Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2316-14T1
03-01-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ERIN L. PLATT, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Brian Uzdavinis, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Koblitz and Gilson. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Indictment No. 14-01-0040. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Brian Uzdavinis, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Following the denial of her suppression motion, defendant Erin L. Platt pled guilty to fourth-degree possession of a stun gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h), and was sentenced to one year of probation. She now appeals, arguing that the seizure of the stun gun from her purse after her arrest violated her constitutional rights. We disagree and affirm because the stun gun was seized as part of a lawful inventory search.
I.
The only witness who testified at the suppression hearing was Pitman Police Corporal Jonathan Streater. He testified that on September 21, 2013, he was on patrol when he stopped a motor vehicle for equipment violations. Streater learned from a warrant check that defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, had two outstanding municipal warrants. Streater, therefore, directed defendant to get out of the vehicle and placed her under arrest. When defendant was arrested, she had her purse with her. Streater did not search defendant's purse or her person at the roadside. Instead, he handcuffed defendant, placed her in the back of his police vehicle, and put her purse in the front of his vehicle.
Defendant was then taken to the police station. At the station, defendant was patted down and secured in a holding cell. Streater testified that the police department's policy was to conduct an inventory search of any item brought with a person in custody into the station house. Streater did not ask defendant for her consent to search her purse. Instead, before opening the purse, Streater told defendant he would conduct a search, and he asked if the purse contained any harmful materials, such as needles. Defendant, who had not been given Miranda warnings, responded that a stun gun was in the purse. Streater then searched the purse, found the stun gun, and seized it. He prepared an evidence sheet listing the stun gun and informed defendant that she would be charged with illegal possession of the stun gun. Streater did not seize any other items from defendant's purse nor did he prepare a separate inventory form for the contents of the purse.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied defendant's suppression motion, finding that the warrantless seizure of the stun gun was legal as a search incident to defendant's arrest, while also mentioning an inventory search. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree possession of a stun gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h). Consistent with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to one year of non-custodial probation and the remaining charge against her — fourth-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a) — was dismissed. Defendant now appeals the denial of her motion to suppress.
II.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I: BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE THAT CPL. STREATER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP AND DETAIN THE CAR, THE EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
POINT II: EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM MS. PLATT'S PURSE MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE STATIONHOUSE SEARCH WAS NEITHER A PROPER SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST NOR INVENTORY SEARCH.
A. Because the purse was not in Ms. Platt's control or immediate area when it was searched at the police station, well after her arrest following a motor vehicle stop, it was not a valid search incident to arrest.
B. Because Ms. Platt was never incarcerated, and because the police failed to allow her to make other arrangements for her purse, it was not a valid inventory search.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual and credibility findings, "so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Deference is afforded "because the 'findings of the trial judge . . . are substantially influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). "An appellate court should disregard those findings only when a trial court's findings of fact are clearly mistaken." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015). The legal conclusions of a trial court are reviewed de novo. Id. at 263. We will affirm an order denying a motion to suppress "if it is correct, even though the judge gave the wrong reasons for it." State v. Deluca, 325 N.J. Super. 376, 389 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Ellison v. Evergreen Cemetery, 266 N.J. Super. 74, 78 (App. Div. 1993)), aff'd on other grounds, 168 N.J. 626 (2001); see also State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176, 182 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 430 (2012).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "There is a constitutional preference for" law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate before conducting a search or seizure. State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004); State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 236 (2001). Among the exceptions to a search or seizure conducted without a warrant are: (1) an investigatory stop, State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 342 (2014); (2) a search incident to a lawful arrest, State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012); and (3) an inventory search, State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 316-17 (2013).
A.
Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove that Streater had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the car in which she was riding as a passenger. Defendant, therefore, contends that the investigative stop violated her constitutional rights. The State responds that defendant never raised this issue before the trial judge and, therefore, we should not consider this argument.
An investigatory stop is permissible if it is "reasonable and justified by articulable facts." Coles, supra, 218 N.J. at 343. The State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it possessed sufficient information to give rise to the required level of suspicion. Pineiro, supra, 181 N.J. at 19-20. "The [reasonable suspicion] standard requires 'some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.'" State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 211-12 (2008) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003)), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1237, 129 S. Ct. 2402, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1297 (2009). A motor vehicle may be lawfully stopped for investigation if the vehicle has equipment violations. State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 2011).
