Opinion
111,376.
06-05-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Bradly David POTUCEK, Appellant.
Michael Peloquin, of Wichita, for appellant. Christopher E. Smith, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Michael Peloquin, of Wichita, for appellant.
Christopher E. Smith, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., ARNOLD–BURGER and GARDNER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Bradly David Potucek appeals his conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Potucek claims the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence. He also claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district court's judgment.
The facts are undisputed. On January 16, 2013, at about 3:25 a.m ., Martin Gibson was in his living room watching television when he heard a loud bang coming from outside his house. Gibson's wife came in the living room a few minutes later and told him that someone had hit his truck which was parked on the street along the curb in front of his house. Gibson opened his front door, looked outside, and saw that a maroon Sport Trac pickup was pinned up against the driver's side door of his truck. Gibson saw a man and woman standing near the bed of the Sport Trac. Gibson observed that the man, later identified as Potucek, had climbed into the driver's seat of the Sport Trac. Potucek shifted the Sport Trac into reverse and attempted to back away from Gibson's truck. Gibson heard screeching that sounded like metal on metal. At this point, he called 911 because he believed Potucek was trying to leave the scene of the accident. Gibson could not see anyone else in the Sport Trac at that time, nor did he see anyone else operate the vehicle.
Gibson waited for law enforcement to arrive and continued to watch as Potucek tried to back up. While doing so, Potucek almost hit another parked vehicle. Gibson watched as the Sport Trac's right front wheel popped up sideways, at which point Gibson told the 911 dispatcher that the Sport Trac was not going anywhere. Potucek exited the Sport Trac and took off running. Gibson described Potucek's pace as “a sprint—he was sprinting away.” Potucek ran southbound between two houses but came back after he encountered a chain-link fence. By this time, two police cars had arrived at the scene.
Winfield Police Officer Greg Venable was one of four officers who responded to the scene. He arrived in uniform with his patrol car's emergency lights activated. Venable observed the Sport Trac in the middle of the road and noted that it seemed to be heavily damaged. He also saw Potucek and a woman standing outside the vehicle. There also was a second woman sitting in the front passenger's seat of the Sport Trac. Venable met with Potucek and asked him if he had any injuries. Potucek advised that he did not. Venable then asked him what was going on, but Potucek said that he was not sure. Venable noticed the odor of alcohol on Potucek's person and observed that his eyes were bloodshot and he seemed to be uneasy on his feet.
At some point during his conversation with Potucek, Venable asked if he wanted to sit in the patrol car due to the cold weather. Potucek agreed and sat in the front passenger's seat of Venable's patrol car. Once inside the patrol car, Potucek told Venable that the Sport Trac belonged to him, but that he was not driving at the time of the collision. Venable asked him if he knew who was driving. Potucek told him that the woman sitting in the Sport Trac's front passenger's seat was the driver. Venable asked Potucek why the woman was driving the Sport Trac that belonged to him. Potucek said he had let the woman drive because he was too drunk to drive.
Winfield Police Officer Phillip Lynch also responded to the scene. Lynch approached the woman seated in the Sport Trac's front passenger's seat and she identified herself as Potucek's cousin, Jeren Potucek. Jeren told Lynch that she was not driving the Sport Trac that night. Lynch determined that there were no direct witnesses to identify who was driving the Sport Trac at the time of the collision. However, Gibson told Lynch that he saw Potucek enter the Sport Trac and try to reverse it.
At about 4:12 a.m., Lynch placed Potucek under arrest and transported him to the police station. Lynch later testified he did so in order to conduct field sobriety tests and to cite Potucek for attempting to leave the scene of an accident. Lynch said that he did not conduct the field sobriety tests at the scene of the accident because of the cold temperature and because “[t]here wasn't any flat, level surface there at the accident scene to conduct” the testing. At the police station, Lynch checked Potucek's eyes using horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN). Then he conducted the walk-and-turn test and the one-legged-stand test. Potucek exhibited clues of impairment during the walk-and-tum test, although he did not exhibit any clues during the one-legged-stand test.
Lynch gave Potucek a copy of the implied consent advisory, commonly known as a DC–70 form. Lynch told Potucek that he was going to read the form to him and that he could read along if he liked. Lynch then read the information on the form aloud to Potucek. Lynch later testified that it is his usual practice to make a checkmark next to each numbered paragraph on the form as he read it to keep track of his progress. He acknowledged that one paragraph on the form he read to Potucek did not have a checkmark next to it. Lynch did not know why the paragraph was not checked, but he testified this did not mean that he did not read the unchecked paragraph to Potucek.
