Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0356
12-05-2019
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JORGE ANTONIO RAMIREZ, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Janelle A. McEachern, Chandler Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. CR201700343
The Honorable James L. Conlogue, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Janelle A. McEachern, Chandler
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court in which Presiding Judge Staring and Chief Judge Vásquez concurred.
BREARCLIFFE, Judge:
¶1 Jorge Ramirez appeals his conviction for theft of a means of transportation. The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 11.25 years.
Issues
¶2 After the close of the state's case, Ramirez moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P. The trial court denied the motion, and Ramirez contends that the court erred in doing so. He further contends that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶3 "We review the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict[] and resolve inferences against the defendant." State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, ¶ 72 (2015). In April 2017, Cochise County Detective Todd Borquez was investigating a series of burglaries committed in the area of Hereford and Palominas, Arizona, including the theft of a tractor in 2016. The tractor was a New Holland brand tractor, stolen from K.L. and P.L., who purchased it in 2006 for approximately $25,550. During his investigation, Borquez interviewed Melissa Livingston, who admitted to stealing the tractor with Matthew Mullins. Mullins testified at trial that he was contacted by a man, John Henson, who asked him to steal a tractor with a bucket on the front, in exchange for a combination of money and drugs. Mullins knew where he could find such a tractor.
¶4 According to Mullins, when he took the tractor, it was painted blue and in good condition. After using a "pick key," or master key, for the ignition, Mullins and Livingston stole the tractor and drove it ten to fifteen miles to Henson's house that same night. Mullins testified that Henson had paid him $300 and had given him an ounce of methamphetamine for it. Mullins denied painting the tractor.
¶5 During the course of the investigation, Detective Borquez interviewed a number of individuals to gain information about the location of K.L. and P.L.'s stolen tractor. Through these interviews, Borquez obtained information that the tractor was located at Ramirez's residence. After gaining a search warrant, officers located a tractor behind a shed in Ramirez's backyard. That tractor's serial number matched that of the tractor stolen from K.L. and P.L.
¶6 The tractor was manufactured by New Holland and, before it was stolen, it had a keyed ignition and, as standard features, a blue paint job with white wheel rims. When Borquez found the tractor, the exterior surface had been painted green, although the underbody and surface under the hood were blue. The tractor wheel rims had been painted yellow and there was a toggle switch where a keyed ignition would be, which is not a standard feature of a New Holland tractor. The headlights, as well as the manufacturer and dealer plates and decals, including the plate bearing its serial number, were also painted green.
¶7 Borquez interviewed Ramirez after finding the tractor on his property. Although Ramirez knew Henson had a reputation for dealing in stolen property, Ramirez denied knowing the tractor was stolen, and claimed he bought it from Henson. In fact, Ramirez consistently referred to Henson as "Con John," Henson's nickname. Ramirez said that he had paid $1,500, along with trading a riding lawnmower. Ramirez said that he did not receive a title from Henson but did receive a bill of sale; however, law enforcement officers did not find a bill of sale after searching Ramirez's home, and neither side produced one at trial. Ramirez admitted he had installed a toggle switch in place of the keyed ignition because the key did not work. And, although he believed the key did not work because someone may have tried to steal the tractor, Ramirez told Borquez that he never made any effort to determine whether the tractor was stolen.
¶8 Henson's testimony at trial contradicted both Mullins's and Livingston's testimony and Ramirez's statements to Detective Borquez. Henson denied that he told Mullins and Livingston to steal the tractor, testified that it had already been painted green when Mullins and Livingston brought it to him, and that they told him the tractor was from Livingston's brother-in-law. Henson testified that Mullins and Livingston first brought the tractor to him one morning wanting to sell it, but Henson told Mullins that he did not "have that kind of money" to buy it. According to Henson, Mullins and Livingston asked him to take it to Ramirez to "see if he would be interested in it." Henson testified that Mullins and Livingston were asking between $3,000 and $4,000 for the tractor.
¶9 Henson had known Ramirez for ten years and lived a block away from him. Henson testified that he brought the tractor to Ramirez the same day Mullins and Livingston had delivered it to him. According to Henson, the tractor was in decent condition and had no mechanical issues. Although Mullins and Livingston were seeking $3,000 to $4,000 for the tractor, Henson said that Ramirez had only given him "$500 down" to give to Mullins and Livingston and said "they were going to work out the rest."
¶10 After the state rested, Ramirez moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20, arguing there was no substantial evidence to prove that he "either knew or should have known that [the] tractor was stolen." The trial court denied the motion, stating, "[t]here is substantial evidence to allow the case to go to the jury." The jury found Ramirez guilty. The court sentenced Ramirez as described above. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).
Analysis
¶11 We review a trial court's denial of a Rule 20 motion de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15 (2011). In such a review, "the controlling question is solely whether the record contains 'substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.'" Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)). Similarly, when a defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict, "[w]e review the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, 'viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict,'" State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, ¶ 22 (2007), and "we will not reweigh the evidence to decide whether we would have reached the same conclusion as the jury," State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 586 (1984).
¶12 "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that 'reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67 (1990) (quoting State v. Jones, 125 Ariz. 417, 419 (1980)). "Evidence may be direct or circumstantial." State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4 (1993). And "if reasonable minds can differ on inferences to be drawn" from the evidence, the Rule 20 motion should be denied, and the verdict sustained. Id. at 5. The relevant question in both examinations here "is whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, ¶ 24 (App. 2013) (quoting West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16).
¶13 A person is guilty of theft of a means of transportation if he "[c]ontrols another person's means of transportation knowing or having reason to know that the property is stolen." A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(5). Here, in arguing that there was no substantial evidence to show that he, in fact, stole the tractor or was aware that it was stolen, Ramirez points to "the several disconnecting parts in the allegations against [him]." Ramirez raises the inconsistencies in Mullins's and Henson's testimony about who initiated the theft, how much was asked for and given in exchange, and who painted the tractor and when. Ramirez seems to be arguing that the inconsistent testimony from the various state witnesses wholly undermined the state's case. This, however, is not the case.
¶14 Although there was conflicting testimony, the state nevertheless presented evidence such that reasonable persons could conclude that Ramirez knew or should have known that the tractor had been stolen. As the trial court observed in its denial of Ramirez's post-trial motion for new trial:
[The State] has correctly pointed to the paint on the tractor. There is conflicting testimony related to that. Mr. Mullins testified that it was not painted at the time that he delivered it to Mr. Henson, and all of the rest of the testimony is consistent that Mr. Henson delivered it to Mr. Ramirez later that same morning.
It's very unlikely that it would have been painted during that short period of time, although Mr. Henson did testify that it had been pain[t]ed. But either way, that is strong circumstantial evidence that the means of transportation was stolen. If it were painted prior to delivery with the headlights painted and everything else, a person would have known that it was stolen at that point.
Obviously if it were painted afterwards, that's strong circumstantial evidence that the person either knew or had reason to know that the property was stolen.
The evidence does support the jury's verdict.
¶15 In addition to the tractor's altered paint color, other substantial evidence supported the denial of the Rule 20 motion and the jury's verdict: Ramirez knew Henson had a reputation for dealing in stolen property. The tractor, which sold for $25,550 ten years earlier and was in good condition, was sold for either a mere $500 or $1,500 in cash plus a riding lawnmower (the value of which was not in the record), and Ramirez had to install a toggle switch ignition because even he suspected that someone may have damaged the keyed ignition trying to steal it. Collectively, these facts were sufficient to have, at the very least, made Ramirez suspect the tractor had been stolen. And from this evidence, a rational jury could conclude that Ramirez knew or should have known that the tractor was stolen.
¶16 Ultimately, regardless of the inconsistencies as to when the tractor was painted, and even as to the other facts surrounding the various transactions here, resolving inconsistencies are "matters for the jury's consideration in making its credibility determinations and weighing the evidence." Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, ¶ 39. The fact that evidence was introduced that contradicted the evidence relied upon by the state does not render the state's evidence insubstantial. State v. Manzanedo, 210 Ariz. 292, ¶ 3 (App. 2005).
Disposition
¶17 Because the trial court did not err in denying the Rule 20 motion and because there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, we affirm Ramirez's conviction and sentence.