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State v. Quinones

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Jun 18, 2012
DOCKET NO. A-4244-10T2 (App. Div. Jun. 18, 2012)

Opinion

DOCKET NO. A-4244-10T2

06-18-2012

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KEVIN QUINONES, a/k/a JOHN SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief). John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).


NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION


Before Judges Reisner and Simonelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 06-11-1926.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

Defendant Kevin Quinones appeals from the November 10, 2010 order, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2; second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b; and third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a, in exchange for an aggregate ten-year term of imprisonment subject to an eighty-five-percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The plea agreement also required the dismissal of other charges: second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1); three counts of fourth-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5); third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a; fourth-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(1); and fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(3).

The charges against defendant stemmed from a violent carjacking, police chase, and threats to police officers on September 4, 2006, which defendant claimed had occurred while he was under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP). Prior to the plea hearing, defense counsel retained a psychiatrist to evaluate defendant. In a January 31, 2007 written report, the psychiatrist noted that defendant had only been hospitalized once prior to the carjacking as a result of hearing voices after smoking PCP. The psychiatrist diagnosed defendant as suffering from polysubstance abuse and antisocial personality disorder. He concluded that defendant "has a good understanding of his charges and court procedures, and he is able to assist in his defense, if he so wishes." He also concluded that defendant's intoxication on the day of the crimes "in itself does not meet the criteria for the insanity defense in the State of New Jersey, since it was a voluntary intoxication."

At the plea hearing before Judge William Meehan on March 30, 2007, defendant acknowledged that he had discussed the plea agreement and its consequences with defense counsel; defense counsel had answered all of his questions about the plea; he was satisfied with counsel's services; he read, initialed, signed and understood the plea forms, which he reviewed with counsel; he understood the NERA and parole supervision consequences of the plea; he had no questions about the plea; he understood that a ten-year term of imprisonment was the minimum for the carjacking charge and he could receive a greater sentence if convicted of the charges; he entered the plea freely and voluntarily; no threats or promises were made to him; he fully understood what was taking place at the hearing; and he had ample time to meet with defense counsel prior to the hearing. Defendant also gave a factual basis for the plea.

At sentencing, defense counsel advised Judge Meehan of defendant's dismal upbringing, that defendant was under treatment for depression and "may" be diagnosed as having schizoaffective disorder, defendant had used PCP since the age of thirteen, and defendant's intoxication on the day of the incident contributed to his conduct.

Judge Meehan found and applied aggravating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(1), "[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner;" N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), "[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense;" N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6), "[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which he has been convicted;" N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9), "[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law;" and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(11), "[t]he imposition of a fine, penalty or order of restitution without also imposing a term of imprisonment would be perceived by the defendant or others merely as part of the cost of doing business, or as an acceptable contingent business or operating expense associated with the initial decision to resort to unlawful practices[.]" The judge relied on defendant's numerous juvenile delinquency adjudications and juvenile incarcerations, the nature of the crimes defendant committed in this matter, and the resulting serious injuries to the victim and property damage to another victim's vehicle into which defendant had crashed during the police chase. The judge found no mitigating factors. He sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement.

Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Instead, he filed a PCR petition, arguing that defense counsel was ineffective because she failed to (1) communicate with him; (2) adequately advise him of his constitutional rights; (3) explore an intoxication defense; (4) adequately explain the charges and guilty plea, thus forcing him to plead guilty; and (5) properly argue the aggravating and mitigating factors, resulting in an excessive sentence.

In an oral decision rendered on November 10, 2010, Judge Lois Lipton denied the petition, concluding that defendant failed to establish both prongs set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The judge reviewed the plea transcript and found that defendant had confirmed to Judge Meehan several times that he understood the plea terms and consequences, he had conferred with defense counsel, and he had voluntarily accepted the plea. Judge Lipton commented that this was "one of the most extensive plea colloquies that this [c]ourt can imagine." She concluded that defendant entered the plea "voluntarily with complete understanding of the charges and the consequences[,]" and there was "no issue of being . . . inadequately informed."

The judge found that defendant's voluntary intoxication was not a defense in this case, and defense counsel had explored intoxication and diminished capacity defenses when she retained the psychiatrist to evaluate defendant prior to the plea hearing. The judge also found that defendant gave a factual basis for the plea, which indicated his awareness, intent, and ability to commit the offenses charged. The judge also found that Judge Meehan had properly weighed the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, and defense counsel gave mitigating information at sentencing.

Finally, Judge Lipton noted that defendant received the minimum term for a first-degree crime, and could have faced a significantly greater sentence if convicted of the crimes charged. She concluded that "the imposition of the 10-year sentence was not even close to being excessive[,]" and defendant "got the benefit of a very favorable plea bargain." This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:

POINT ONE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
POINT TWO DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO DEFENDANT.
POINT THREE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AFFORD DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

For a defendant to establish a case of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that "[defense] counsel's performance was deficient," and that "there exists 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463-64 (1992) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698). Our Supreme Court approved that two-part test in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), in which it held that the federal standard for evaluating an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim approved in Strickland should apply in defining our state constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.

"When a guilty plea is part of the equation, [the Court has] explained that '[t]o set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (i) counsel's assistance was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (ii) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996)).

We have considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Lipton in her well-reasoned oral opinion rendered on November 10, 2010. However, we make the following brief comments.

The medical expert who evaluated defendant prior to the plea hearing did not diagnose him as suffering from any psychiatric or psychological condition that would have established an intoxication or diminished capacity defense, and in his PCR petition defendant offered no medical evidence to substantiate those defenses.

In addition, we are satisfied that defendant's sentence is not excessive. The record supports the judge's finding and application of aggravating and mitigating factors, and defendant received the minimum sentence for a first-degree crime.

Affirmed.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

CLERK OF THE APELLATE DIVISION


Summaries of

State v. Quinones

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Jun 18, 2012
DOCKET NO. A-4244-10T2 (App. Div. Jun. 18, 2012)
Case details for

State v. Quinones

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KEVIN QUINONES, a/k/a JOHN…

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Date published: Jun 18, 2012

Citations

DOCKET NO. A-4244-10T2 (App. Div. Jun. 18, 2012)