The State suggests that New Jersey courts have never recognized Laurick relief in any context other than that of an individual who lacks notice of the right to counsel and is prejudiced by the absence of representation. The State notes that in State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 217 A.3d 1143 (2019), this Court distinguished Laurick relief from traditional PCR. According to the State, PCR is both broader -- in absolving defendants of criminal and civil consequences of their convictions -- and narrower, through its five-year time bar. Even if we were to accept the orders as binding, the State argues, we should not construe Laurick relief to bar defendant's prosecution under Section 26(b).
The Court's holding in Laurick is grounded in a defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 120 N.J. at 15; see also State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 440 (2019) (noting "[t]he right-to-counsel principles articulated in Laurick"); State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351, 400-01 (2005) (explaining to obtain relief under Laurick a "defendant has the burden of proving in a second or subsequent DWI proceeding that he or she did not receive notice of the right to counsel in the prior case"). The Court's holding in Laurick "provided a limited form of postconviction relief to those defendants who had not waived their right to counsel 22 and who were not informed by the court of their right to retain counsel or, if indigent, of their right to assigned counsel without cost."
Nor can defendant avail himself of Rule 7:10-2(g), which permits a PCR petition seeking "relief from an enhanced custodial term based on a prior [DWI] conviction" to "be filed at any time." That Rule was specifically adopted by the Court in State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 447 (2019), and is limited to PCR petitions seeking relief under State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990). In Laurick, the Court "provided a limited form of post-conviction relief to those defendants who had not waived their right to counsel and who were not informed by the court of their right to retain counsel or, if indigent, of their right to assigned counsel without cost."
We review de novo the Appellate Division's legal determination that the trial court's application of the crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege to defendant's messages did not violate ex post facto laws. See State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 435, 217 A.3d 1143 (2019) ("We review issues of law de novo and owe no deference to the interpretive conclusions of either the Appellate Division or Law Division."); State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 337, 2 A.3d 379 (2010) ("[A] reviewing court owes no deference to the trial court in deciding matters of law."). We do not review the trial court's decision admitting the text messages for plain error, as the State urges us to do.
In Laurick, "[w]e held that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction could 'not be used to increase a defendant's loss of liberty'" for sentencing purposes upon a subsequent DWI conviction. State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 438 (2019) (quoting Laurick, 120 N.J. at 4). The basic logic of Laurick was that the use of a prior uncounseled conviction as a predicate offense to enhance a custodial sentence was fundamentally unjust.
In sum, Laurick "provided a limited form of post-conviction relief to those defendants who had not waived their right to counsel and who were not informed by the court of their right to retain counsel or, if indigent, of their right to assigned counsel without cost." State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 438 (2019).
Whether a sentence is constitutional is an issue of law, which we review de novo. State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 435 (2019) (citing State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 55 (2018)).
The constitutionality of a sentence is an issue of law, which we review de novo. State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 435 (2019) (citing State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 55 (2018)). In Miller, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."
The judge noted an exception to this rule for "enhanced penalties for second or subsequent convictions" for "DWI offenses, motor vehicle thefts, . . . and penalties for driving while suspended," none of which applied here. See e.g. State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424 (2019); State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 381 (2012); State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990). Turning to the prejudice prong, the judge explained that "defendant has failed to articulate or establish a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea offer for a probationary sentence and gone to trial."
When a defendant files a PCR petition beyond the time prescribed by Rule 3:22-12(a)(1), the court "consider[s] the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits." State v.Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 448 (2019) (quoting State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004)). "Absent compelling, extenuating circumstances, the burden to justify filing a petition after the five-year period will increase with the extent of the delay."