Opinion
No. 1-940 / 00-2030.
Filed March 27, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, ROBERT A. HUTCHISON, Judge.
Jason Ponx appeals his conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to manufacture of methamphetamine in excess of five grams, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999). AFFIRMED.
Dennis Bjorklund, Coralville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Gary W. Kendell and Stephanie Cox, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee State.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Jason Ponx pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in excess of five grams, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999). The district court entered judgment and imposed a prison term not exceeding forty-five years. On appeal, Ponx argues: (1) his trial counsel misinformed him of the criminal penalties and range of sentencing options associated with the crime and, therefore, rendered ineffective assistance, and (2) the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing such a long sentence and in considering his criminal history. We affirm.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ponx maintains his attorney did not tell him that the district court had discretion to triple his sentence based on his prior offense. He contends this omission amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Our review of Ponx's constitutional claim is de novo. State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2001). To prevail, Ponx must establish: (1) a breach of an essential duty and (2) prejudice. State v. McBride, 626 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
The State argues Ponx failed to preserve error by failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge the plea. Our highest court has recognized that a claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel is an exception to this preservation rule if it "bears on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea." State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Iowa 2000) ( citing Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000)). We believe Ponx's claim implicates the voluntariness of his plea and, accordingly, we proceed to the merits.
The record does not support Ponx's claim that his attorney breached an essential duty. The district court asked Ponx whether he understood what the maximum penalty was for the crime to which he was pleading guilty. Ponx responded, "Isn't it 25, but it's 75 because it's two of them?" The court said, "[t]hat's right", and proceeded to confirm the penalty. The court later asked Ponx if he understood the minimum penalty for the crime. Ponx responded:
The Court: Tell me what you understand the minimum to be.
The Defendant: The minimum? Twenty-five but the one-third.
The Court: Right.
The Defendant: — to be what? Thirty-three months?
The court again confirmed the minimum sentence and explained how it worked. The court also explained the nature its sentencing discretion. Finally, the court asked Ponx if he understood what the maximum and minimum penalties would be in light of his prior offense. The defendant responded that he did. In sum, Ponx understood that his sentence could be enhanced based on his prior offense and understood by precisely how much it could be enhanced. There is, therefore, no evidence that his attorney misinformed him of the penalty and his ineffective-assistance of counsel claim must fail.
II. Sentencing Discretion
Ponx next maintains that the district court imposed an excessive sentence and inappropriately considered his criminal history in sentencing him. Our review of this issue is for abuse of discretion. State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001).
In sentencing Ponx, the court stated:
The court has reviewed the presentence investigation report. I have looked at those factors set forth in Iowa Code sections 907.3 and 907.5. Those include the defendant's age, his prior record of convictions, which is extensive; and it does include two prior felonies, the one that we're here on and the probation revocation. I have looked at the defendant's employment and family circumstances, the nature of the offense that was committed here. There is a dispute about whether any weapon or force was involved, and I have not considered those factors in connection with sentencing because the defendant does dispute that. The defendant's financial circumstances, his needs for rehabilitation and what I see, frankly, as his limited potential for that. The necessity for protecting the community from further offenses by the defendant and others and the other factors that are set forth in the presentence investigation report. . . .
The court went on to point out that the system had provided Ponx with "multiple opportunities" to reform and he had not availed himself of those opportunities.
We find no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. The penalty was enhanced based on Ponx's prior offense. As for the court's characterization of Ponx's criminal history as "extensive," the record reveals Ponx was only nineteen years old at the time he entered his plea and had already been sentenced to the crimes of manufacturing a controlled substance and theft. Therefore, the court's statement is supported by the record.
Ponx's judgment and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.