Opinion
No. 111465.
04-03-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Robert E. PRUITT, Appellant.
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Amanda G. Voth, assistant solicitor general, Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Amanda G. Voth, assistant solicitor general, Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Robert E. Pruitt pled guilty to rape of child under 14 years of age. He then requested the district court grant him a downward durational departure sentence. The court denied the request and sentenced him under Jessica's Law to a life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of 25 years. He appeals the district court's denial of a downward departure. Finding the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Facts
At the plea hearing, the State's factual basis for the plea contended that Pruitt had briefly been left in charge of his 1–year old cousin, K.D. When K.D.'s grandmother returned home, K.D. indicated that she was hurt somewhere under her diaper. K.D.'s grandmother removed the diaper and saw blood, so she took K.D. to the hospital. At the hospital, it was discovered that K.D. was bleeding from her vagina. Kansas Bureau of Investigations (KBI) Special Agent Bethany Keating interviewed Pruitt, who confessed to hurting K.D. after being confronted with photographs of K.D.'s injuries. He confessed that he had stuck his index finger past the first knuckle into K.D.'s vagina while changing her diaper. The KBI's DNA testing results confirmed that K.D.'s blood was on Pruitt's middle finger and pants. Following the State's proffer, Pruitt affirmed he was guilty of the offense, and the district court accepted his guilty plea.
Prior to sentencing, Pruitt moved the district court for a downward durational departure, citing (1) his acceptance of responsibility and cooperation in the investigation, (2) his age, (3) his mental health history and psychological evaluations, and (4) the nature of his criminal history.
Specifically, Pruitt's motion noted that he was only 22 years old and his prior criminal history consisted of nonperson felony charges, primarily criminal damage to property. The presentence investigation report reflected a prior criminal history for Pruitt consisting of several criminal damage to property charges, as well as misdemeanor theft and battery charges. Pruitt's motion also noted he had a difficult childhood which included the death of his father by suicide and his placement out of his home for juvenile behavior issues. He also pointed out that he was in special education classes in high school and has been receiving services for the mentally handicapped.
Pruitt attached various psychological evaluations to the motion. We will briefly summarize those reports.
The first was from Horizons Mental Health Center when Pruitt was 13 years old. It indicates possible neglect issues in his parental home and a possible history of sexual abuse. The report reveals that his foster mother caught him in a compromising position with two other boys his age. Pruitt maintained that he was demonstrating wrestling moves, but both boys independently told the foster mother that Pruitt had threatened the boys if they did not allow Pruitt to put the boys' penises in his mouth. Testing revealed a borderline IQ. Other tests indicated anxiety, mania, possible ADHD, and bipolar disorder. The psychologist referred Pruitt for additional evaluation.
The follow up evaluation was conducted at Saint Francis Community Services. The report reveals a long history of behavioral problems and past physical and emotional abuse. Pruitt was prescribed medication to manage mood swings and aggressive behaviors. His diagnoses were Asperger's disorder, mood disorder, ADHD, conduct disorder, and mild mental retardation.
River Park Psychology Consultants performed a sex offender evaluation on Pruitt after the criminal charges were filed in this case. Pruitt denied ever being in any trouble for his sexual behavior prior to this charge and said that he had been sexually molested by an older male cousin for several years. The report concluded that while Pruitt admitted to molesting K.D., testing indicated that he had not accepted personal accountability for the event. There were no other indications of sexual acting out or sexual pathology, but the psychologist wrote that psychological testing was not valid because Pruitt had a significant tendency to exaggerate and magnify his psychological problems. The psychologist recommended initial individual sex offender therapy to address Pruitt's own sexual abuse and lack of accountability, followed by group sex offender treatment.
Finally, the motion included a forensic psychological evaluation report. Testing and a review of other records resulted in diagnoses of conduct disorder, ADHD, dysthymic disorder, diagnosis deferred of a paraphilic disorder, and diagnosis deferred of a personality disorder. At this evaluation, Pruitt reported remembering very little about the rape of his cousin. The psychologist concluded that Pruitt's behaviors during the rape were not influenced by mental disease or defect. He posited that the rape was a manifestation of Pruitt's longstanding behavioral problems and maladjustment, as well as possible sexual deviance. Further, he concluded that Pruitt was capable of forming the requisite criminal intent to commit the rape.
The district court also had before it at the time of sentencing, a copy of a victim impact statement from K.D.'s mother. In it, she describes the pain Pruitt caused K.D. and their entire family. She wrote that K.D. bled for 7 hours after the incident, had to spend 2 1/2 days in the hospital, and had to have surgery to correct the damage caused by Pruitt. The family was also investigated by the State after the incident, and the mother's marriage had suffered from the stress of the event. K.D. suffered nightmares and demonstrated behavior problems after the event. K.D.'s mother was devastated that she had trusted Pruitt and that she was unable to protect her daughter. She told the district court that she had seen Pruitt get in trouble time and again, knew that he would hurt someone else in the future, and asked the district court to imprison Pruitt permanently.
