Opinion
I.D. No. 0312010283.
Submitted: January 20, 2010.
Decided: February 26, 2010.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.Martin B. O'Connor, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Emmett Poon, Georgetown, Delaware, Pro Se.
ORDER
This 26th day of February 2010, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant, Emmett Poon, was convicted following a jury trial in this Court "on two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary in the second degree, wearing a disguise during a felony, conspiracy in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child." Sentence was imposed on November 19, 2004.
Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236 (Del. 2005).
2. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court and his conviction was affirmed on July 28, 2005. On December 9, 2009, Defendant filed a "Motion for Admissions; And Discovery of Facts Motion to Overturn Convictions; And Motion to Dismiss the Charges." This Court denied that motion on December 11, 2009 because the form of that motion did not comply with Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
For a more comprehensive set of facts see Id.
3. Following denial of Defendant's "Motion for Admissions; And Discovery of Facts Motion to Overturn Convictions; And Motion to Dismiss the Charges," Defendant filed a new motion for postconviction relief that properly complied with Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
4. In his motion for postconviction relief, Defendant raises a litany of arguments as to why this Court should grant his motion. Defendant argues that there was "Fabricated evidence" that was "manufactured or arranged after the fact, and either wholly false or else warped and discolored by artifice and contrivance with a deceitful intent." Defendant also argues that he was "defame[ed], libel[ed], and slander[ed]" and that he was falsely imprisoned without proper legal authority. Additionally, Defendant also reiterates his request for "Admissions" and other "Discovery."
Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
Id.
5. The Court need not address the merits of Defendant's claims because Defendant has failed to overcome the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Rule 61(i)(1) provides that "[a] motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final . . ." However, the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(1) may be overcome by Rule 61(i)(5), which provides that:
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991) (stating the court must first apply the procedural bar under Rule 61 before considering the merit of any claim); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (same).
Super. Ct. R. Crim. Pro. 61(i)(1).
[t]he bars to relief in paragraph (1) . . . shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings to the judgment of conviction.
"While [a] `colorable claim' does not necessarily require a conclusive showing of trial error, mere `speculation' that a different result might have obtained certainly does not satisfy the requirement."
State v. Getz, 1994 WL 465543, at *11 (Del Super.) (finding no exception under Rule 61(i)(5) to the procedural bars of Rule 61).
6. Here, Defendant's convictions became final on July 28, 2005 when the Supreme Court issued its decision. Defendant's motion was filed far outside the timeframe prescribed for motions for postconviction relief because this motion was filed more than four years after Defendant's conviction became final.
Super. Ct. R. Crim. Pro. 61(m)(2).
Additionally, this Court finds that the "fundamental fairness" exception of Rule 61(i)(5) does not apply. The exception is narrow and has only been applied in limited circumstances. Defendant has failed to present a "colorable claim" claim for relief as required by the Rule and only states conclusory allegations without any mention of how his arguments would have affected the result at trial. Defendant's litany of arguments are little more than the definitions of various terms.
State v. Laws, 1995 WL 411710, at *1 (Del. Super.).
Defendant's reiterated requests for "Admissions" or other "Discovery" are now moot in light of this Court's decision.
7. For the reasons stated, Defendant has failed to allege any appropriate basis for relief and is barred by the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. As such, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.