Opinion
COA23-312
10-17-2023
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD ROBERTSON PEAK, JR
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Wendy J. Lindberg, for the State. Drew Nelson for Defendant-Appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 2023.
Appeal by Defendant from Judgment entered 3 August 2022 by Judge Lisa C. Bell in Buncombe County, No. 19CRS83285 Superior Court.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Wendy J. Lindberg, for the State.
Drew Nelson for Defendant-Appellant.
PER CURIAM.
Factual and Procedural Background
Edward Robertson Peak, Jr. (Defendant) appeals from a Judgment entered 3 August 2022 upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of Driving while Impaired (DWI). The Record before us tends to reflect the following:
On 28 March 2019, Defendant was arrested following a traffic stop; Defendant was charged with one count of DWI. Defendant appeared in Buncombe County District Court and pleaded guilty to the single DWI charge. The District Court entered Judgment on 1 December 2021, and Defendant, through counsel, gave oral notice of appeal to the Buncombe County Superior Court. On 1 August 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence seized during the stop and seizure of Defendant. The matter came on before the Superior Court on 2 August 2022. The Superior Court denied Defendant's Motion, stating its Findings of Fact and rationale in open court:
Defendant's appeal was not noted on the Judgment entered by the District Court. However, in the Record on Appeal, the parties stipulate Defendant provided oral Notice of Appeal on 1 December 2021. Further, Defendant was granted a full suppression hearing and jury trial in Buncombe County Superior Court. Out of an abundance of caution, Defendant has filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court in the event we deem his oral Notice of Appeal insufficient to preserve his appeal from the trial court's Judgment. To the extent it is necessary to permit our appellate review of this Judgment, we allow Defendant's Petition and issue our Writ of Certiorari to review the issue raised in Defendant's appeal.
Based on the evidence presented in this motion I find that Deputy Gillstrap did have reasonable articu[l]able suspicion for the stop, specifically considering the totality of the circumstances. One, that Deputy Gillstrap did especially -- or specially trained in DWI investigation and stops as part of the DWI Task Force and has himself investigated between five and six thousand -- or over five to six thousand DWI's.
On this particular incident he encountered [Defendant] stopped at a stop light. There's no testimony that he observed the driving beforehand. There was one distinguishing factor in Roberson is that the officer who stopped the [d]efendant in Roberson did observe the driving for a few minutes beforehand, and there were no issues with the driving before that driver came to a stop. Deputy Gillstrap observed [Defendant] wait approximately 10 seconds before turning after the light at the intersection had turned green. And I agree that Roberson stands for the
proposition being a case of first impression for our Appellate Courts that that alone was not sufficient to establish reasonable articu[l]able suspicion. However, in this matter we have not only the delay, we have the specialized training of Deputy Gillstrap, and we have the area having two open bars serving alcohol within about a quarter of a mile radius of the stop. That there was a ten second delay after the light turned green. That even though there was a wider than standard lane, [Defendant] actually took the turn so widely that he crossed over the yellow lines with both left side tires, and it went into -- his vehicle went into the opposite lane of travel, although there was not traffic coming from the other direction.
Also specifically, [Defendant] continued to travel approximately one to two miles per hour. I can take judicial notice that that is significantly below any speed limit inside the city limits and traveling below the speed limit is also a factor to consider.
Deputy Gillstrap also testified [Defendant] took a sharp turn onto the interstate after accelerating. At that point he had already made the decision to stop based on failure to maintain the lane of travel. So for these reasons I'm denying the Motion to Suppress the stop or the fruit of the stop.
Defendant pleaded not guilty to the DWI charge, and the matter proceeded to trial by jury. On 3 August 2022, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty. Defendant provided oral Notice of Appeal in open court.
Issue
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop.
Analysis
" 'Ordinarily, the scope of appellate review of an order [regarding a motion to suppress] is strictly limited to determining whether the trial [court]'s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the [court]'s ultimate conclusions of law.'" State v. Dahlquist, 231 N.C.App. 100, 101, 752 S.E.2d 665, 666 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Salinas, 366 N.C. 119, 123, 729 S.E.2d 63, 66 (2012)). When considering a motion to suppress, the trial judge "must set forth in the record his findings of fact and conclusions of law." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f) (2021). "These findings and conclusions must be in the form of a written order unless '(1) the trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are no material conflicts in the evidence at the suppression hearing." Dahlquist, 231 N.C.App. at 101, 752 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting State v. Royster, 224 N.C.App. 374, 376, 737 S.E.2d 400, 403 (2012)).
In the case sub judice, there were no material conflicts in the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court announced its Findings of Fact and explained the rationale for its decision in open court. Defendant does not contend the trial court's Findings are not supported by competent evidence. Rather, Defendant argues "the trial court erred in concluding Deputy Gil[l]strap had reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed when he stopped [Defendant]'s car." We disagree.
"Reasonable suspicion is a 'less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Peele, 196 N.C.App. 668, 670, 675 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2009) (quoting State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008)). Officers need "some minimal level of objective justification" as well as "specific and articulable facts . . . [and] rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 129 S.Ct. 264, 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008). The test for reasonable suspicion is the totality of the circumstances, as "a court must consider . . . the whole picture in determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, in making its determination, the trial court considered the following factors: (1) Deputy Gillstrap's specialized training in DWI investigations; (2) Defendant's 10-second delay in proceeding through the traffic light after it turned green; (3) the presence of two open bars serving alcohol "within a quarter mile radius" of the traffic stop; (4) Defendant's vehicle crossing over the yellow lines with both left tires into the opposite lane of travel; and (5) Defendant traveling at one to two miles per hour.
Thus, the trial court's consideration of these facts supports the trial court's determination these circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion. See id. (concluding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, a 30-second delay at a traffic light, coupled with the officer's training and experience, gives rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion for a traffic stop); State v. Hudson, 206 N.C.App. 482, 486, 696 S.E.2d. 577, 581 (2010) (concluding the observation of a vehicle twice crossing the center line justified an officer's stop for a "readily observable" traffic violation); see also State v. Jones, 258 N.C.App. 643, 650, 813 S.E.2d 668, 672 (2018) ("[T]he State's evidence established that [the officer] personally saw Defendant cross the double yellow line dividing the lanes of travel on Highway 32. This was sufficient to give him reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle."). Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding under the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Gillstrap had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop of Defendant. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the Motion to Suppress.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude there was no error at trial and affirm the trial court's Judgment entered 3 August 2022.
NO ERROR.
Panel consisting of: Judges ZACHARY, HAMPSON, and FLOOD.
Report per Rule 30(e).