State v. Helmick, 112 Ariz. 166, 169 (1975). Although we have found "contradictory verdicts returned on a single count" to be "impossible in the sense that they cannot be given simultaneous effect," State v. Hansen, 237 Ariz. 61, ¶ 21 (App. 2015), we have upheld "a special verdict on an element of the offense" that was internally inconsistent with the predicate offense within a single count, State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 16 (App. 1991) (trial court did not err in submitting dangerousness allegation to jury on aggravated assault charges, even though jury convicted on aggravated assault but inconsistently found dangerousness allegation not proven). See also State v. Cordova, No. 1 CA-CR 2014-0807, ¶¶ 7-9, 2016 WL 503227 (Ariz.
We find no error. See State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 15-16 (App. 1991) (finding no error when the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault based on use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument but found the offense was not dangerous because the State had not proven the offense involved the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument). 4. Sufficient Evidence for the Verdict
Id. at ¶ 20. ¶10 In State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15 (App. 1991), we affirmed a guilty verdict based on facts similar to those in this case. In Parsons, the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault for assaulting the victim using a "knife and/or board."
Here, the jury may have found Lizarraras not guilty on the criminal damage count "as a compromise verdict," Lewis, 222 Ariz. 321, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d at 413, rather than a determination that the state failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had damaged the vehicle. See State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 16, 827 P.2d 476, 477 (App. 1991) (whether jury's verdict result of carelessness or compromise immaterial, as "'[j]uries may indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries'"), quoting State v. Estrada, 27 Ariz. App. 38, 40, 550 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1976). ¶9 Moreover, Lizarraras admitted he and the others had driven the vehicle.
¶19 Moreover, even if Appellant's armed robbery conviction was inherently dangerous, the jury nonetheless could have found the deadly weapon or dangerous instrument allegation not proven. See id. at ¶ 42 (citing State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 15-16, 827 P.2d 476, 476-77 (App. 1991) (finding no error when a jury rendered inconsistent verdicts by finding the defendant guilty of aggravated assault using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, while finding the State failed to prove dangerousness based on the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument)); see also State v. Estrada, 27 Ariz. App. 38, 40, 550 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1976) (upholding a conviction for conspiracy to violate state narcotics laws, even though the only evidence of an overt act was the substantive offense of heroin possession, of which the defendant was acquitted). II. Other Issues
But the mere possibility of a compromise or inconsistent verdict is not a sufficient ground for reversal. State v. Van Winkle, 149 Ariz. 469, 471, 719 P.2d 1085, 1087 (App. 1986); see also State v. Zakhar, 105 Ariz. 31, 32-33, 459 P.2d 83, 84-85 (1969) (consistency unnecessary; inconsistent verdicts may be result of leniency); State v. DiGiulio, 172 Ariz. 156, 162, 835 P.2d 488, 494 (App. 1992) ("There is no constitutional requirement that verdicts be consistent."); State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 15-16, 827 P.2d 476, 476-77 (App. 1991) (no error in jury finding aggravated assault with deadly weapon but finding state failed to prove dangerous nature of offense). "Well-settled Arizona law permits inconsistent verdicts."
Indeed, in Arizona we do not disturb inconsistent verdicts. Gusler v. Wilkinson, 199 Ariz. 391, ¶ 25, 18 P.3d 702, 707 (2001) ; State v. Zakhar, 105 Ariz. 31, 32, 459 P.2d 83, 84 (1969) ; e.g., Webb, 186 Ariz. at 561, 925 P.2d at 702 (defendant acquitted of felony DUI but convicted of DUI and driving without license); State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 15–16, 827 P.2d 476, 476–77 (App.1992) (defendant convicted of aggravated assault with deadly weapon, but crime found not to be dangerous-nature offense); State v. Estrada, 27 Ariz.App. 38, 39–40, 550 P.2d 1080, 1081–82 (1976) (defendant guilty of conspiracy but acquitted of underlying drug offenses).
SeeA.R.S. § 13–704(L) (“The penalties prescribed by this section shall be substituted for the penalties otherwise authorized by law if ... an allegation of dangerous offense is charged in the indictment or information and admitted or found by the trier of fact.”). Although Larin's armed robbery conviction was inherently dangerous, we acknowledge that the jury nonetheless could have found the dangerousness allegation not proven. See State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 15–16, 827 P.2d 476, 477 (App.1991) (finding no error when jury rendered inconsistent verdicts finding defendant guilty of aggravated assault using deadly weapon or dangerous instrument and finding state failed to prove dangerousness). Notably, in separate proceedings, the jury acquitted Larin of the prohibited possessor charge and found the aggravator of use, threatened use, or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument not proven.
As we concluded above, the guilty finding was reasonably supported by the evidence; moreover, the inconsistency redounds to Garza's benefit. And, had this been a jury trial, a similar verdict would not be subject to a similar challenge. See State v. Zakhar, 105 Ariz. 31, 32-33, 459 P.2d 83, 84-85 (1969) (consistency unnecessary; inconsistent verdicts may be result of leniency); State v. DiGiulio, 172 Ariz. 156, 162, 835 P.2d 488, 494 (App. 1992) ("there is no constitutional requirement that verdicts be consistent."); State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 15-16, 827 P.2d 476, 476-77 (App. 1991) (no error in jury finding aggravated assault with deadly weapon but finding state had failed to prove dangerous nature of offense). The reasoning in Zakhar, that inconsistent jury verdicts may be the result of leniency, is equally applicable to findings in bench trials.
Here, by contrast, the jury had returned a verdict that acquitted Webb of the greater offense; resubmitting the charge to the jury had great potential to work to his detriment, as indeed occurred. The only Arizona cases involving acquittals of which we are aware are State v. Parsons, 171 Ariz. 15, 827 P.2d 476 (App. 1991), and State v. Estrada, 27 Ariz. App. 38, 550 P.2d 1080 (1976), and both are inapposite to this case. In Estrada, the jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy but acquitted him of the substantive charge, which was the only overt act alleged as part of the conspiracy.