State v. Piorkowski

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Revelo

    256 Conn. 494 (Conn. 2001)   Cited 50 times
    Finding “no difficulty” in discerning from record that “trial court imposed a more severe sentence on the defendant solely because he asserted his right to a judicial ruling on his motion to suppress”

    State v. Revelo, supra, 55 Conn. App. 226 ( Shea, J., dissenting). Judge Shea explained that both the Appellate Court, in State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996), and this court, also in State v. Piorkowski, 236 Conn. 388, 400, 672 A.2d 921 (1996), have "explicitly rejected the view . . . that § 54-94a restricts the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to consider issues involved in an appeal beyond those specified in the statute." State v. Revelo, supra, 55 Conn. App. 229 ( Shea, J., dissenting).

  2. State v. Piorkowski

    243 Conn. 205 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 21 times
    Discussing Stoddard and noting that, although our state constitution "scrupulously protects the right of an individual's access to counsel, we always have recognized that the right to counsel is a personal right"

    The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant's claims were not reviewable under Practice Book § 4003, which applies to appeals of conditional pleas, and it remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. See State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995). This court then granted the defendant's petition for certification limited to the issue of whether the defendant's claims were entitled to appellate review.

  3. State v. Piorkowski

    236 Conn. 388 (Conn. 1996)   Cited 35 times
    In State v. Piorkowski, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996), we explained that, "[i]n the jurisprudence of statements made to the police by persons accused of crime, traditionally there are two types of ‘voluntariness’ inquiries.

    The defendant, Michael Piorkowski, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court which declined to review his claims regarding the admissibility of certain statements that he had made to the police, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995). The defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that his claims were not reviewable under General Statutes § 54-94a, Practice Book § 4003 or the appellate supervisory power over the administration of justice.

  4. State v. Piorkowski

    658 A.2d 980 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    Decided May 8, 1995 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 252 (AC 13537), is granted, limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of this case, was the defendant entitled to appellate review of the admissibility of his statements?

  5. State v. Palkimas

    116 Conn. App. 788 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    " State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 98, 503 A.2d 136 (1985). It "did not [however] create a new jurisdictional doorway into [the Appellate Court]." State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 259, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). See also Practice Book § 61-6 (2) (i).

  6. Brehm v. Brehm

    65 Conn. App. 698 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 18 times
    In Brehm v. Brehm, 65 Conn.App. 698, 83 A.2d 1068 (2001), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to open judgment of dismissal where the trial court stated that even if it were to accept the representations of the defendant's counsel that the defendant did not learn until some time in December 2000 that he was required to attend a mandatory workshop on the day of trial, it would not grant the motion to reopen the dismissal because the defendant had ample time before the trial date to inform the court and to seek a continuance.

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 265, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). Where, as here, an appellant fails to follow the most basic rules established to guarantee the presentation of an adequate record, this court should not exercise its supervisory powers to afford the appellant review of his claim.

  7. State v. Revelo

    55 Conn. App. 217 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    "When viewed in light of the definition of subject matter jurisdiction and the statutes that create such jurisdiction, it becomes clear that § 54-94a neither confers nor curtails appellate subject matter jurisdiction." State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). Our Supreme Court has adopted the same position: "We agree with the defendant and the Appellate Court that § 54-94a is not a subject matter jurisdictional statute."

  8. Ireland v. Ireland

    45 Conn. App. 423 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 6 times

    Accordingly, we exercise our supervisory authority to provide guidance in this area of the law and endorse the D'Onofrio criteria for use in future postjudgment relocation cases. See State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 265, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995); O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78, 521 A.2d 599 (1987). In this case, we conclude that the trial court essentially considered those criteria.

  9. Winn Management Co. v. Firment

    1997 Ct. Sup. 11128 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    " (Emphasis added.) State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 104 (1995), reversed on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996); see HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 657, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995) ("The legislature is the branch of government empowered to bestow subject matter jurisdiction."). "Summary process is a statutory remedy that enables a landlord to recover possession from a tenant upon the termination of a lease."

  10. Leventhal v. Janicki

    1997 Ct. Sup. 9215 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    " (Emphasis added.) State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 104 (1995), reversed on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996); see HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 657, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995) ("The legislature is the branch of government empowered to bestow subject matter jurisdiction."). "Practice Book rules do not ordinarily define subject matter jurisdiction."