After Lynch read the information contained in the DC–70 form, Potucek agreed to submit to a breath test. Before conducting the test, Lynch conducted a 20–minute deprivation period according to protocol. The deprivation period began at 4:38 a.m. Lynch testified that his usual practice while conducting a deprivation period is to seat the individual waiting to be tested partially in the hallway and partially in the office room where the Intoxilyzer machine is located. Consistent with his usual practice, Lynch testified that he stayed and watched Potucek during the 20–minute deprivation period. As he observed Potucek, Lynch spent 4 to 5 minutes typing Potucek's personal information into the Intoxilyzer machine. Lynch administered the breath test at 5:03 a.m. The Intoxilyzer reading showed Potucek's breath alcohol content to be .175 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath—in excess of the legal limit.
On February 1, 2013, the State charged Potucek with DUI (first offense), a class B misdemeanor. Potucek later filed a motion to suppress. He sought to suppress “any and all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop of [his] vehicle and person arising from a lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe [he] had violated Kansas Law and a lack of probable cause for an arrest and breath test request.” He also alleged that Lynch did not follow proper protocol when he administered the breath test.
On August 1, 2013, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Potucek's motion to suppress. The State called Gibson, Venable, Lynch, and another officer as witnesses. Potucek did not present any evidence. At the close of the hearing, the district court announced that it would take the matter under advisement. On August 23, 2013, the parties reconvened. The district court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately overruling Potucek's motion to suppress.
On November 14, 2013, the parties agreed to submit a stipulation of facts at a bench trial. Based on that stipulation of facts, the district court found Potucek guilty of DUI. The district court sentenced Potucek to 6 months in jail and a $750 fine and placed him on probation after serving 48 hours. Potucek timely appealed his conviction.
Motion to Suppress
Potucek first contends that the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. Specifically, Potucek argues that the district court should have suppressed Lynch's testimony regarding his performance of the field sobriety tests, his statement that he was too drunk to drive, and the results of his breath test. The State responds that the district court did not err when it denied Potucek's motion to suppress.
The standard of review of a district court's decision on a motion to suppress applies a bifurcated standard. The appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed using a de novo standard. In reviewing the factual findings, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Gibson, 299 Kan. 207, 215–16, 299 Kan. 207, 322 P.3d 389 (2014). When the material facts to the district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. State v. Stevenson, 299 Kan. 53, 57, 321 P.3d 754 (2014).
The State bears the burden of proof for a suppression motion. It must prove to the district court the lawfulness of the search and seizure. State v. Reiss, 299 Kan. 291, 296, 326 P.3d 367 (2014). The State also has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement was voluntarily made. State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, 1004, 306 P.3d 244 (2013).
Probable cause to arrest
Potucek contends that he was arrested without probable cause. As a result, he claims the district court should have suppressed all evidence Lynch obtained after the arrest. In particular, Potucek challenges Lynch's decision to administer the field sobriety tests at the police station after his arrest. He contends there was no reason that Lynch could not have conducted the tests at the scene of the collision.
While Potucek's argument on this issue is far from clear, he seems to assert that he was effectively placed under arrest when Lynch transported him to the police station and that Lynch lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time. In support, he cites this court's decision in City of Norton v. Wonderly, 38 Kan.App.2d 797, 172 P.3d 1205 (2007), rev. denied 286 Kan. 1176 (2008). In that case, a sheriff's officer who suspected Wonderly of DUI determined that Wonderly should perform field sobriety tests at the sheriff's office due to adverse weather conditions. The officer did not place Wonderly under arrest, but he also did not give Wonderly the option to perform the field sobriety tests elsewhere. This court found that Wonderly was effectively placed under arrest when the officer transported him in handcuffs to the sheriff's office to perform field sobriety tests. 38 Kan.App.2d at 807, 172 P.3d 1205. This court also concluded that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest Wonderly when he was transported in handcuffs to the sheriff's office; thus, the results of the field sobriety tests should have been suppressed. 38 Kan.App.2d at 808–09, 172 P.3d 1205.
Potucek's reliance on Wonderly is misplaced. Unlike the officer in Wonderly, Lynch told Potucek that he was under arrest prior to transporting him to the police station. We do not need to decide whether Potucek was “effectively arrested” at the time he was transported to the police station—clearly he was under arrest at that time. The only question for us to decide is whether there was probable cause to support the arrest.
The district court found that Lynch had probable cause to arrest Potucek for DUI at the time of his arrest. Potucek's Sport Trac was involved in an early-morning collision with a parked car. Gibson witnessed Potucek's unsuccessful attempt to move his vehicle after the collision. Gibson did not see anyone else operate the vehicle. Potucek then sprinted away from the vehicle and disappeared between two houses. He stopped and returned to the scene after encountering a fence. The officers noticed an odor of alcohol on Potucek's person. His eyes were bloodshot, and he was unsteady on his feet. When an officer tried to learn who was driving the Sport Trac at the time of the collision, Potucek denied being the driver and acknowledged that he was “too drunk to drive.”
The district court correctly recognized that the results of the field sobriety tests should not factor into the probable cause analysis. We agree with the district court that Lynch had probable cause to arrest Potucek for DUI prior to transporting him to the police station. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained by the police after Potucek's arrest, including the results of the field sobriety tests, based on a lack of probable cause to make the arrest.
Potucek's statement that he was too drunk to drive
Next, Potucek contends the district court should have suppressed his statement to Venable that he was too drunk to drive. Potucek argues that Venable should have administered Miranda warnings before questioning him in the patrol car about who was driving the Sport Trac. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). The State counters that Venable asked Potucek investigatory questions at the scene of the collision and did not conduct a custodial interrogation that would require Miranda warnings.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents any person from being compelled to be a witness against himself or herself in a criminal case. Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights recognizes the same guarantee. State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 34, 936 P.2d 1364 (1997). The United States Supreme Court, in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, extended this privilege when it held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, officers must inform an individual accused of a crime that “he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444.
In State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 496, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012), our Supreme Court recognized that the safeguards of Miranda are triggered only when an accused is (1) in custody and (2) subject to interrogation. A custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way. 294 Kan. at 496, 277 P.3d 1111. A custodial interrogation is distinguished from an investigatory interrogation, which occurs as a routine part of the fact-finding process before the investigation has reached the accusatory stage. 294 Kan. at 496, 277 P.3d 1111. Factors to be considered in determining if an interrogation is investigative or custodial include:
“(1) the time and place of the interrogation; (2) the duration of the interrogation; (3) the number of law enforcement officers present; (4) the conduct of the officers and the person subject to the interrogation; (5) the presence or absence of actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed guard; (6) whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether the person being questioned was escorted by the officers to the interrogation location or arrived under his or her own power; and (8) the result of the interrogation, for instance, whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the interrogation. [Citation omitted.]” 294 Kan. at 496, 277 P.3d 1111.
In State v. Vanek, 39 Kan.App.2d 529, 180 P.3d 1087, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1185 (2008), a case similar to this one, a police officer saw Vanek's vehicle straddle the double yellow line while traveling at a slow rate of speed. The officer activated his patrol lights and stopped Vanek's vehicle. Vanek provided his driver's license to the officer. Based on Vanek's mannerism, the officer asked Vanek if he had been drinking alcohol. Vanek replied, “I sure have been.” 39 Kan.App.2d at 531, 180 P.3d 1087. In response to the next several questions, Vanek told the officer that he had just finished his last drink a minute before the stop, that he had been coming from a specific bar, and that he had been drinking all day long.
The officer asked Vanek to exit his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. He also asked Vanek to take a preliminary breath test, but Vanek refused. Based upon Vanek's poor performance on the field sobriety tests, the officer placed Vanek under arrest for DUI. While Vanek was arrested and sitting in the back of the patrol car, the officer asked him if there was any alcohol in the cup of dark liquid the officer found in Vanek's car. Vanek replied that the cup contained alcohol mixed with Coke. At no time during the encounter did the officer inform Vanek of his Miranda rights.
The State charged Vanek with felony DUI. Prior to trial, the State filed a Jackson v. Denno motion to determine the voluntariness of Vanek's statements. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). At the hearing, the State conceded that Vanek's statement after his arrest that the cup in his car contained alcohol mixed with Coke was inadmissible because Vanek had not been Mirandized. After a full evidentiary hearing, the district court suppressed all statements made by Vanek during the entire traffic stop because the officer never gave Vanek the Miranda warnings. The district court concluded that Vanek was not free to leave during the questioning and thus Vanek “ ‘was in custody at the time the statements were made.’ “ 39 Kan.App.2d at 531, 180 P.3d 1087.
On appeal, this court found that certain rules could be adopted concerning when a law enforcement officer must Mirandize an individual during a lawful traffic stop:
“A law enforcement officer is not required to Mirandize an individual before asking routine investigatory questions where the individual is not in legal custody or deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way. This is true even though the officer suspects the individual may have committed a crime, and even though the individual is not free to leave during the lawful detention. However, a law enforcement officer is required to Mirandize an individual before questioning can continue once the individual is accused of a crime and has been arrested and taken into custody. These rules can be readily applied in most cases.
