Opinion
Cr.A. No. IN 02-01-0296 through 0299 ID. No. 0112013022
Submitted September 13, 2002
Decided September 16, 2002
ORDER
This 16th day of September 2002, upon consideration of the Defendants Motion to Suppress, the States Motion in Opposition, the record, testimony and oral arguments by counsel, it appears that: (1) Defendant Leon Perkins ("Perkins") has filed a Motion to Suppress evidence obtained during the search of his automobile after he was pulled over by the New Castle City Police ("NCCP") at about 8:45 p.m. the evening of December 19, 2001. Perkins avers such evidence is the fruit of an unlawful automobile stop executed in absence of reasonable articulable suspicion. (2) Perkins was driving his automobile on a public street, with a female passenger in what has been characterized as a non-residential, industrial district in New Castle County on East 6th Street. The road has two lanes which dead end. Officer Cawley ("Crawley") of the NCCP testified that the area was commercial and housed a number of commercial shipping facilities and warehouses. Many of the area facilities were also under construction. (3) There was testimony that during that year, there had been 62 complaints filed with the NCCP regarding the district, that had triggered investigations into theft, burglary, drugs, and prostitution. Crawley further noted recent theft from construction sites in the area, including a recent tractor trailer theft. The hours of businesses in the area were 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. (4) On the evening of December 19, 2001, at about 8:45 p.m., Crawley observed an automobile exiting the dead end road, and felt it "odd" that a car would be driving in a commercial area given the evening hour. He executed a three-point turn and pursued the vehicle. Crawley's testimony revealed that he had determined to initiate a stop even prior to his three-point turn and pursuit. (5) When he caught up to the vehicle, he activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. Crawley testified that from the time of the initial observation to the time of the automobile stop, no other remarkable event had occurred; the car had not violated any motor vehicle rules, nor had it accelerated or slowed down in response to the officers turn. (6) Crawley's testimony was that Perkins puled over immediately, and had his license, registration, and insurance information in hand before Crawley reached the drivers side window. Crawley testified that he did not intend to issue the driver a citation at the time of the stop. He further testified that he merely planned to collect the driver's information in accordance with DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 Del. C. § 1902, and thereafter release the driver to go about his business.
Crawley testified that the stop location was near the Mattress Giant, and the old Cieba Giegy facility.
§ 1902 (commonly called the "two hour detention rule") states that:
(a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who the officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name, address, business abroad and destination.
(7) It is well understood that police officers, having less than probable cause for an arrest, may stop and provisionally detain an individual for questioning. This power is not unfettered however, in that prior to such a detention "specific and articulable facts,. . . together with all rational inferences [therefrom]. . ." must suggest criminal activity. Consequently, an officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion prior to any temporary detention. In the State of Delaware this, standard has been codified in DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 Del. C. § 1902 and states that an officer must have a "reasonable ground." (8) Reasonable ground for the purpose of the statute "has the same meaning as reasonable articulable suspicion." Therefore, a lawful detention "requires the officer to point to specific facts, which viewed in their entirety accompanied by rationale inferences, support the suspicion that the person sought to be detained was in the process of violating the law." An examination of the totality of circumstances leading to such articulable suspicion will be evaluated through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer, in the same or similar circumstances. Nevertheless, it is well settled that a "defendant's presence in a high crime area late at night. . . [is] alone insufficient to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion." That is, a mere "hunch" or the intrigue generated by a situation that appears a little suspicious, may indeed justify additional investigation, however, more is required to detain and question a suspect.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
See id.
See supra note 2.
See Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999).
See Cummings v. Delaware, 765 A.2d 945, 948 (Del. 2001) citing Jones, 745 A.2d at 861.
See Cummings, 765 A.2d at 948; citing Downes v. State, 570 A.2d 1142 (Del. 1990).
See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989); see e.g. Jones, 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999); Cummings, 765 A.2d at 948.
See Jones, 745 A.2d at 871.
(9) The testimony and record are clear. It was early in the evening on December 19, 2001, and Perkins was lawfully operating his automobile on a public street. Crawley felt that given past criminal activity in the area, and the evening hour that Perkins vehicle appeared suspicious. Crawley made a three-point turn, pursued the automobile and initiated a traffic stop for the purpose of obtaining further information as to the whereabouts and purpose of the drivers activities on the public street. Perkins had committed no traffic violation, nor had he tried to evade Crawley. (10) Crawley may have admirably felt that the circumstances warranted further investigation, but here, the totality of the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion upon which a reasonable police officer would be justified in initiating a stop under DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 Del. C. § 1902. A police officer must develop more facts from which inferences of criminal activity can be drawn, prior to effecting a traffic stop for the purpose of further investigation. It was not enough that there had been recent crime in the area. Nor was it sufficiently odd for a vehicle to be driving in this area at 8:45 p.m. The officer observed neither any potential criminal activity, nor a traffic violation. Under the circumstances, the stop was not justified.
THEREFORE, in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, the traffic stop initiated by Crawley was not justified and the detention and questioning of Perkins was unlawful. Further, any such evidence flowing from the unjustified detention of Perkins is tainted and inadmissible as the fruit of the unlawful stop. The Court neither reaches the issue of the validity of the search by probation officers nor Perkins consent, as they are moot in light of the unjustified detention.
IT IS SO ORDERED.