At sentencing, the district court read the victim impact statement, and the State recommended a life sentence under Jessica's Law with a mandatory minimum of 25 years' imprisonment and lifetime electronic monitoring. The State reiterated the tender age of the victim and gave more details about the extent of K.D.'s injuries, which included serious vaginal tearing as documented by photos taken at the hospital. Pruitt's attorney then argued his departure motion, which generally mirrored the written motion. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the psychological evaluations showed that the court should imprison Pruitt for life based on his anger issues and lack of accountability for his actions against K.D. Pruitt briefly apologized in open court for his behavior.
The district court denied Pruitt's motion for departure and sentenced him to life in prison with a mandatory minimum prison term of 25 years, lifetime parole, and lifetime electronic monitoring. The district court stated that it had spent considerable time carefully reading all of the information provided by Pruitt's attorney, including the psychological evaluations. It noted that Pruitt had had a rough upbringing, but also noted that (1) Pruitt had 12 prior convictions, (2) nothing indicated that Pruitt was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed the rape, (3) Pruitt was the sole criminal actor in the commission of this offense, and (4) Pruitt understood the criminality of his act at the time it occurred. The district court felt there were not substantial and compelling reasons to grant the departure, stating, “I believe that based on Mr. Pruitt's background, as sad and pitiful as it is, he is a danger to the community and the community needs to be protected from Mr. Pruitt.”
Analysis
Pruitt argues that the mitigating factors he presented to the district court provided substantial and compelling reasons for the court to depart from the mandatory Jessica's Law sentence, and the court's failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion to depart for an abuse of discretion. State v. Florentin, 297 Kan. 594, 599, 303 P.3d 263 (2013). Judicial discretion is abused when the district court's action
“(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.” State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1594 (2012) (citing State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755–56, 234 P.3d 1 [2010] ).
Pruitt asserts only that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the district court in this case. He does not argue that the court's decision was based on an error or law or fact.
Jessica's Law provides that when a defendant over the age of 18 is convicted for the first time of the rape of a child under 14 years of age, he or she “shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life with a mandatory minimum term of not less than 25 years” unless the judge finds “substantial and compelling reasons” to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6627(a)(1)(B) and (d)(1). “Substantial” means something real and not imagined; something of substance and not ephemeral. 297 Kan. at 598–99. “Compelling” implies the court is compelled by the facts of the case to leave the status quo or go beyond the ordinary. 297 Kan. at 598–99. If the sentencing judge departs from the mandatory minimum, he or she must state on the record the substantial and compelling reasons supporting the departure. K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6627(d)(1).
K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6627(d)(2) contains a nonexclusive list of mitigating circumstances, including:
“(A) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
“(B) the crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
“(C) the victim was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person, and the defendant's participation was relatively minor;
“(D) the defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial domination of another person;
“(E) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and
“(F) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime.”
Pruitt's motion for departure cited (1) his acceptance of responsibility and cooperation in the investigation, (2) his age, (3) his mental health history and psychological evaluations, and (4) the nature of his criminal history as the mitigating factors justifying departure. On appeal, Pruitt supports his argument that the district court abused its discretion by citing other cases in which appellate courts have found that mitigating factors similar to those he cited did provide substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the mandatory sentence.
However, the district court is under no obligation to depart from a mandatory sentence simply because mitigating factors exist. State v. Whorton, 292 Kan. 472, 476, 254 P.3d 1268 (2011). The district court's obligation is to review the mitigating circumstances and weigh them against both the norm defined by the legislature and any aggravating circumstances in order to determine whether a departure is warranted. Florentin, 297 Kan. at 598.
Here, the district court stated that it had carefully reviewed Pruitt's psychological evaluations and other information provided in and with the departure motion. The court ran through several of the other mitigating factors listed in K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6627(d)(2), finding none but Pruitt's young age applicable here. It determined, however, that Pruitt was a danger to the community, and it declined to depart from the mandatory sentence. While these findings do not address all of the mitigating factors raised by Pruitt and do not discuss aggravating factors or the legislative definition of the norm, the district court was not required to make any specific findings unless it decided to depart. 297 Kan. at 601–02.
We do not find that Pruitt's mitigating factors supporting his motion for departure tip the scales very far in favor of departing from a sentence under Jessica's Law. Pruitt initially denied he had done wrong and only cooperated with law enforcement when confronted with the gruesome photographic evidence of what he had done. Additionally, his sex offender evaluation indicated that he had not accepted personal accountability for the rape. And while Pruitt may have been only 21 when this crime occurred, his victim was only 1 year old and was completely vulnerable. No explanation is necessary to understand why that factor does not help his argument. Further, although Pruitt's mental health history and psychological evaluations show that Pruitt had a very hard childhood and may have been molested as a child, that same evidence demonstrated that he has posed a threat to society for some time and that he attempted to exaggerate his mental problems to avoid culpability in this case. Finally, while Pruitt's criminal history may show that he has historically been more of a threat to property than to people, it is nonetheless a prolific criminal history for one so young and demonstrates that Pruitt has not been amenable to reforming his behavior in the past.
When one factors these mitigating circumstances against the crime here-the rape of a 1–year–old resulting in such severe vaginal tearing that required surgery to correctwe conclude that a reasonable person could agree with the district court's denial of Pruitt's motion to depart. Pruitt's position, that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the district court, is without merit.
Affirmed.