Opinion
112,318.
04-17-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Derrick Adam PRUETT, Appellee.
Joseph M. Penney assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. James R. Watts, of El Dorado, for appellee.
Joseph M. Penney assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
James R. Watts, of El Dorado, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., PIERRON and ATCHESON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court's suppression of Derrick Adam Pruett's statements. The State contends the investigation was part of a traffic stop; therefore Miranda warnings were not required. The State argues the court considered improper factors, erroneously distinguished caselaw beneficial to the State's position, and improperly articulated a bright-line rule governing when an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes. However, because a review of the totality of the circumstances of the facts of this case indicates a reasonable person would not have felt free to end the interrogation and leave, Pruett was in custody for Miranda purposes. Therefore, Miranda warnings were required, and we must affirm the suppression of Pruett's statements.
On November 28, 2013, Officer Joshua Blanding initiated a traffic stop of a car after observing it fail to use its turn signal. Officer Shawn Botsick was in Blanding's patrol car as well. Pruett was the passenger in the car the officers stopped. Blanding smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the car. Blanding told the driver and Pruett he would just cite and release them if it was only a small amount of drugs. In response, Pruett offered the officers a baggie with a very small amount of marijuana—4.51 grams, or 1/6 of an ounce. Blanding immediately asked Pruett to step out of the vehicle. The officers searched both Pruett and the driver—including inside their pockets. Blanding testified he had no belief either Pruett or the driver was armed. The officers removed Pruett's wallet from his pocket and placed it on the trunk of the car instead of returning it to him. Blanding intended to search the car. Because it was cold outside, he told Pruett and the driver they could sit in the backseat of his patrol car while the officers searched the car. Blanding reiterated that they were not under arrest, and they agreed to sit in the backseat. A search of the car revealed more marijuana, a scale, a grinder, and $150 in cash from Pruett's wallet.
Blanding knew, based on his training and experience, the items found in the car were associated with drug dealing. He removed Pruett from the backseat of the patrol car. Prior to providing Pruett with his Miranda warnings, Blanding asked Pruett how long he had been selling marijuana. In response, Pruett offered multiple incriminating statements. He told the officers that (1) he had been dealing for about a week; (2) he sold to the employees at the local Applebees; (3) the drugs were his and not the driver's; and (4) he was selling drugs to try to pay back money he owed. The officers immediately arrested Pruett.
The State charged Pruett with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful acts involving proceeds from the sale of marijuana, possession of clonazepam, and possession of alprazolam.
On May 16,2014, Pruett filed a motion to suppress the statements made to Blanding. Pruett argued that based on the totality of the circumstances, he was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the point Blanding asked him how long he had been dealing drugs. Therefore, the officers should have read him Miranda warnings prior to questioning him. In response, the State argued the investigation was part of a traffic stop and Miranda warnings are generally not required for this roadside questioning.
The trial court held a hearing on Pruett's motion. Blanding and Pruett testified. The State again argued that because this was a routine traffic stop, officers had more leeway to ask investigatory questions. The State contended that “traffic stops are generally exempt from the typical Miranda rules.”
Pruett's counsel argued this case did not involve a routine traffic stop. He challenged the Terry search of Pruett, but because nothing illegal had been obtained from the search, there was nothing to suppress. However, counsel argued the initial illegal Terry search “laid the groundwork” for what followed. Counsel argued the factors a court must consider when determining whether Miranda warnings are required favor suppression. Counsel further argued that if Pruett's statements were not suppressed, officers would learn to ask questions on the side of the road—where Miranda is not generally required as argued by the State—as opposed to the station house.
The trial court distinguished the roadside questioning in this case from the questioning in caselaw precedent involving driving under the influence (DUI) investigations. The court noted that the questions involved in a DUI investigation—“Have you been drinking? How much have you been drinking?”—are different because drinking is not inherently illegal, whereas dealing drugs is. The court noted Blanding's intent was clear when he asked Pruett about his time dealing drugs. The court said Blanding had enough information “irrespective of” Pruett's response “to believe that there was intent to distribute.” The court held that at the time Blanding asked that question, “his investigation was done. It was finished. There was no more that he was going to do.” The court held that a “reasonable person would believe that they were under arrest and not free to go.”
The trial court then articulated a bright-line rule: “[W]hen your investigation is complete, you begin your interrogation. And the person is in custody under arrest or clearly not free to go; that they need to be Mirandized. ” Finally, the court ruled Pruett's statements would be suppressed.
The State filed an interlocutory appeal.
The State presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously based its ruling on improper factors; and (2) whether the trial court erred in finding Pruett was in custody for Miranda purposes. All of the State's concerns can be sufficiently addressed by reviewing whether the totality of the circumstances indicate Pruett was in custody for Miranda purposes.
The standard of review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is a bifurcated standard. The appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed without any deference to the trial court. State v. Gibson, 299 Kan. 207, 215–16, 322 P.3d 389 (2014). Kansas appellate courts regularly apply the above dual standard of review of fact and law on a State's appeal of a trial court grant of a defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Schultz, 289 Kan. 334, 340, 212 P.3d 150 (2009).
However, when the material facts to a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. State v. Stevenson, 299 Kan. 53, 57,321 P.3d 754 (2014).
