Opinion
(4881) (4882) (4883) (4884) (4885) (4886)
Argued March 1, 1988
Decision released April 19, 1988
Substitute informations, in the first and second cases, charging the defendant with the crime of robbery in the second degree, and informations, in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth cases, charging the defendant with the crimes of larceny in the third degree and forgery in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex and presented to the court, Spallone, J., on pleas of guilty; judgments of guilty of two counts of the crime of robbery in the second degree and four counts of the crime of larceny in the third degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Error; further proceedings.
The appellee filed a motion for reargument which was denied.
Mark Petty, with whom was A. Paul Spinella, for the appellant (defendant).
Vincent J. Dooley, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant appeals from the judgments of conviction, after his pleas of guilty, to two counts of robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-135, and four counts of larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-124. The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in failing, in violation of Practice Book 711 and in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law, to inform him during the plea canvass of the maximum possible sentence and the elements of each crime with which he was charged, and (2) in failing to use the correct standard of proof in granting the state's amended request to correct the transcripts of the plea canvass.
We first address the defendant's claim regarding the trial court's failure to apprise him of the elements of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. The disposition of this issue is controlled by our decision in State v. Loyd, 8 Conn. App. 491, 513 A.2d 193 (1986), cert. denied, 203 Conn. 801, 522 A.2d 293 (1987). In State v. Loyd, we interpreted the constitutional stricture that a plea of guilty must be knowingly and voluntarily made; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); as requiring not only that there be a voluntary waiver during a plea canvass of the right to a jury trial, the right of confrontation and the right against self-incrimination, but also that the defendant "must be aware of and have an understanding of all of the elements of the crime or crimes with which he is charged . . . ." State v. Loyd, supra, 494B. Furthermore, Practice Book 711(1) requires that a trial court not accept a guilty plea until it is satisfied that the defendant "fully understands . . . [t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. . . ." "The provisions of Practice Book 711 are mandatory when challenged on direct appeal." State v. Loyd, supra, 494B.
The defendant did not raise this claim in the trial court. Because the error claimed by the defendant involves the violation of a fundamental constitutional right, however, we will consider it for the first time on appeal. State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 417, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 423, 93 L.Ed.2d 373 (1986); State v. Collins, 10 Conn. App. 659, 665, 525 A.2d 135 (1987).
The record clearly discloses that the defendant was not informed by the trial court during the plea canvass of the essential elements of the crimes with which he was charged. We find error because of this failure to inform the defendant. Since we find error in this regard, we need not address the defendant's other claim.