ailed to make a proper challenge to the prosecutor's claim that the requested sheriff's records were work product); Chillicothe v Knight, 75 Ohio App.3d 544; 599 N.E.2d 871 (1992) (where the plaintiff failed to assert facts to establish materiality, trial court was under no obligation to conduct review of police "use of force" records); Amos v Dist Court of Mayes Co, 814 P.2d 502, 503 (Okla App, 1991) (the trial court must conduct an in camera examination of the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation file even though they are privileged by statute because "[e]xculpatory evidence is always available to a defendant and statutory provisions cannot deny access"); State ex rel Dugan v Tiktin, 313 Or. 607; 837 P.2d 959 (1992) (a judge may not delegate statutory duty to examine a children's services division file upon a showing of good cause for disclosure); State v Leslie, 119 Or. App. 249; 850 P.2d 1134 (1993) (in camera examination of personnel files appropriately balances the interests); State v Pena, 108 Or. App. 171; 813 P.2d 1134 (1991) ( Brady exculpatory standard applied to eye witness records); State v Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d 298 (SD, 1992) (the failure by the trial court to disclose confidential juvenile records after an in camera examination was not error because the records did not contain relevant information); Crawford v State, 863 S.W.2d 152, 165 (Tex App, 1993) (the defendant is entitled to in camera review of confidential "Crime Stoppers" report to determine if Brady information is contained therein); Washington v State, 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex Crim App, 1993) (when a work product privilege is claimed, the defendant is entitled to in camera review of documents for a determination of whether they are discoverable). But cf. DeFries v State, 597 So.2d 742 (Ala App, 1992) (in a jurisdiction that retains a prohibition against impeaching one's own witness, the defendant was not entitled to an in camera inspection of the police report where the officer who prepared the report was called as a
The majority is correct that a party is not required to provide the information specified in ORS 135.815(1) for people it does not intend to call as witnesses. State v. Pena, 108 Or. App. 171, 175, 813 P.2d 1134, rev den 312 Or. 526 (1991). Where the majority errs, I believe, is in interpreting the term "relevant" in that statute to refer only to the material about which a particular witness is expected to testify.