North Carolina has addressed this concern, in more general form, in a series of cases dealing with the trial judge's power to accept, reject, or modify a verdict with formal defects. See State v. Sumner, 269 N.C. 555, 153 S.E.2d 111 (1967) (error to reject ambiguous verdict where it was possible to cull ambiguous language and be left with a clear verdict); State v. Gatlin, 241 N.C. 175, 84 S.E.2d 880 (1954) (no error to reject verdict not responsive to charge, but error to offer suggestive guidance for revision of verdict); State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869 (1945) (error to reject verdict containing clear verdict plus surplusage). In light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner's proposed instruction did not contain "applicable law," and that the trial court therefore had no obligation to give the instruction, either as submitted by petitioner or in any revised form.
State v. Hampton, 294 N.C. 242, 247-48, 239 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Willie McNair cites State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869 (1945), in support of his argument that the trial court "should have acknowledged the verdict first tendered by the jury," finding him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill of Pittman, because the verdict was complete and unambiguous. A review of the record, however, shows that the jury did not render a verdict finding Willie McNair guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill of Pittman. Rather, the trial court initially read the verdict incorrectly due to a clerical error on the verdict sheet discussed in further detail below.
State v. Hampton, 294 N.C. 242, 247-48, 239 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Willie McNair cites State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869 (1945), in support of his argument that the trial court "should have acknowledged the verdict first tendered by the jury," finding him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill of Pittman, because the verdict was complete and unambiguous. A review of the record, however, shows that the jury did not render a verdict finding Willie McNair guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill of Pittman. Rather, the trial court initially read the verdict incorrectly due to a clerical error on the verdict sheet discussed in further detail below.
In making such interpretation, non-essential words which do not cast doubt upon the character of the verdict may be treated as mere surplusage. State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869 (1945). Here, in his final mandate to the jury and throughout the charge, the trial judge made it clear that the jury might find defendant guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the bill of indictment, guilty of the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree, or not guilty. The only possible verdict submitted which contained the language "in the first degree" was the crime charged in the bill of indictment, to-wit: murder in the first degree.
The defendant sought to challenge the verdict on the ground it was neither authorized by the indictment nor by the statute, the latter being G.S. 14-89.1. A verdict should answer the issue raised by the State's charge of guilt contained in the indictment and the defendant's denial raised by his plea of not guilty. "A verdict is not bad for informality . . . in the language . . . if it is such that it can be clearly seen what is intended. It is to have a reasonable intendment and is to receive a reasonable construction and must not be voided except from necessity." State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869. See also State v. Rhinehart, 267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651. The indictment charged that the defendant by the use of a hammer, torch, chisel, hacksaw, etc. did unlawfully and feloniously force open and attempt to force open the safe and vault being used for the storage of money and other valuables, the property of the named corporation.
These principles of law are well settled in this State: While a verdict is a substantial right, it is not complete until accepted by the court for its records. S. v. Rhinehart, 267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651; S. v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869. Verdicts in criminal cases ought to be clear and free from ambiguities and uncertainties. S. v. Rhinehart, supra; S. v. Jones, 227 N.C. 47, 40 S.E.2d 458. The enforcement of the criminal law and the liberty of citizens demands exactitude. S. v. Jones, supra. In accepting or refusing a verdict the trial judge cannot exercise unrestrained discretion.
State v. Gatlin, 241 N.C. 175, 84 S.E.2d 880. It is a substantial right, but it is not complete until it is accepted by the court for record. State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869. The court should examine a verdict as to form and substance so as to prevent a doubtful or insufficient finding from becoming the record of the court, but this power to accept or reject a verdict is restricted to the exercise of a limited legal discretion. State v. Perry, supra; State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172.
"When and only when, an incomplete, imperfect, insensible, or repugnant verdict, or a verdict which is not responsive to the issues or indictment is returned, the court may decline to accept it and direct the jury to retire, reconsider the matter, and bring in a proper verdict." State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869; citing State v. Noland, 204 N.C. 329, 168 S.E. 412; State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172; State v. McKay, 150 N.C. 813, 63 S.E. 1059; State v. Arrington, 7 N.C. 571. To the foregoing may be added, State v. Lewis, 256 N.C. 430, 124 S.E.2d 115, and State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 556, 11 S.E.2d 567.
Defendant further assigns as error that the court further erred in then recharging the jury and in receiving a verdict that Rhinehart was guilty of a felonious breaking and entry and guilty of larceny as charged in the indictment. A verdict is a substantial right. S. v. Gatlin, 241 N.C. 175, 84 S.E.2d 880. But it is not complete until it is accepted by the court for record. S. v. Gatlin, supra; S. v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869. Verdicts and judgments in criminal actions should be clear and free from ambiguity or uncertainty.
Hence, the trial judge had the discretionary power to give further instructions to the jury and order that they retire and give further consideration to the matter and return a proper verdict." State v. Gatlin, 241 N.C. 175, 84 S.E.2d 880. The case of State v. Perry, 225 N.C. 174, 33 S.E.2d 869, relied on by the defendant, is not in point. The jury in that case returned a permissible verdict.