Opinion
No. 2-025 / 01-0808.
Filed May 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, DALE E. RUIGH, Judge.
David Paulson appeals from the judgment and sentence entered following a jury verdict finding him guilty of willful injury, false imprisonment, and aggravated domestic abuse. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Mary Howell Sirna, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
David Paulson appeals from the judgment and sentence entered following a jury verdict finding him guilty of willful injury, false imprisonment, and aggravated domestic abuse. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
Paulson was accused of committing these offenses for repeatedly striking and pushing his eighty-two-year-old mother, Evelyn Paulson. As a result, Evelyn sustained multiple bone fractures. The State's false imprisonment theory was premised on evidence indicating Paulson dragged his mother from the place where she was initially assaulted into her bedroom where, despite her pleas for assistance, Paulson continued to abuse her for another thirteen hours before summoning emergency medical assistance. Based on this evidence, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. Paulson's motion for judgment of acquittal on the false imprisonment count was denied. Judgment and sentence were entered in accordance with the jury's verdict, resulting in this appeal.
On appeal, Paulson challenges the district court's ruling denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false imprisonment count, citing the State's failure to prove that he intentionally confined Evelyn. He claims that any confinement Evelyn experienced was the result of her incapacity and merely incidental to the commission of the other offenses charged. Paulson also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the effects Paulson's medications had on his ability to form the requisite specific intent to commit the crimes charged.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Confinement .
We review Paulson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Phams, 342 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1983). A jury's guilty verdict is binding upon us unless we conclude the record lacks substantial evidence to support such a finding. State v. Bush, 518 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Iowa 1994). Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993); State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d at 334. While a verdict can rest on circumstantial evidence alone, it must at least raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime. Id.
A person commits false imprisonment by intentionally confining another against his or her will, without a reasonable belief that the person has any right or authority to do so. Iowa Code § 710.7 (1999). Confining another means to substantially restrict his or her freedom to move by force, threat, or deception. Id. In cases where kidnapping or false imprisonment is one of several crimes charged, the State must prove the confinement was not merely incidental to the concurrent commission of another crime, lest every forcible felony be converted into an additional crime. State v. McGrew, 515 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1994); State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1981); State v. Snider, 479 N.W.2d 622, 623 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). In making this determination, we consider whether the confinement substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, significantly lessened the risk of detection, or significantly facilitated escape following consummation of the offense. Rich, 305 N.W.2d at 745; Snider, 479 N.W.2d at 624.
Contrary to Paulson's claims, we find the State's confinement evidence sufficient to support his conviction on the false imprisonment count. As noted earlier, Paulson dragged Evelyn from the place where she was assaulted into her bedroom where he continued to abuse her for another thirteen hours. Any claim that Evelyn's confinement was merely incidental to her incapacityor the assaults underlying the willful injury and domestic abuse counts is belied by testimony indicating that Paulson confined Evelyn as punishment for failing to acquiesce to his demands for money and that he summoned assistance only after she promised to give him all of her money. Based on these facts, the jury could reasonably infer that Evelyn's confinement substantially increased her risk of harm as well as the risk that Paulson's crimes would be detected. We accordingly affirm on this issue.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel .
Paulson also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the effects of his medications on his ability to form the specific intent to harm. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Allison, 576 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Iowa 1998). Ordinarily, we preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 1997). Because we find the record insufficient to address Paulson's claim, we preserve it for possible postconviction proceedings.
The district court is affirmed in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.