The State may not use statements made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation unless the State has provided procedural safeguards to preserve the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. “The safeguards of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, [444,] 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966), are triggered only when an accused is (a) in custody and (b) subject to interrogation.” State v. Lewis, 299 Kan. 828, Syl. ¶ 1, 326 P.3d 387 (2014). A custodial interrogation has occurred once “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way.” 299 Kan. 828, Syl. ¶ 1. This is to be distinguished from an investigatory interrogation, which occurs as a routine part of the fact-finding process before the investigation reaches the accusatory stage.” 299 Kan. 828, Syl. ¶ 1.
Here, the State does not challenge that there was an interrogation. Instead, the State only challenges the trial court's determination that Pruett was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
The material facts are not in dispute. Therefore, we need only review de novo the question of whether suppression was proper. Stevenson, 299 Kan. at 57.
We must determine whether the totality of those circumstances would have led a reasonable person in Pruett's position to believe he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation. See Schulz, 289 Kan. at 340–41.
There are numerous factors a trial court must consider when determining whether an interrogation is investigative or custodial:
“(1) the interrogation's time and place; (2) its duration; (3) the number of law enforcement officers present; (4) the conduct of the officer and the person questioned; (5) the presence of absence of actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed guard; (6) whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether the person questioned was escorted by officers to the interrogation location or arrived under his or her own power; and (8) the interrogation's result, e.g., whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the interrogation.” Lewis, 299 Kan. at 835.
“No single factor outweighs another, nor do the factors bear equal weight. Every case must be analyzed on its own particular facts.” State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 496, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012).
Here, the trial court also focused on the officer's subjective intent. However, as the State points out, the United States Supreme Court has explained that an officer's unspoken intent is generally irrelevant to a Miranda inquiry. “A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 869, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (officer decided as soon as driver exited the car that driver would be taken into custody, but did not communicate that intent to the respondent); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (“[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”). However, to the extent an officer's subjective believe would “affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom of action,’ “ they are relevant. 511 U.S. at 325 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 ).
Even discounting the officer's subjective intent beyond the degree to which it is relevant, the totality of the circumstances indicates a person in Pruett's position would not have felt free to leave. The following factors support this.
The conduct of the officers and the person subject to the interrogation: Blanding told Pruett he would only give Pruett a citation if it were a small amount of drugs. Instead of writing Pruett a citation, the officers removed him and the driver from the car, searched Pruett—including inside his pockets—and searched the car. Instead of returning Pruett's wallet to him, the officers placed it on the trunk of the car. Upon searching the car, the officers found another box of marijuana, a scale, and a grinder. Blanding got Pruett out of the patrol car and immediately asked Pruett how long he had been selling drugs. The State describes the officer's tone as “blunt” and Pruett describes it as “accusatory.” No matter the tone, the nature of the question, combined with the search of Pruett's person and the car and the placement of his wallet on the trunk instead of back in Pruett's possession, make this search and subsequent questioning more similar to a routine arrest than a general investigation during a routine traffic stop.
The presence or absence of actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms of a stationed guard: After searching Pruett, Blanding asked Pruett if he wanted to wait in the backseat of his patrol car since it was cold outside. Pruett did. He was unable to open the doors or lower the windows from the backseat. While officers searched the car, Pruett watched from the locked backseat. Although Pruett chose to wait in the car to escape the cold, we can still consider that he was effectually restrained while the officers searched the car;
Whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness: Blanding testified that based on his training and experience, the paraphernalia he found indicated drug dealing. Blanding testified he knew he was going to arrest Pruett as soon as he removed Pruett from the patrol car. At the point Blanding asked Pruett how long he had been dealing, Pruett was undeniably a suspect. See Stans bury, 511 U.S. at 323 (subjective intent relevant to the extent it would affect how a reasonable person in the same situation would gauge his or her freedom to leave).
The result of the interrogation, for instance, whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the interrogation: The officers arrested Pruett immediately after he answered Blanding's question.
A consideration of the totality of the circumstances indicates that this was not a routine traffic stop as the State contends and Blanding's question was not the typical investigatory question present at a DUI investigation. Instead, this was a roadside custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (“If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. ”). Based on Blanding's conduct, the functional equivalent of physical restraint, the fact that Pruett was clearly being interrogated as a suspect, and the result of the interrogation was Pruett's arrest, a reasonable person would not have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave at the point Blanding asked Pruett how long he had been dealing drugs. See State v. Espinobarros, No. 111,217, 2014 WL 7653864, at *3–5 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion) (even though a district court considered subjective factors when determining whether a defendant was in custody, the appellate court would merely disregard those factors upon de novo review).
Therefore, the encounter was custodial under the totality of the circumstances and a Miranda waiver was necessary. Because the officer failed to provide Pruett his Miranda warnings prior to asking him how long he had been a drug dealer, the trial court properly suppressed Pruett's statements.
The State also challenges the bright-line rule articulated by the trial court. It is unnecessary to discuss a bright-line rule in this case. Supreme Court precedent instructs courts to make the decision whether Miranda warnings were required based on a case-by-case basis after looking at all the facts. Smith v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 291 Kan. 510, 517242 P.3d 1179 (2010); State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 642–43, 186 P.3d 785 (2008). Although the trial court's bright-line rule might often be true, we will affirm the trial court by following the totality of the circumstances approach.
Affirmed.