Here, Streater testified that he stopped the vehicle because of "equipment violations." Neither the State nor defense counsel probed the basis for the stop at the suppression hearing. The trial judge accepted Streater's testimony and found that the vehicle had been stopped for several motor vehicle violations. Given Streater's unchallenged and uncontested testimony, we are satisfied that this record supports the determination that the officer conducted a lawful investigatory stop.
Because we discern no constitutional infringement in the stop of the motor vehicle, we need not determine if defendant should be permitted to raise this new argument on appeal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2009) (explaining that in certain circumstances, the defendant will be precluded from raising on appeal an issue that was not presented to the trial judge). --------
B.
Next, defendant contends that the search of her purse was not incident to her arrest. "Under the search incident to arrest exception, the legal seizure of the arrestee automatically justifies the warrantless search of his [or her] person and the area within his [or her] immediate grasp." State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 19 (2009) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015). "The purpose of such a search is (1) to protect the arresting officer from any potential danger and (2) to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence." State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 461 (2002).
A search incident to an arrest, however, does not authorize a limitless search of the surroundings. In New Jersey, after the defendant "has been arrested, removed and secured elsewhere, the considerations informing the search incident to arrest exception are absent and the exception is inapplicable." State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 541 (2006). Thus, a reviewing court must "determine, on a case-by-case basis whether [the defendant] was in a position to compromise police safety or to carry out the destruction of evidence, thus justifying resort to the search incident to arrest exception." Ibid.; see also State v. Oyenusi, 387 N.J. Super. 146, 155 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 426 (2007).
In this case, defendant's purse was searched while she was secure in a holding cell. There was no showing by the State that defendant had any ability to access her purse once she was placed in the holding cell. Although the trial judge found that the search was incident to the arrest, that holding was not supported by any fact-findings that defendant had access to her purse. Consequently, given the undisputed facts in this record, the State did not prove that the search was a lawful search incident to defendant's arrest.
C.
It appears the trial judge may have also concluded that the search was lawful as an inventory search. We agree that the record here supports that alternative finding. To the extent that the judge failed to clearly explain her reliance on the inventory search exception, we find no error in the judge's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. See Adubato, supra, 420 N.J. Super. at 176.
An inventory search includes "[a]n inventory search of personal effects of an arrestee at a police station." State v. Paturzzio, 292 N.J. Super. 542, 550 (App. Div. 1996) (holding the search of the arrestee's pocketbook was reasonable). "A range of governmental interests supports an inventory process"; including deterring arrestees' false claims of loss or stolen items, inhibiting "theft or careless handling" of arrestees' possessions, reducing the risk of injury to arrestees from items on their persons, and removing "[d]angerous instrumentalities -- such as razor blades, bombs, or weapons." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 71 (1983). An inventory search cannot, however, be "a subterfuge for a warrantless investigatory search"; rather, it must be conducted according to "standard departmental procedure." State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 585 (1980).
Here, Streater testified that it was his department's standard procedure to conduct an inventory when an arrestee is brought to the police station. The trial judge accepted that testimony and found that the purse was searched for administrative inventory purposes.
Furthermore, given the facts in this record, Streater was not required to offer defendant an opportunity to consent to the search or "make other arrangements for the disposition of the personal property." See State v. Padilla, 321 N.J. Super. 96, 111 (App. Div. 1999), certifs. denied, 162 N.J. 198, and aff'd o.b., 163 N.J. 3 (2000). The trial judge found that the purse was brought with defendant to the police station, and there was no indication that Streater requested defendant to bring the purse or even suggested that she bring the purse. To the contrary, Streater could not recall the exact circumstances of how defendant came to have her purse when she exited the vehicle, and he explained that he was not focused on the purse at the time of defendant's arrest. The trial judge accepted Streater's testimony and we discern no error because her fact-findings are based on credible evidence in the record. No facts in this record suggest that the police sought to conduct an investigative search of defendant's purse looking for evidence of criminal activity.
Because the search of defendant's purse was a lawful inventory search, we find no error in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the stun gun.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION