Opinion
UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET No. CR-15-277
08-03-2015
STATE OF MAINE v. CODY PRATT, Defendant
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss. ORDER
Before the court is a motion to suppress by defendant Cody Pratt. Pratt seeks to suppress both certain statements he made at the scene of an accident and the results of a blood test that was taken at CMMC, where he was taken for treatment after the accident.
Statements
Pratt's contends that his statements were involuntary under the circumstances given the injuries he had suffered. At the hearing, although the motion had been continued to allow the officer to be present, the officer was not present. The State has the burden of demonstrating that statements are voluntary and offered no evidence to meet that burden. Pratt's statements at the scene of the accident that there was no one else in the vehicle and that he had been driving are suppressed.
Results of blood test
The blood test results were obtained by a search warrant issued by the District Court (Darvin, J.). Pratt argues that the blood test results were illegally obtained for two reasons. He argues that there was a HIPAA violation because the warrant affidavit states that Officer Gaumont had been advised by CMMC medical staff that blood had been drawn from Pratt and that the blood had been screened for alcohol.
First, there is no suggestion in the record that CMMC Medical staff told Gaumont what Pratt's medical records disclosed as to his alcohol content. Pratt argues that it was a violation of HIPAA for CMMC staff even to tell Officer Gaumont that blood had been drawn and that an alcohol screen had been performed. Even is this is correct, Pratt has offered no authority for the proposition that a search warrant must be invalidated if the officer relies on information provided by private parties who disclosed that information in violation of HIPAA. Officer Gaumont is not a health care provider subject to HIPAA, and his inclusion of the information that Pratt's blood had been drawn did not violate HIPAA.
Second, although Pratt argues that he has a right to cross-examine the officer on whether he was aware that HIPAA had been violated, Pratt has not submitted an affidavit making a substantial preliminary showing that Officer Gaumont's warrant affidavit contains any deliberate or reckless falsehoods, and Pratt is therefore not entitled to a hearing under Delaware v. Franks, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). See State v. Van Sickle, 580 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1990).
Third, even if the warrant affidavit did not contain the information that CMMC staff had told Gaumont that there had been a blood draw and an alcohol screen, there would have been probable cause to issue a warrant to determine if such information had been collected.
Pratt's second challenge is based on the wording of the warrant, which lists the place to be searched as the person of Cody Pratt. However, from the warrant affidavit and from other language in the warrant itself, it is evident that what was sought to be seized were medical records evidencing a blood sample alcohol screen. Read as a whole, the warrant and the affidavit provided sufficient specificity as to the items to be seized. See Commonwealth v. Truax, 397 Mass. 174, 180-81, 490 N.E.2d 425 (1986). The requirement of specificity in a warrant is intended to prevent a general exploratory search, and Pratt does not argue that the warrant at issue in this case authorized such a search nor is he arguing that medical records were obtained that were unrelated to his blood-alcohol content.
Accordingly, Pratt's motion to suppress statements he made at the scene of the accident is granted and his motion to suppress the blood alcohol results obtained by search warrant is denied. Dated: August 3, 2015
/s/_________
Thomas D. Warren
Justice, Superior Court