Opinion
No. COA03-82
Filed 18 November 2003 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 July 2002 by Judge James C. Spencer in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 October 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Newton G. Pritchett, Jr., for the State. J. Clark Fischer, for defendant-appellant.
Alamance County No. 01 CRS 53203.
On 1 July 2002, defendant Shawn Pritchard was indicted for assault inflicting serious bodily injury. The indictment alleged that on 16 March 2001, defendant "willfully and feloniously did ASSAULT JAMES A. RAY inflicting serious bodily injury in that the Victim suffered serious and permanent head injuries." The case was tried at the 22 July 2002 Criminal Session of Alamance County Superior Court.
At the end of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because the indictment failed to allege any serious bodily injury. The motion was denied. Defendant was convicted of assault inflicting serious bodily injury and sentenced to one term of twenty-one to twenty-six months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the indictment was inadequate to charge the offense. Defendant contends that the indictment was insufficient because the pleading did not specify the exact nature of the injury suffered by Ray. Defendant argues that the allegation of "serious and permanent head injuries" is too vague and fails to track the language of the statute.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we find no error. Defendant was indicted for assault inflicting serious bodily injury pursuant to G.S. 14-32.4. The essential elements of the offense are: "(1) an intentional assault on another person (2) resulting in serious bodily injury." State v. Williams, 154 N.C. App. 176, 180, 571 S.E.2d 619, 622 (2002). G.S. 14-32.4 defines "serious bodily injury" as:
bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in prolonged hospitalization.
G.S. 14-32.4 (2001). Defendant essentially argues that the indictment was insufficient to charge the offense because there was no allegation that the assault resulted in any of the permanent or protracted conditions listed by the statute. However, this Court has stated:
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924, an indictment must contain a "plain and concise factual statement in each count which . . . asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant . . . of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation." An indictment which avers facts constituting every element of an offense need not be couched in the language of the statute.
State v. Cockerham, 155 N.C. App. 729, 735, 574 S.E.2d 694, 698, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 166, 580 S.E.2d 702 (2003) (emphasis added and citations omitted). Here, the indictment alleged the essential elements of the offense, stating that defendant assaulted Ray causing serious bodily injury in that Ray suffered serious permanent head injuries. See Williams, 154 N.C. App. at 180, 571 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we hold that the indictment was sufficient to charge the defendant with assault inflicting serious bodily injury without specifying which permanent or protracted condition listed in the statute was suffered by Ray. See State v. Edwards, 305 N.C. 378, 380, 289 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1982) (noting that an indictment "without specifying which `sexual act' was committed is sufficient to charge the crime of first-degree sexual offense and to inform a defendant of such accusation"). If a defendant wishes additional information as to the nature of the "serious bodily injury" with which he stands charged, he may move for a bill of particulars. Id. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.
No error.
Judges MCGEE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).