Opinion
No. 3-143 / 02-0973.
Filed March 12, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, PETER B. NEWELL, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction of operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). AFFIRMED.
Christopher Kragnes and Tiffany Koenig, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Kasey Wadding, County Attorney, and Christine DeLorme, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Michael Ramker appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction of operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). He contends the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test. We review evidentiary issues for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sallis, 574 N.W.2d 15, 16 (Iowa 1998).
Iowa Code section 321J.6(1) sets forth the State's authority to request a chemical test for the purposes of determining alcohol concentration. Implied consent is invoked when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and one of the specified conditions listed in section 321J.6(1) exists. State v. Palmer, 554 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 1996). Ramker argues the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was intoxicated absent the preliminary breath test (pbt) result. He also asserts that the condition set forth in section 321J.6(1)(d), a pbt result indicating alcohol concentration of .10 or more, was not met because the field sobriety tests were improperly administered.
The district court found, and we agree, that even if the pbt results were invalid, the officer had lawfully arrested Ramker based on probable cause for a violation of section 321J.2, therefore invoking implied consent pursuant to section 321J.6(1)(a). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is being committed. State v. Horton, 625 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2001). Here, the officer observed empty beer cans and a cooler in the back of Ramker's truck. Ramker admitted to the officer that he had "a couple" of drinks. The officer observed an empty beer can on the passenger side of the vehicle. He also noticed Ramker's eyes were bloodshot and watery. The officer smelled the odor of alcoholic beverages inside the cab of Ramker's truck. While Ramker was seated in the officer's car, the officer noticed the smell of alcoholic beverages emanating from Ramker. The officer administered three field sobriety tests, and Ramker failed two. Although the officer testified he would not have arrested Ramker if he had not failed the pbt, the existence of probable cause is determined on an objective basis. See State v. Hofmann, 537 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Iowa 1995).
Ramker challenges the validity of the field sobriety tests. He claims the officer did not administer the tests in the prescribed standardized fashion. This allegation appears to be based on the officer's testimony. The officer said he did not know whether there is an allowable margin of error that a person can sway back and forth during the one leg stand test, the one test Ramker passed. Ramker failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, exhibiting four clues of intoxication. He does not assert any error in regard to this test. Finally, Ramker failed the walk and turn test because he did not turn as instructed and missed heel to toe contact on one step. Ramker espouses that his failure to turn as instructed is not a sign of intoxication. We conclude Ramker has failed to prove the officer improperly administered the field sobriety tests.
Probable cause existed to arrest Ramker prior to administering of the pbt. The requirements to invoke implied consent under section 321J.6(a) existed. Accordingly, the court properly denied Ramker's motion to suppress.