Opinion
CR. A. No. IN06-10-2483-R1.
Submitted: May 9, 2007.
Decided: July 12, 2007, Vacated: July 25, 2007.
The Court vacated its July 12, 2007 decision upon concluding that the decision incorrectly held that the defendant's motion for postconviction relief was not procedurally barred. That determination is the subject of this corrected opinion.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief, DEF. I.D.: 0609016546.
DENIED OR, ALTERNATIVELY, SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 25th day of July, 2007, upon consideration of the Motion for Postconviction Relief brought by Defendant, Jeremiah Pauls ("Defendant"), it appears to the Court that:
1. On March 30, 2007, Defendant filed his first Motion for Postconviction Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is DENIED or, alternatively, SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. On November 26, 2006, Defendant was charged with Assault Second Degree and Attempted Robbery First Degree. On January 29, 2007, Defendant pled guilty to Assault Second Degree, in exchange for which the State entered a nolle prosequi on the charge of Attempted Robbery First Degree. After an extensive colloquy, the Court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation to occur prior to sentencing. During the plea colloquy, the Court advised the defendant that even though the Truth-in-Sentencing guidelines for this offense recommend a sentence of between zero to four years at Level V, the Court in its discretion could impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum of eight years at Level V. On March 23, 2007, Defendant was sentenced to eight years at Level V, suspended after four years for various levels of probation. The Court also ordered the Defendant to pay $137,066.74 in restitution. The Defendant did not appeal his sentence to the Supreme Court of Delaware.
11 Del. C. § 612, a class D felony punishable by up to eight years at Level V incarceration under 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(4).
11 Del. C. § 531, a class B felony punishable by two to twenty-five years at Level V incarceration under 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).
Docket Item ("D.I.") 9, Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form; D.I. 15 at 4:7-13, Colloquy.
D.I. 15 at 4:14-5:1.
D.I. 9; D.I. 15 at 6:17-20.
D.I. 15 at 5:2-6; D.I. 15 at 6:13-16.
D.I. 13, Sentence Order.
Id.
3. Defendant seeks postconviction relief on the ground that his plea agreement is unfulfilled. Specifically, he argues that his sentence is longer than the statute allows because he was told that he faced a maximum of only four years incarceration when he agreed to plead guilty to Assault Second Degree. Defendant points to no legal authority or facts in the record to support his claims.
4. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court must first determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61. To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court will not address the substantive aspects of the claims if Defendant's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: 1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; 2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceedings; 3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and 4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. Under Rule 61(i)(5), a defendant may avoid the first three of these procedural imperatives if the claim is jurisdictional or there is a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation[.]"
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991) ("The first inquiry in any analysis of a post-conviction relief claim is whether the petition meets the procedural requirements of Rule 61.") See also Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
5. Applying the procedural filters to the current case, the Court must conclude that Defendant's motion is procedurally barred. The Court acknowledges that the motion was filed within one year of his sentencing and that this is the first postconviction proceeding relating to this case. Nevertheless, to the extent the Defendant believed he had been sentenced illegally, he was obliged to raise that issue in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware. The Defendant did not take an appeal from his conviction or sentence and, consequently, he is procedurally barred from challenging the legality of his sentence in a motion for postconviction relief. There are no applicable exceptions to this procedural bar applicable here. Accordingly, the motion must be DENIED.
See Wilson v. State, 2006 WL 1291369, *2 (Del.Supr.); Short v. State, 181 A.2d 225, 226-27 (Del. 1962).
SUPER. CT . CRIM . R. 61(3)(i)(3).
6. In addition to passing through the procedural filters, the moving Defendant must set forth a "sufficient factual and legal basis" to support his "collateral attack" on his conviction. "If it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified."
SUPER. CT . CRIM . R. 61(a)(1).
SUPER. CT . CRIM . R. 61(d)(4). See also State v. Jordan, 1994 WL 637299, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. June 23, 1994)("This Court will not address Postconviction Relief claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated.).
7. Assuming arguendo that the Defendant's claim is not procedurally barred, the claim, nevertheless, must be dismissed because it plainly appears on the record that he is not entitled to relief. While Defendant makes no obvious legal argument in his motion, it appears the crux of his motion is that he assented to the Plea Agreement on the condition that he would be charged with a lesser crime than Assault Second Degree, and that this lesser crime would carry a maximum of four years of incarceration. These claims find absolutely no support in the record.
The Court also could reach the merits by considering Defendant's motion as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). See Wilson, supra, at *2 (recognizing that challenge to illegal sentence is properly brought under Rule 35, not Rule 61).
8. First, Defendant's claim that his sentence is longer than the statute allows is inaccurate. Defendant does not specify the statute(s) he claims the Court violated at sentencing. As best as the Court can discern, there are two statutes implicated by the Defendant's claims: 11 Del. C. § 612 and 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(4). 11 Del. C. § 612 provides that Assault Second Degree is a class D felony. 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(4) provides that class D felonies may be punished by up to eight years in prison. Accordingly, Defendant's eight year sentence (suspended after serving four years) does not exceed the statutory maximum of eight years; it is the statutory maximum.
9. Second, Defendant entered his plea with full knowledge of the maximum penalty for the crime to which he pled guilty. In this regard, it is well-settled that a defendant's answers to the Court's inquiries prior to the acceptance of a plea and his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form are presumed to be truthful and binding, absent "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." At the hearing where the Court accepted the Plea Agreement, the Court questioned Defendant in detail regarding his understanding of the Plea Agreement. Defendant knew that he was pleading guilty to Assault Second Degree:
Scott v. State, 2003 WL 22416036, at *1 (Del. Oct. 21, 2003) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997)).
THE COURT: The plea agreement indicates that you will enter a plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment, charging Assault 2nd Degree, a felony offense. In exchange for your plea of guilty to that charge, the State has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in this indictment against you. Is that your understanding?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
D.I. 15 at 4:7-13.
The Court also repeatedly ensured that Defendant knew he might be sentenced to up to eight years in prison:
THE COURT: Do you understand that . . . the Court can sentence you up to the statutory maximum penalty? Do you understand that?
D.I. 15 at 5:2-6.
. . . .
THE COURT: Do you understand that the charge of Assault 2nd Degree carries with it a statutory penalty of up to eight years in jail?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
D.I. 15 at 6:13-16.
Defendant also averred that no one had promised him what his sentence would be and that he entered into the Plea Agreement of his own free will.
D.I. 15 at 7:5-7; 7:8-8:2. See also D.I. 9 (Defendant's signed Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form demonstrates that he understood the nature of the Plea Agreement and the potential sentence he faced).
10. Defendant has offered no evidence, "clear and convincing" or otherwise, to dispute that he accepted the terms of the Plea Agreement knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. He is, therefore, bound by the terms of that agreement, the answers he gave during the plea colloquy, and the lawful sentence imposed upon him by the Court.
Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632.
11. As it plainly appears that Defendant is not entitled to relief, pursuant to Rule 61(d)(4), his motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.