State v. Revelo, supra, 55 Conn. App. 226 ( Shea, J., dissenting). Judge Shea explained that both the Appellate Court, in State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996), and this court, also in State v. Piorkowski, 236 Conn. 388, 400, 672 A.2d 921 (1996), have "explicitly rejected the view . . . that § 54-94a restricts the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to consider issues involved in an appeal beyond those specified in the statute." State v. Revelo, supra, 55 Conn. App. 229 ( Shea, J., dissenting).
The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant's claims were not reviewable under Practice Book § 4003, which applies to appeals of conditional pleas, and it remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. See State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995). This court then granted the defendant's petition for certification limited to the issue of whether the defendant's claims were entitled to appellate review.
The defendant, Michael Piorkowski, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court which declined to review his claims regarding the admissibility of certain statements that he had made to the police, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995). The defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that his claims were not reviewable under General Statutes § 54-94a, Practice Book § 4003 or the appellate supervisory power over the administration of justice.
Decided May 8, 1995 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 252 (AC 13537), is granted, limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of this case, was the defendant entitled to appellate review of the admissibility of his statements?
" State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 98, 503 A.2d 136 (1985). It "did not [however] create a new jurisdictional doorway into [the Appellate Court]." State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 259, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). See also Practice Book § 61-6 (2) (i).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 265, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). Where, as here, an appellant fails to follow the most basic rules established to guarantee the presentation of an adequate record, this court should not exercise its supervisory powers to afford the appellant review of his claim.
"When viewed in light of the definition of subject matter jurisdiction and the statutes that create such jurisdiction, it becomes clear that § 54-94a neither confers nor curtails appellate subject matter jurisdiction." State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). Our Supreme Court has adopted the same position: "We agree with the defendant and the Appellate Court that § 54-94a is not a subject matter jurisdictional statute."
Accordingly, we exercise our supervisory authority to provide guidance in this area of the law and endorse the D'Onofrio criteria for use in future postjudgment relocation cases. See State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 265, 656 A.2d 1046 (1995); O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78, 521 A.2d 599 (1987). In this case, we conclude that the trial court essentially considered those criteria.
" (Emphasis added.) State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 104 (1995), reversed on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996); see HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 657, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995) ("The legislature is the branch of government empowered to bestow subject matter jurisdiction."). "Summary process is a statutory remedy that enables a landlord to recover possession from a tenant upon the termination of a lease."
" (Emphasis added.) State v. Piorkowski, 37 Conn. App. 252, 258, 656 A.2d 104 (1995), reversed on other grounds, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996); see HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 657, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995) ("The legislature is the branch of government empowered to bestow subject matter jurisdiction."). "Practice Book rules do not ordinarily define subject matter jurisdiction."