Id. at 139, 571 N.E.2d at 714. In granting appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court relied upon State v. Pfouts (C.P.1992), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 587, 609 N.E.2d 249, in which the child-abuse victim, who was fourteen at the time the abuse occurred, did not report it to authorities until she reached age twnety-one. The court held that the misdemeanor charge was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A).
The focus of these cases is whether or not the tolling of the statute of limitations adopted in Hensley terminates when the victim reaches the age of majority. In State v. Pfouts (1992), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 587, the Common Pleas Court of Wood County distinguished Hensley in a misdemeanor sexual imposition prosecution where the victim did not report the crime allegedly committed upon her at age 14 until she reached the age of 21. The court held that the tolling of the statute of limitations ceased upon the victim's attaining the age of eighteen and dismissed the indictment.
In State v. Hughes (1994), 92 Ohio App.3d 26, 633 N.E.2d 1217, the Court of Appeals for Brown County determined that the tolling of the statute of limitations ceases when the victim attains the age of majority. The court relied upon the reasoning of State v. Pfouts (1992), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 587, 609 N.E.2d 249, in which the child-abuse victim was fourteen years old at the time the abuse occurred, and did not report it to the authorities until she was twenty-one years old. The court found that a child-abuse victim is "presumed to have understood and acknowledged the act and the criminal nature of the act upon attaining the age of majority; and, absent a showing to the contrary rebutting such presumption, the tolling of the statute of limitations with regard to that act ceased upon the child-victim's attaining the age of eighteen years."
" In State v. Hughes (1994), 92 Ohio App.3d 26, 633 N.E.2d 1217, the Court of Appeals for Brown County relied upon the reasoning of State v. Pfouts (C.P.1992), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 587, 589-590, 609 N.E.2d 249, 251, wherein the court found that a child-abuse victim is "presumed to have understood and acknowledged the act and the criminal nature of the act upon attaining the age of majority; and, absent a showing to the contrary rebutting such presumption, the tolling of the statute of limitations with regard to that act ceased upon the child-victim's attaining the age of eighteen years." We decline to adopt such a presumption where there is no legislative authority for it.