“However, there may be unusual circumstances that can transform a routine traffic stop from an investigatory detention to a situation comparable to a formal arrest.
Examples include instances where law enforcement officers have handcuffed the individual, drawn their weapons on the individual, or extended the duration of the stop for a protracted period of time. In these instances, whether questioning by a law enforcement officer constitutes a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings must be determined on a case-by-case basis, with the ultimate test being whether a reasonable person would believe he or she was in custody under the totality of the circumstances.” 39 Kan.App.2d at 537–38, 180 P.3d 1087.
This court ultimately rejected Vanek's argument that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation at the moment he was stopped because the officer's questions immediately focused on whether Vanek had committed the crime of DUI. It reasoned that the same thing could be said for every law enforcement stop since a law enforcement officer is not permitted to stop a person unless the officer reasonably suspects the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. See K.S.A. 22–2402(1). Consequently, this court recognized that questioning during most law enforcement stops is usually focused on discovering whether the suspect is, in fact, involved in the commission of a crime. Vanek, 39 Kan.App.2d at 538, 180 P.3d 1087.
This court also rejected Vanek's contention that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation because from the moment his vehicle was stopped, he was no longer free to leave. The court found it “too simplistic to say that Vanek's interrogation was custodial simply because a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave.” 39 Kan.App.2d at 538, 180 P.3d 1087. Rather, the court found that whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave is the test to determine when a person has been seized or detained—not the test to determine when a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. The court reiterated that a person who is lawfully seized or detained by a law enforcement officer is not free to leave or terminate the encounter. “Clearly this fact alone does not make the encounter custodial for purposes of whether Miranda warnings are required before questioning.” 39 Kan.App.2d at 538, 180 P.3d 1087.
Finally, this court held that the district court's suppression of Vanek's prearrest statements was contrary to the generally recognized jurisprudence on when a custodial interrogation has occurred. This court concluded that Vanek was not in custody for Miranda purposes when the officer asked him whether he had been drinking alcohol:
“Although Vanek was not free to leave during the traffic stop, his initial detention in no way resembled that of a formal arrest. Vanek was not subjected to a custodial interrogation until after he was arrested.
“We conclude that [the officer], who was investigating Vanek for suspicion of DUI, was not required to Mirandize Vanek before asking him whether he had been drinking alcohol. [The officer's] initial questions were part of an investigatory interrogation and at that time Vanek was not in custody for Miranda purposes. The district court erred in suppressing statements made by Vanek prior to his arrest....” 39 Kan.App.2d at 539, 180 P.3d 1087.
This court's holding in Vanek supports the State's contention here that Venable's questions posed to Potucek were investigatory in nature and therefore did not require Miranda warnings. After asking Potucek some initial questions about the collision, Venable asked him if he wanted to continue talking in his patrol car due to the cold weather. While Potucek sat in the front seat of the patrol car, Venable tried to ascertain who was driving the Sport Trac at the time of the collision. Potucek told Venable that he let his cousin drive the Sport Track because Potuck was “too drunk to drive .” Potucek's answer was not responsive to Venable's question. In any event, Venable's question was part of an investigatory interrogation about the collision. Potucek was not under arrest when Venable inquired about who was driving the Sport Trac, and Potucek's detention was not comparable to a formal arrest. Because Potucek's statement that he was too drunk to drive was not made as a result of a custodial interrogation, the Miranda warnings were not required. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the statement.
Protocol for administering the breath test
Finally, Potucek argues that the district court should have suppressed his breathtest results because Lynch did not follow the proper protocol when he administered the test. Potucek claims that Lynch failed to read aloud one paragraph of the DC–70 form and that he did not properly observe Potucek during the 20–minute deprivation period.
The district judge addressed and ultimately rejected these arguments following the evidentiary hearing on Potucek's motion to suppress, stating:
“The officer then read Mr. Potucek a DC–70.
“The officer did not check item 5, as he normally does. In other words, the officer testified that normally as he reads items, he checks them off, not because that's something that's required by any entity, it's just how he does it. He did not check number 5, but he testified that he did read the entire DC–70 to Mr. Potucek. There's no evidence in the record that he didn't read him that information, and the Court accepts the officer's testimony and finds it credible that he did read the entire DC–70 to Mr. Potucek.
