a jury to decide. State v. Rawls,202 N.C. 397, 399, 162 S.E. 899, 900 (1932).This argument is without merit.