Summary
In Finley, we specifically held that "the Probate Court is a court of general jurisdiction" for purposes of exercising inherent judicial authority.
Summary of this case from State ex rel. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. O'DiamOpinion
No. 34205
Decided April 13, 1955.
Courthouses — Court located therein — Paramount right to space as against others — Space reasonably necessary, not merely desirable — Necessity for space a question of fact — Legislative, executive and judicial branches of government — Neither may impinge on authority or rights of others.
1. The legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and distinct and neither may impinge upon the authority or rights of the others; such branches are of equal importance; and each in exercising its prerogatives and authority must have regard for the prerogatives and authority of the others.
2. A court of general jurisdiction located in a courthouse has a paramount right to space therein which is essential for the proper and efficient operation of such court, but the necessity for such space constitutes a question of fact and a court is entitled to additional space as against other branches of government only where it is shown that such space is reasonably necessary for its operation as distinguished from being merely desirable.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Tuscarawas County.
On April 6, 1954, appellee, Ralph Finley, Judge of the Probate Court of Tuscarawas County, instituted an action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Tuscarawas County against B.K. Pfeiffer, Roy Kennedy and Elmer Miller, members of the Board of County Commissioners of Tuscarawas County, hereinafter called respondent. In his amended petition relator alleges that the building commissioners of Tuscarawas County caused to be erected a courthouse in such county, pursuant to law; that such courthouse is now occupied by the Probate Court, together with other offices; that the respondent is charged by law with the duty to furnish the Probate Court with the necessary offices, supplies and equipment for performing its functions; that the office quarters and courtroom facilities in the courthouse, which have been furnished to and are now in use by the Probate Court, are wholly inadequate by reason of lack of room in which to carry on the regular duties of the court; that the location of a portion of such offices is such that the court can not maintain proper supervision and safeguard over the files and journals of the court; that there is additional room in the courthouse, adjoining the present offices of the Probate Court, which is occupied by the County Recorder; that such additional room is needed by the Probate Court for the purpose of a courtroom and jury room; that it will be necessary to make certain alterations in the providing and equipping of the additional room for such purpose, namely, the cutting of a door from the judge's chamber into such room and the installation of necessary equipment for such courtroom and jury room and an acoustical ceiling for the same; and that on April 3, 1954, the relator entered upon the court's journal the following finding and order:
"In the Matter of Additional Space for the Probate Court.
"This court now finds the space now provided within the courthouse for the use of the Probate Court is inadequate by reason of lack of room to carry on the duties of the said Probate Court, and that it is such the court cannot maintain the proper supervision of the files and journals.
"Such court further finds that additional space is needed for filing space and for a courtroom and jury room, and that the board of commissioners have heretofore been requested to furnish the same, and they have failed and refused to do so.
"It is hereby ordered that this finding of the court be spread upon the journal of this court, and the board of commissioners, by furnishing a certified copy of the same.
"Ralph Finley, Probate Judge."
Relator alleges further that he has made demand upon the respondent to provide the court with the necessary space for the purposes alleged, but respondent has refused to do so.
Relator prays that an alternative writ of mandamus issue forthwith, ordering the respondent to provide the accomodations for the use of the Probate Court, as set forth, and to make the necessary alterations and to furnish the supplies, equipment and furnishings needed for the proper functioning of the court, or to show cause why it has not done so.
In its answer the respondent admits most of the allegations of the amended petition but alleges that the office quarters and courtroom facilities furnished to and in use by the Probate Court are adequate for carrying on the regular duties of the court; that the location of the offices is such that the court can maintain proper supervision and safeguard over the files and journals of the court, if available space is utilized; and that the respondent has provided the Probate Court with the necessary offices, supplies and equipment.
Respondent prays that the alternative writ be dissolved and the amended petition dismissed.
Relator filed a reply in the nature of a general denial of everything contained in the answer, except admissions in the answer of various allegations in the amended petition.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, ordered that the alternative writ of mandamus be made absolute; and that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue against respondent for the performance of the acts sought.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Mr. Arthur Limbach, for appellee.
Mr. Danny D. Johnson, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Joseph M. Streb, for appellants.
The majority of the Court of Appeals based its decision upon the case of Zangerle, Aud., v. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, 46 N.E.2d 865, the syllabus of which reads as follows:
"1. The primary and paramount purpose of a courthouse, as its name implies, is to furnish the rooms and facilities essential for the proper and efficient performance of the functions of the court.
"2. Courts of general jurisdiction, whether named in the Constitution or established pursuant to the provisions thereof, possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial functions and can not be directed, controlled or impeded therein by other branches of the government.
"3. Such courts may pass upon the suitability and sufficiency of quarters and facilities for their occupation and use, and may exercise control over the courthouse to the extent required to assure the provision, equipment and maintenance in the courthouse of rooms and facilities essential for their proper and efficient operation."
In the majority opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the Probate Court is a court of general jurisdiction, that the law as indicated in the syllabus of the Zangerle case applies to it, that the necessity of the facilities prayed for by relator does not constitute a question of fact, and that, therefore, testimony adduced in reference thereto was irrelevant and immaterial.
