Opinion
No. 5-431 / 04-0081
Filed July 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
Troylynn Poafpybitty, Anthony Randolph, and Juan Rico appeal from their convictions and sentences for operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John C. Heinicke and Linda K. Zanders, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Troylynn Poafpybitty, Anthony Randolph, and Juan Rico (hereinafter appellants) appeal from their convictions and sentences for operating while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
The appellants were all arrested and charged with operating while intoxicated between November 2002 and February 2003. Before their respective trials, the appellants filed motions to suppress the evidence of their breath test results as determined by the DataMaster cdm. The motions were overruled.
On January 13, 2004, Poafpybitty was convicted of operating while intoxicated, first offense, and sentenced to serve one year in jail with all but three days suspended, and ordered to complete 100 hours of community service. Randolph was convicted of operating while intoxicated, second offense, on January 12, 2004, and sentenced to serve a two-year term of imprisonment with all but seven days suspended, and ordered to complete 225 hours of community service. On January 12, 2004, Rico was convicted of operating while intoxicated, first offense, and sentenced to serve one year in jail with all but three days suspended, and ordered to pay a $1000 fine. The appellants appeal.
This combined appeal raises the following issues for review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS FILED BY EACH DEFENDANT.
A. BREATH ALCOHOL RESULT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE STATE HAS FAILED TO CERTIFY THE OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY OF THE DATAMASTER WITH THE SIGNATURE STATUTORILY REQUIRED.
B. BREATH ALCOHOL RESULT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO CERTIFY THE OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY OF DATAMASTER IN A LABORATORY SETTING.
C. BREATH ALCOHOL RESULT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE STATE'S FALSE CERTIFICATION OF THE DATAMASTER VIOLATES DUE PROCESS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE IOWA CONSTITUTION.
D. BREATH ALCOHOL RESULT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE FALSE CERTIFICATION OF THE DATAMASTER VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE IOWA CONSTITUTION.
II. COUNSEL MAY HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE RAISED IN DIVISION I.
III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY STATE REASONS FOR THE SENTENCE IMPOSED.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court's decision to admit evidence for errors at law. See State v. Hornik, 672 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Iowa 2003). Because the trial court's ruling was made in the context of an Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.104( a) hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence, we will affirm that ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2001). We also note that reversible error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected. Iowa R. Evid. 5.103( a).
We review sentencing challenges for errors at law. State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 815 (Iowa 2003). "A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citation omitted).
We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999).
III. Motion to Suppress DataMaster Results
The appellants argue the court erred in failing to suppress their DataMaster test results because Robert Monserrate improperly signed the certification forms, the certification was not completed in a laboratory setting, and the false certification violated their due process and confrontation rights under the Iowa and United States Constitutions. After a careful review of the record, we affirm without opinion on these issues pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.24(1).
We have previously considered and rejected identical certification issues concerning the DataMaster. See State v. Williams, No. 03-1832 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 9, 2005), (finding Monserrate's signature on the DataMaster certification forms did not invalidate the results); State v. Christy, No. 03-732 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2005), further review denied April 12, 2005 (affirming the district court's decision to admit the DataMaster test results because Monserrate's signature did not amount to noncompliance, the recertification rules do not require examination inside the criminalistics laboratory, and the defendant was not denied his right to confrontation); State v. Mick, No. 03-1830 (Iowa Ct.App. July 14, 2004), further review denied Nov. 29, 2004 (affirming the district court's decision to admit the DataMaster test results because Monserrate's signature on the certification forms was a surplus matter not calling into question the accuracy of the results, and the recertification rules permit examination of the DataMaster at the police department rather than at the criminalistics laboratory).
IV. Sentencing
The appellants argue the sentencing court failed to state on the record its reasons for choosing the sentences imposed. The State contends the court provided sufficient reasons to allow review of its sentencing discretion, and in the alternative, the State asserts that any error would be harmless in Randolph's case because he received the minimum sentence allowed by statute.
A sentencing court must state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)( d). "A statement may be sufficient, even if terse and succinct, so long as the brevity of the court's statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court's sentencing discretion." State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). In exercising its discretion, the court should weigh all pertinent information including the defendants' age, the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendants' character, and the chances of reform. State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (citing State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)). "Each sentencing decision must be made on an individual basis, and no single factor alone is determinative." State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994). The nature of the offense alone cannot serve as the basis of a discretionary sentence. State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982).
In determining whether the trial court considered all pertinent factors, we look to all parts of the record to find support. State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The record includes the reasons stated during the sentencing hearing and also those given in the written judgment entry. State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001).
In the appellants' sentencing orders, the court stated:
The sentence[s] given here [are] made after considering the protection of the public, the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation of the Defendant[s], the Defendant[s'] prior record, and the statutorily required sentencing requirements. Based upon these considerations, the Court finds the sentence[s] imposed here [are] appropriate.
Although terse and succinct, we find the sentencing judge's stated reasons for the sentence imposed in each case are minimally sufficient to facilitate our review of the trial judge's exercise of his sentencing discretion. In each case, the sentencing judge had access and made specific reference to the appellants' prior records, and further stated he considered the nature of the offense, the chance of reform, and all "statutorily required sentencing requirements" in reaching his decisions. Accordingly, the appellants' convictions and sentences are affirmed in their entirety.