Opinion
No. 1-901 / 01-0136.
Filed April 24, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, JAMES P. RIELLY, Judge.
Christopher Quinn appeals his judgment and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession with intent to deliver and/or delivery of more than five grams of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee-State.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
The State charged Christopher Quinn with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession with intent to deliver and/or delivery of more than five grams of methamphetamine. Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999). Following his conviction on both charges, the district court sentenced him to a prison term not exceeding twenty-five years on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Quinn contends the court: (1) considered unproven charges in sentencing him; (2) did not provide reasons for imposing consecutive sentences; and (3) imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm.
I. Unproven Charges
Quinn maintains the district court impermissibly considered unproven charges listed in his presentence investigation report. He suggests that, absent this information, his criminal history would not have warranted imposition of two consecutive twenty-five year prison terms. Our review of this issue is on error. See State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 n. 1 (Iowa 2000).
The Iowa Supreme Court has held "[t]here is no general prohibition against considering other criminal activities by a defendant as factors that bear on the sentence to be imposed." State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000). Rather, "when a challenge is made to a criminal sentence on the basis that the court improperly considered unproven criminal activity, the issue presented is simply one of the sufficiency of the record to establish the matters relied on." Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d at 401. Cf. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Iowa 2002) (stating a court may not rely on unproven, unprosecuted charges unless admitted or facts show the offense was committed).
Here, we need not reach the question of the sufficiency of the record supporting the unproven charges because the court did not consider any unproven charges. See Formaro, 738 N.W.2d at 725 (refusing to draw inference of improper sentencing considerations not apparent in the record). The court only made general reference to Quinn's "prior criminal record" and his "history of ongoing criminal behavior." The presentence investigation report provided ample support for these two references, as it documented a prior felony conviction as well as twenty misdemeanor convictions. Accordingly, we reject Quinn's first challenge to his sentence.
II. Failure to State Reasons for Consecutive Sentences
Quinn next contends the court failed to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. Our review of this issue is for abuse of discretion. See State v. Oliver, 588 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1998). Immediately after the court announced it was imposing consecutive sentences, Quinn erupted with a string of expletives directed at the judge. The court thrice attempted to articulate its reasons for the sentence but was impeded by Quinn's diatribe. The court finally ordered Quinn removed from the room and proceeded to state its reasons for the sentence, as follows:
The factors why the Court believes the sentence just imposed is appropriate is the defendant's age and prior criminal record, the defendant's history of ongoing criminal behavior, the defendant's prior inability to perform under supervision as evidenced by the revocation of his probation on at least two prior occasions, the defendant's need for aggressive substance abuse treatment and a structured environment in which to obtain maximum benefit from such treatment, and the fact that the recommendation offers a reasonable degree of protection to the community and from further criminal accounts committed by the defendant and offers a substantial opportunity for the defendant's rehabilitation.
We conclude these reasons applied to the entire sentence, including the court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Before articulating its reasons, the court made explicit reference to the "sentence just imposed." Therefore, this case is distinguishable from State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000), in which the court gave reasons for imposing a term of incarceration rather than a suspended sentence but gave no reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we reject Quinn's second challenge to his sentence.
III. Excessive Sentence
Quinn finally asserts "the severity of the sentence in and of itself warrants a vacation of the sentence and remand for resentencing." Quinn makes no further argument on this point and cites no authority to support this contention. Therefore, we deem the issue waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c).
IV. Disposition
Quinn's judgment and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.