“Regarding the 20–minute observation period in Mitchell [v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 41], Kan.App.2d 114, [200 P.3d 496, rev. denied 289 Kan. 1279 (2009),] the Court held that where an officer allowed a person to leave his presence, and go to a restroom for a couple minutes, and then allowed the person to consume water during the 20 minute observation period, that the testing procedure outlined by KDHE protocol was not substantially complied with.
“Here the facts are that the observation period began at 4:38 A .M.; testing was at 5:03 A.M. So, effectively, a period of 25 minutes.
“Sometime during the 25 minutes, the officer was typing information into the Intoxilyzer machine. This was done in the presence of the defendant, as the machine and the defendant were essentially in the same room and area. The officer observed the defendant and entered information into the Intoxilzyer at the same time. The officer's eyes would not have been trained only on the defendant during the entire time. However, the defendant was in his presence, and he did maintain contact of observation of the defendant. He did not observe any burping, belching or anything that indicated that the 20–minute observation period had been breached, nor is there any evidence presented that that occurred.
“If you took the 20–minute observation period to a hyper-technicality where people blink, people ... I think the purpose of it is that they be in the presence of the person, that they have a general observation of them; not that they are specifically staring at them for that 20 minutes.
“And I would also note that an officer that's in the presence of an individual has other senses besides eyes. They can hear, they can smell. There's no evidence that the officer heard any kind of a burp or a belch, or anything that would cause his attention to turn to that. Sometimes if a person belches, they emit an odor. There's no evidence of that either.
“Therefore, it's the Court's finding that the statement that was made by the defendant should not be suppressed; that his arrest should not be suppressed. Essentially, that the results of the breath test are admissible.”
Regarding the implied consent advisory, Lynch testified that he read Potucek the information printed on the DC–70 form. Lynch explained that it was his usual practice to make checkmarks beside each of the form's numbered paragraphs as he read them to keep track of his progress. He confirmed that he followed this practice in Potucek's case. Lynch said he did not know why one paragraph on the DC–70 form he used in Potucek's case had not been checked. However, Lynch said that the fact that the paragraph was not checked did not mean that he failed to read it to Potucek. Rather, he testified that he simply failed to make the checkmark. Lynch's uncontroverted testimony was competent to support the district court's finding that Lynch read the entire DC–70 form to Potucek.
Regarding the 20–minute observation period, in Kansas “the question of whether the appellant actually was observed for twenty minutes is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court.” City of Shawnee v. Gruss, 2 Kan.App.2d 131, 133, 576 P.2d 239, rev. denied 225 Kan. 843 (1978), superseded on other grounds in State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 691 P.2d 1 (1984). In State v. Lieurance, 14 Kan.App.2d 87, 91–92, 782 P.2d 1246 (1989), rev. denied 246 Kan. 769 (1990), this court concluded that the deputy's testimony that he observed Lieurance in excess of 20 minutes constituted substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that the testing protocol was followed, even though conflicting testimony was presented regarding the observation period.
Here, Lynch testified that he began the 20–minute observation period at 4:38 a.m. During the observation period, Potucek was seated in a chair that was halfway in the hallway and halfway in the office room where the Intoxilyzer machine was located. Lynch was inside the office observing Potucek and typing Potucek's personal information into the machine. Lynch said that it takes approximately 4 to 5 minutes to enter the required information. Lynch testified that he stayed and watched Potucek during the 20–minute observation period. Lynch administered Potucek's breath test at 5:03 a.m. In light of Gruss and Lieurance, Lynch's testimony that he watched Potucek as he entered his personal information into the Intoxilyzer machine in his presence constituted substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that Lynch properly observed Potucek during the deprivation period. Thus, the district court properly concluded that Lynch followed the requisite protocol in administering the breath test, and the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the breath-test results.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Potucek argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of DUI, especially if the district court had excluded the results of the field sobriety tests, the results of his breath test, and his statement that he was too drunk to drive. The State responds that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this court reviews all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must be convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, this court generally will not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. 299 Kan. at 525, 324 P.3d 1078.
The parties entered into a written stipulation of facts at the bench trial. The facts indicated that Potucek's Sport Trac was involved in an early-morning collision with a parked car. Gibson witnessed Potucek's attempt to move the vehicle after the collision and did not see anyone else operate the vehicle. Officers who responded to the scene noted that Potucek smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and was unsteady on his feet. Potucek told Venable that he had let his cousin drive the Sport Trac because he “was too drunk to drive.” After Potucek's arrest, he exhibited clues of impairment during one of the field sobriety tests. Finally, the Intoxilyzer reading showed Potucek's breath alcohol content to be .175 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath—well above the legal limit. Viewing all of this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found Potucek guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.