The court held further that, since an abuse of discretion is not an issue in the case, it had no alternative except to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring respondent to do all the things prayed for in the amended petition.
The dissenting judge was of the opinion that the Probate Court is not a court of general jurisdiction but one of limited jurisdiction; that in Section 2101.01, Revised Code, it is provided that a Probate Court is established for each county and shall be held at the county seat in an office supplied by the Board of County Commissioners; that from this section it is clear that the Board of County Commissioners is not required to furnish an office in the courthouse; and that, as a result, the Zangerle case has no application to a Probate Court.
We are of the opinion that the Probate Court is a court of general jurisdiction. Assuredly, it has full authority and power to deal with all the subjects entrusted to it, whether that dealing involves legal or equitable jurisdiction. It is a court established by the Constitution, and, if it can be said to be a court of limited jurisdiction, that same postulate can be made with reference to any of the courts of the state. Each of them has only such jurisdiction and power as the Constitution and the laws enacted thereunder give to it, and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the Zangerle case applies to the Probate Court where that court is located in the courthouse.
It will be noted that in the third paragraph of the syllabus of the Zangerle case the words, "in the courthouse," are italicized. However, we are presented with another question.
The Zangerle case was distinguished by this court in the case of In re Rooms and Facilities of the Common Pleas Court of Marion County, 162 Ohio St. 345, 123 N.E.2d 521.
In the Marion County case the syllabus reads as follows:
"In view of the provisions of the Ohio statutes, the Common Pleas Court has no power to order the county commissioners to provide an elevator and a shaft therefor in its courthouse even where it has determined that such elevator is essential to the efficient performance of the functions of that court. ( Zangerle, Aud., v. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, distinguished.)"
The Zangerle case reviews the statutes which give the county commissioners the authority to provide a courthouse, the equipment, stationery and postage for use therein, and such facilities as will result in the expeditious and economical operation of the county offices.
The Marion County case points out that, although the second paragraph of the syllabus in the Zangerle case is very broad in its language, it must be confined to the facts in that case, and that the court there had no power to order the county commissioners to make permanent or capital improvements in a courthouse.
Assuredly, a court of general jurisdiction has great inherent power to acquire and control the ordinary facilities which are essential to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise of its functions. However, that inherent power can not be exercised except for the acquisition of necessary as distinguished from desirable quarters and space.
It must be noted that in the Zangerle case the court was not proceeding against the county commissioners but was defending in an action brought by the County Auditor against it, in which the auditor attempted to prohibit the court from taking certain space from him. From aught that appears in the opinion, no question was raised as to the necessity for the court to have the additional space, and, since the spatial and other requirements of the court must be paramount in a courthouse, the auditor's action was dismissed.
In the present case, the court is not only attempting to secure the space which had been assigned to the County Recorder, but is attempting to compel the respondent to do construction work in reference to the new space, including the installation of an acoustical ceiling. It may be arguable that this latter installation may be governed by the decision in the Marion County case.
Many ridiculous results would ensue if the inherent power of the court was not confined to the acquisition of the space and facilities essential for its proper and efficient operation. In fact, that is the very language of the third paragraph of the syllabus in the Zangerle case. Therefore, the reasonable necessity for additional space, where a court demands space occupied by other branches of government, is a question of fact.
The legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and distinct and neither may impinge upon the rights or authority of the others. They are all of equal importance, and each in exercising its prerogatives and authority must have regard for the prerogatives and authority of the others. Therefore, where a court demands additional space in the courthouse, it is relevant and material to inquire whether the additional space is essential for the proper and efficient operation of the court, and, where a court is passing upon such demands of another court, evidence concerning the necessity of increased space and facilities for the demanding court should be received, and it would be error to exclude it. Any other rule would result in chaos.
Two courts of general jurisdiction might each demand the same additional space, and, unless the question of the necessity for the space were one of fact, it would be impossible to resolve such conflicting demands.
It is maintained in the present case, however, that the question of evidence is not before us because there is no bill of exceptions, and, in fact, relator has filed a motion for an affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals upon that ground and upon the ground that the record is insufficient to present a question which this court may consider. That motion raises a somewhat close question, but we find in the journal entry of the Court of Appeals that certain testimony was adduced subject to a reserved ruling as to its competency, and that the testimony adduced was held irrelevant and immaterial because the necessity for the facilities is not a question of fact. It may be inferred that, since that was the only reason given by the Court of Appeals for the rejection of the proffered testimony, such testimony would be relevant and material were the question of the necessity of the facilities one of fact.
We conclude, therefore, that under the record in this case we are justified in holding that the Court of Appeals was in error in rejecting any testimony with reference to the necessity for the additional space and facilities demanded by the Probate Court. For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to that court for the taking of testimony as to the reasonable necessity for the additional space and facilities demanded by the Probate Court.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN, BELL and TAFT, JJ., concur.