Opinion
No. 21920.
October 5, 1953.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, COLE COUNTY, SAM C. BLAIR, J.
George L. Gisler, Lee Reeder, Lewis A. Dysart, Kansas City, for appellant.
Thomas A. Johnson, General Counsel, Frank K. Iuen, Asst. General Counsel, for Public Service Commission.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County affirming an order of the Public Service Commission granting Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc., additional authority to render through service at through rates between St. Louis, Missouri, on the one hand, and Marshall, Gilliam and Slater on the other hand, over presently authorized routes.
Applicant, Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc., is a motor carrier having its principal office in Moberly, Missouri, and serving substantially all the principal Missouri towns and cities along and north of U.S. Highway 40 and Jefferson City south of that highway. It serves Kansas City and St. Louis. The record shows that by reason of the transfer to applicant of the authority of one Robert W. Rowland to operate from Kansas City to Glasgow, together with operating authorities previously held by applicant, resulted in applicant having authority to operate between Kansas City through Glasgow, Gilliam, Slater and Marshall. However, applicant did not have authority to render through service at through rates between St. Louis on the one hand and Marshall, Gilliam and Slater on the other hand. The application for permission to render such service is the basis for this proceeding.
The application was opposed by Brooks Truck Lines, Inc., appellant here. The application was made, as in the case of State ex rel. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., v. Public Service Commissions, Mo.App., 261 S.W.2d 252, under Section 390.060 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which authorizes the transfer of certificates of convenience and necessity and then provides: "In the event of such purchase, when there is a consolidation of one or more certificates of convenience and necessity and when through service will be beneficial to the public, such through service may be permitted." (Italics ours.)
At the hearing before the Commission thirteen witnesses appeared, six for applicant and seven for appellant. After taking the cause under advisement and considering the briefs submitted by the parties, the Commission reached the following conclusion:
"The testimony of the witnesses produced by applicant shows it will result in a public benefit if applicant is granted authority to render through service at through rates between St. Louis on the one hand and Marshall, Gilliam and Slater on the other hand. While the Brooks Truck Lines, Inc. renders through service at through rates between St. Louis and the points involved herein, there was evidence to the effect that some shippers have been using Orscheln's service and it would be a benefit to be able to ship via this line between the points involved herein. The evidence offered by protestant Brooks was to the effect that protestant is now rendering adequate service between the points involved and if this authority is granted it will result in a loss to the protestant of approximately twenty percent of the business it is now receiving between said points.
"The Commission has had this same question before it on numerous occasions and has always found that where the evidence shows it will be beneficial to the public, the Commission will grant authority to a party to render through service at through rates between points on its authorized route. It may affect the protestant to some extent but the shipping public doing business between the points involved in this application will undoubtedly find this service advantageous and the Commission feels that any loss that may accrue to protestant by reason of granting the authority would be outweighed by the benefits it will afford to the public."
It is strenuously insisted by appellant that the Commission's order "is not supported by any substantial evidence but is contrary thereto, and conflicts with the Commission's own decisions."
The law is settled that, as a reviewing court, we may not substitute our judgment on the evidence for that of the Commission, but we are authorized to decide whether such tribunal could have reasonably made its findings, and reached its result, upon consideration of all the evidence before it; and to set aside decisions clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
A careful study of the record convinces us that the result reached by the Commission could reasonably have been made under the evidence. Thus we are not warranted in disturbing it. The decisions cited in, Mo.App., 261 S.W.2d 252, sustain the Commission's finding.
The judgment of the learned trial court approving the order of the Commission is affirmed.
All concur.