[3] We agree with appellants, an agency created by statute has only those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied from the statute. Ortblad v. State, 85 Wn.2d 109, 530 P.2d 635 (1975); State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). An agency cannot legislate, its rules must be within its statutory framework.
Administrative agencies are creatures of the legislature without inherent or common-law powers and may exercise only those powers conferred either expressly or by necessary implication.State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 581, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). Accord, State ex rel. Eastvold v. Maybury, 49 Wn.2d 533, 304 P.2d 663 (1956).
(Additionally, in Johnson a statute expressly authorized the county board to "review, change and modify" its prior decision.) An express grant must emanate from a body with legislative power, State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 580, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974) (state agency's powers must come from Legislature); Cole v. State Utils. Transp. Comm'n, 79 Wn.2d 302, 306, 485 P.2d 71 (1971) (same), and here there was no statute or ordinance authorizing reconsideration. We observe parenthetically that the Board in its capacity as the legislative body for a home rule county may have had inherent legislative power to enact an ordinance granting to itself, in its capacity as a quasi-judicial hearing tribunal, quasi-judicial power to reconsider and alter previous decisions ( see Bartz v. Board of Adj., 80 Wn.2d 209, 214, 492 P.2d 1374 (1972)); but assuming that it had such power, it had not exercised it at the times relevant here.
[1, 2] Administrative agencies are creatures of the legislature without inherent or common-law powers and may exercise only those powers conferred either expressly or by necessary implication. State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 581, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). The director of the Department of Fisheries adopted WAC 220-20-010 pursuant to an enabling statute, RCW 75.08.080, which confers upon him general power to make regulations specifying when the taking of food fish is lawful or prohibited, and such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and duties of the department.
This being the case, reference must be made to the long-standing rule that an administrative department of state government authorized to act by statute is a creature of the Legislature without inherent or common law powers and thus may exercise only those powers conferred by statute. See State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). In Boydston v. State, Okl., 277 P.2d 138 (1954), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in the Syllabus to its opinion as follows: "Generally, when boards or commissions are created by statute, their powers are limited to those granted by the applicable statute, which may not be enlarged by the board itself."
This being the case, reference must be made to the long-standing rule that an administrative department of state government authorized to act by statute is a creature of the Legislature without inherent or common law powers and thus may exercise only those powers conferred by statute. See State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). In Boydston v. State, Okla., 277 P.2d 138 (1954), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in the Syllabus to its opinion as follows:
Having these facts in mind, reference must be made to the long standing rule that an administrative entity of state government created by statute is a creature of the legislature without inherent or common law powers and thus may exercise only those powers conferred by statute. See State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). In Boydston v. State, Okla., 277 P.2d 138 (1954), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in the Syllabus to its opinion as follows: