Opinion
ID# 0006004918
Submitted: August 6, 2001
Decided: October 11, 2001
On Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
ORDER
This 11th day of October, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to this Court that:
1. Joseph M. Pryer (Defendant) has filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
2. On April 16, 2001, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Robbery Second Degree (as a lesser included offense of Robbery First Degree). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the then-pending charge of Conspiracy Second Degree was nolle prossed. On April 16, 2001, the Court sentenced the Defendant to three years Level V suspended after nine months for two years and three months at Level IV suspended after six months for one year and nine months at Level III or II. On April 27, 2001, Defendant filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief.
3. In his motion, Defendant essentially alleges three grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant alleges in Ground One that his defense counsel, Kevin J. O'Connell ("Counsel"), "coerced" Defendant into entering a guilty plea. Defendant alleges in Ground Two that Counsel failed to adequately communicate with the Defendant during the pendency of the matter. Defendant contends in Ground Three that Counsel failed to keep him informed and was not dedicated to the case.
Def.'s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
Id.
Id.
4. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different." In attempting to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must allege concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them. Moreover, any "review of counsel's representation is subject to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."
Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1988) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 555-56 (1990)
Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990)
5. With regard to the "coerced" guilty plea, Defendant alleges that on the day of his final case review, one day before trial was scheduled to begin, Counsel informed Defendant that he would be unavailable for trial and that Counsel would seek a continuance if Defendant so desired, but if Defendant pleaded guilty, Defendant would "be home [sooner then if Defendant went to trial]." Defense Counsel, however, explains that his "recommendation" to Defendant was strategically-based in that Robbery First Degree (the crime with which Defendant was originally charged) carried a two year mandatory minimum sentence at Level V, but the penalty for Robbery Second Degree (the plea offered by the state) carried a recommended sentence of nine months. Because Defendant had already served more than five months in prison, Counsel "believed it in [Defendant's] best interest to accept the plea offer extended by the State." The Court finds no merit in the Defendant's argument that his plea of guilty was coerced. The Court looks to the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form executed by Defendant on April 16, 2001, which states that Defendant "freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty," that Defendant's lawyer had "fully advised [Defendant] of [his] rights and of [his] guilty plea," and that Defendant had "read and understood all the information contained in this form." Additionally, Defendant stated during the colloquy required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 11 that the above-quoted statements were true.
Def.'s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3
O'Connell Aff. ¶ 1.
6. Grounds Two and Three of Defendant's motion essentially allege that Counsel failed to keep Defendant informed about the case and was not dedicated to the case. Defendant states that he was "kept . . . unintelligently in the dark" and that Counsel "never once showed any dedication to [the case]." In response, Counsel indicates that he "provided [Defendant] with all discovery sent to [Counsel] by the State," and that he "met with [Defendant] on at least two occasions before the entry of his plea." Additionally, Counsel states that "[t]he only interview [Defendant] requested that [Counsel] conduct that [Counsel] did not conduct was that of the victim," and that that interview was not conducted because the victim was incarcerated and was represented by the Office of the Public Defender at the time. The Court finds Counts Two and Three of defendant's motion to be without merit. The Court again looks to the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form executed by Defendant on April 16, 2001. That form states that Defendant was "satisfied with [his] lawyer's representation," that Defendant's lawyer had "fully advised [Defendant] of [his] rights and of [his] guilty plea," and that Defendant had "read and understood all the information contained in this form."
Def.'s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3
O'Connell Aff. ¶ 3
O'Connell Aff. ¶ 4
7. Based on the above, this Court finds that Counsel's representation of Defendant did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Defendant has failed to make a sufficient showing for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on Defendant's own statements and representations to the Court contained in the Truth-In-Sentencing form. Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is therefore DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED