State v. Plante

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Chrisicos

    148 N.H. 546 (N.H. 2002)   Cited 3 times

    "[B]efore a statement can be admitted into evidence, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was apprised of his or her constitutional rights and that the subsequent waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent." State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386 (1990). On appeal, "[w]e will not reverse the trial court's finding on the issue of waiver unless the manifest weight of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is to the contrary."

  2. State v. Girmay

    139 N.H. 292 (N.H. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    [5-7] Before the defendant's statement can be admitted into evidence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was apprised of his constitutional rights and that his subsequent waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386, 577 A.2d 95, 97 (1990). The waiver need not be explicit to be valid; in the absence of an express waiver, we look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether the defendant's understanding of his rights, together with his conduct, support the trial court's ruling that he waived his rights beyond a reasonable doubt.

  3. Hurlburt v. Cunningham

    802 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.H. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    In making this decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that the trial court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Hurlburt, 135 N.H. 143, 603 A.2d 493, 495 (1991) (citing State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 387, 577 A.2d 95 (1990); See doc. no. 17, Attachment 4 to Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition. The court continued by stating that the lower court's "'finding on the issue of waiver (will not be reversed] unless the manifest weight of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is to the contrary.'"

  4. State v. Gagnon

    139 N.H. 175 (N.H. 1994)   Cited 9 times

    A valid waiver need not be explicit, but absent an explicit waiver, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the record supports the trial court's ruling that the defendant waived his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386-87, 577 A.2d 95, 97 (1990). Recognizing that a trial court is "in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, we will not reverse its finding on the issue of waiver unless the manifest weight of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is to the contrary."

  5. State v. Stayman

    640 A.2d 771 (N.H. 1994)   Cited 13 times

    [1] Before a defendant's statement can be admitted into evidence, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was apprised of her constitutional rights and that any waiver was knowing and intelligent. State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386, 577 A.2d 95, 97 (1990). The State must show that the defendant actually understood her rights, not that she reasonably should have.

  6. State v. Watson

    170 N.H. 720 (N.H. 2018)   Cited 14 times
    Ruling that, under the State and Federal Constitutions, defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent under Miranda because, although the defendant "indicated that he was not comfortable speaking" about a particular topic, and displayed "obvious apprehension at going forward," he "neither said that he wanted to remain silent nor that he did not want to speak with the police"

    The totality of these circumstances supports the trial court's determination that the defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386–87, 577 A.2d 95 (1990) (determining that, although the defendant was not asked whether he "waived" his Miranda rights, his responses and agreement to talk supported the trial court's ruling that he implicitly waived those rights). Because the Federal Constitution affords the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.

  7. State v. Higgins

    149 N.H. 290 (N.H. 2003)   Cited 17 times
    Indicating that a person's "status as a prostitute" does not imply that "she will accept every opportunity that comes along to engage in sexual relations or relent to the desires of any paying customer, regardless of her motivation for engaging in prostitution in the first instance"

    Because the trial court faced conflicting testimony on this issue and it "was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, we will not reverse its finding [in favor of the State] unless the manifest weight of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is to the contrary."State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 387 (1990). According to the interrogating officers, Detectives Stacey Howe and James Soucy, they began their interview with the defendant around 8:15 p.m., after his arrest.

  8. State v. Roache

    148 N.H. 45 (N.H. 2002)   Cited 16 times

    Accordingly, before statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation may be considered as evidence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977), that the defendant was warned of his constitutional rights, see State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 730 (1979), and that any subsequent waiver of those rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. See State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386 (1990). "The requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver implies a rational choice based upon some appreciation of the consequences of the decision."

  9. State v. Grant-Chase

    140 N.H. 264 (N.H. 1995)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer, and officer testified that request was unambiguous

    If, upon clarification, the defendant states that the purpose of the request for counsel was unrelated to the subject matter of the imminent questioning or that the purpose of the call was merely to seek advice of counsel on how to proceed with imminent questioning, the police may proceed with questioning. of course, before any questioning begins, the police would have to secure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary Miranda waiver. See State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386, 577 A.2d 95, 97 (1990). If, upon clarification, after talking with counsel, the defendant states that she does not wish to proceed with questioning until counsel is present, that right must be scrupulously honored and no police questioning may follow. Cf. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153.

  10. State v. LaFountain

    138 N.H. 225 (N.H. 1994)   Cited 6 times

    [2] Before the defendant's statement could be admitted into evidence, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights and that his subsequent waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See State v. Plante, 133 N.H. 384, 386, 577 A.2d 95, 97 (1990); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977). The State was required to show that the defendant actually understood his rights, see State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 494, 484 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1984), and that his decision to waive his rights was "based upon some appreciation of the consequences of the decision."