Opinion
No. 2-807 / 01-1870.
Filed December 30, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, JERROLD W. JORDAN, Judge.
Norman Duane Paulson appeals from his conviction and sentencing of first-degree criminal mischief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, and Mary Benton, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Norman Duane Paulson appeals his conviction and sentencing for first-degree criminal mischief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
On April 15, 2001, Easter Sunday, Norman Paulsen failed to show up for a family dinner. His brother, Larry, found Paulsen in his truck in a park. Paulson was unresponsive, and Larry noticed a hypodermic needle on the seat of the truck. Suspecting Paulsen was under the influence of drugs, Larry first enlisted the help of their father and then the Coon Rapids police department. When a Coon Rapids police officer arrived, Paulsen did not acknowledge him, but drove away. Thus began a car chase that spanned two counties, involved several law enforcement officers, and reached speeds in excess of eighty miles an hour.
The police officers used various methods in their attempt to stop Paulsen, but he evaded the officers for a time by steering toward and in some instances colliding with the vehicles or by trying to pass them when they got in front of him. Finally, the officers decided to employ a "legal intervention" to stop Paulsen. This strategy was described by one officer as "purposefully hav[ing] a wreck happen." Several police vehicles surrounded Paulsen's truck and rammed into his truck in an attempt to either disable the truck or force Paulsen to bring it to a stop. During the legal intervention, Paulsen's truck swerved toward and collided with at least two police cars, and at least two officers intentionally drove their vehicles into Paulsen's truck. The police eventually ran Paulsen's truck off the road and brought it to a stop. Paulsen remained in his truck, "like he was comatose." He did not say a word and did not respond to orders given by the police. The police broke out the window of his pickup, removed him, and placed him under arrest. Three law enforcement vehicles sustained damage during the chase.
Paulsen was charged with four counts of assault on a peace officer, first-degree criminal mischief, attempting to elude a law enforcement vehicle, operating while intoxicated, and possession of a controlled substance. He was also cited for reckless driving, failing to provide proof of financial responsibility, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failing to obey stop signs. Paulsen waived his right to a jury trial. The district court dismissed one count of assault on a peace officer, but found Paulsen guilty of all other charges. The court found Paulsen caused property damages in excess of $10,000 to two of the law enforcement vehicles involved in the chase. Paulsen appeals his conviction for first-degree criminal mischief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Paulsen alleges his trial counsel was ineffective in two respects: (1) failing to raise a defense of intoxication, and (2) failing to assert that Paulsen was not legally responsible for property damages resulting from the police officers' intentional collisions with his vehicle. Because Paulsen is claiming a violation of a constitutional right, we review his claim de novo. Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1984).
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Paulsen must prove both that his trial counsel breached an essential duty and that prejudice resulted. State v. Shumpert, 554 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1996). In order to satisfy the first prong, Paulsen must overcome the presumption that his trial counsel's actions were reasonable and within the normal range of competency. Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, he must prove a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are normally not decided on direct appeal, but are preserved for postconviction relief proceedings. State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999). When the record is adequate, however, we will resolve ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. Id.
Paulsen first claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an intoxication defense to the first-degree criminal mischief charge. Criminal mischief is a specific intent crime, and the defense of intoxication is available to a defendant to refute his ability to form the requisite specific intent to damage property. State v. Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986); Iowa Code §§ 701.5 and 716.1 (2001). There is substantial evidence in the record tending to prove that Paulsen was intoxicated at the time of the car chase. His brother, as well as several police officers, testified about Paulsen's strange behavior and obvious intoxication. He was found guilty of operating while intoxicated. However, it is unclear from the record why his trial counsel did not raise the intoxication defense. We therefore preserve this issue for possible post-conviction relief proceedings.
Paulsen next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the amount of damages relied upon for his conviction of first-degree criminal mischief. Criminal mischief in the first degree requires proof of damage in excess of $10,000. Iowa Code § 716.3. The officers who testified regarding the damage to their police vehicles admitted that some of the damage occurred when Paulsen struck them with his pickup truck and other damage occurred when the officers intentionally drove their vehicles into Paulson's pickup during the legal intervention. Paulsen contends that if the damages resulting from the police vehicles hitting him were deducted from the total damages to the vehicles, the amount caused by his voluntary acts would be less than $10,000, and he would not be subject to a conviction for first-degree criminal mischief. This proposition was never raised by his trial counsel.
In prosecutions for specific intent crimes, a fact finder may presume, based on the surrounding circumstances, that a defendant intended all the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. State v. True, 190 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1971). We are unable to determine on this record whether there is a factual basis upon which Paulsen's counsel should have asserted that the value of property damages resulting from the collisions intentionally precipitated by Paulsen, when separated from the damages resulting from impacts caused when the officers intentionally crashed their vehicles into Paulsen's truck, did not exceed $10,000. Because the district court did not find Paulsen legally responsible for damages to a third law enforcement vehicle which sustained damage only when the officer driving it intentionally crashed it into Paulsen's truck, we cannot conclude at this juncture that Paulsen has failed to establish prejudice. Accordingly, we also preserve this issue for potential post-conviction proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION.
We affirm Paulsen's conviction for first-degree criminal mischief, but preserve his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for possible post-conviction relief proceedings.