r and DโAuria to support the conclusion that a remand to the trial court for an in camera review is appropriate and necessary are inapposite. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43, 57, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987); United States v. Stillwell, 986 F.3d 196, 200โ201 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Djibo, 730 Fed. Appx. 52, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Valenzuela v. United States, 543 U.S. 887, 125 S. Ct. 126, 160 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2004); United States v. Rosario-Peralta, 175 F.3d 48, 56โ57 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 65 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 732, 50 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1977), and cert. denied sub nom. Valentine v. United States, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 732, 50 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1977), and cert. denied sub nom. Diaco v. United States, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 732, 50 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1977); State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 406โ407, 415โ16, 508 A.2d 1 (1986); State v. Gonzales, 186 Conn. 426, 435-36, 441 A.2d 852 (1982). Put simply, these cases are distinguishable because, in each of them, the defendant claimed on appeal either that the government had refused the defendantโs request to review specific evidence for Brady material, or that the defendant became aware of undisclosed evidence that was subject to disclosure under Brady during or after trial.
Upon hearing the appeal, in which the defendant raised several claims of error, we remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of augmenting the record so that we could conduct a "meaningful appellate review" of the defendant's claim of error premised on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 415, 508 A.2d 1 (1986). In remanding for an evidentiary hearing, we indicated that the trial court must resolve "whether the state suppressed . . . Brady material that was favorable and material to the defendant.
In State v. Ellis, 227 Conn. 902, 630 A.2d 73 (1993), this court on its own, without a request from either party, remanded the case "to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and written findings . . . ." Likewise, in State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 416, 508 A.2d 1 (1986), this court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether Brady materials were withheld from the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
The central issue in this claim, therefore, is whether the evidence was disclosed in sufficient time for the defendant to have effectively used it at trial. State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 414, 508 A.2d 1 (1986). This is essentially a factual determination for the trial court.
Following the hearing on remand, the trial court is directed to make its findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing, which shall promptly be filed with the Office of the Appellate Clerk for our review. See, e.g., State v. Pollitt , 199 Conn. 399, 416โ17, 508 A.2d 1 (1986) (remanding case to trial court with order to conduct evidentiary hearing on suppression of evidence claim and instructing court, after making "its findings of fact and conclusions of law," to "promptly file such findings and conclusions with the clerk of this court for our review"); see also Practice Book ยง 60-2 ("[this] court may, on its own motion or upon motion of any party ... (8) remand any pending matter to the trial court for the resolution of factual issues where necessary"). At that time, depending on the trial court's findings, this court will determine whether it is necessary to reach the defendant's remaining claim on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence testimony from lay witnesses identifying him in a surveillance video recording.
In State v. Snook , 210 Conn. 244, 555 A.2d 390, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 3258, 106 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1989), this court explained that it has "on several occasions remanded a case for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing necessary for appellate review of a claim. See, e.g., State v. Badgett , 200 Conn. 412, 433โ34, 512 A.2d 160 [(remanding case for factual hearing to determine whether illegally discovered evidence was admissible under recently articulated inevitable discovery rule), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986) ]; State v. Pollitt , 199 Conn. 399, 415โ16, 508 A.2d 1 (1986) (remanding case for factual hearing to determine whether state suppressed exculpatory evidence); cf. State v. Garrison , 199 Conn. 383, 388โ89, 507 A.2d 467 (1986) ([when] court [was] unable to determine from record whether state established defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, court ordered remand for further articulation of trial court's grounds for rejecting defendant's defenses)." State v. Snook , supra, at 254, 555 A.2d 390.
Although I have been unable to find a case with a procedural posture identical to that of the present case, in other unique cases in which the trial court failed to rule on a motion or failed to conduct a hearing, this court has remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the motion or conduct the hearing and then, based on the outcome of those further proceedings, either this court or the trial court has been permitted to vacate the sentence and order a new trial. See State v. Pollitt , 199 Conn. 399, 416โ17, 508 A.2d 1 (1986) (remanding case to trial court to conduct evidentiary hearing in order to have sufficient record to determine claims on appeal, but waiting on whether to vacate conviction and order new trial until court has full record to decide claims); see also Tough v. Ives , 159 Conn. 605, 607, 268 A.2d 371 (1970) (in case in which trial court refused to rule on motion to set aside verdict, case was "remanded to the Superior Court with direction that it be referred to the judge who presided at the trial, and he is directed forthwith to either grant or deny the March 15, 1968, motion to set aside the verdict and thereafter, forthwith, in accordance with the result of his decision on that motion, to order either that the verdict be set aside or that judgment be rendered on the verdict"); Alderman v. Hanover Ins. Group , 155 Conn. 585, 590, 236 A.2d 462 (1967) ("the proper judgment in ... a situation [where the court failed to decide an issue] is to remand the case in order that the court may decide
Although the defendant presented evidence from which the jury might have inferred the existence of the alleged secret promise, the defendant, for reasons of strategy or otherwise, never sought a determination by the court regarding the existence of such a promise. Because it is the function of the trial court, not this court, to resolve disputed factual issues; see, e.g., State v. Cobb, 234 Conn. 735, 750, 663 A.2d 948 (1995); State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 415, 508 A.2d 1 (1986); State v. Lafferty, 189 Conn. 360, 363, 456 A.2d 272 (1983); the defendant was required to seek a determination by the trial court of his fact-based claim of an undisclosed agreement between Notice and the state. Since the defendant never did so, the record contains no findings to support his assertion.
If "necessary to the proper disposition of the cause," we may remand the case to the trial court for a clarification or explication of its decision. Practice Book ยง 4061; see, e.g., State v. Patterson, 227 Conn. 448, 454-55, 629 A.2d 1133 (1993); State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 416-17, 508 A.2d 1 (1986); State v. Cobbs, 198 Conn. 638, 643, 504 A.2d 513 (1986); State v. Lafferty, 189 Conn. 360, 363, 456 A.2d 272 (1983); State v. Ostroski, 184 Conn. 455, 460-61, 440 A.2d 166 (1981). We conclude that a remand to Judge Dranginis for an articulation of the reasons for her order precluding the parties from filing any motions regarding custody or visitation for at least one year is appropriate in this case.
In determining whether the defendant was prejudiced by late disclosure, this court focuses on the effect of the late disclosure on the jury's verdict. See State v. Pollitt, 199 Conn. 399, 414, 508 A.2d 1 (1986). "The focus is not on the fact of nondisclosure, but the impact of the nondisclosure on the jury's verdict."