Opinion
No. 5-287 / 04-0720
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Thomas W. Mott, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals the judgment and sentenced entered following his guilty plea to second-offense operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Gerald Feuerhelm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Johnson, County Attorney, and Michael K. Jacobsen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
David Michael Parker appeals the judgment and sentenced entered following his guilty plea to operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). He contends the district court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. See Iowa R. Crim P. 2.33(2)( c). We review this claim for corrections of errors at law. See State v. Keys, 535 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Parker also contends his sentence is excessive and arbitrary. We review this claim for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Nelson, 279 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1979) ("[A] sentence within the statutory limits will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion.").
Our supreme court has already determined that a plea of guilty waives challenges based on speedy trial rights. State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001). However, even if this court were to consider the merit of his claim, the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss would be affirmed; as the court noted, the delay in trial was caused by Parker's motion to suppress, which the parties agreed should not be considered until the Iowa Supreme Court's ruling in five similar cases. Accordingly, there was both good cause for the delay, and the delay was attributable to the defendant. See State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999).
We also conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Parker. Parker contends his sentence violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. A sentence that falls within the parameters of a statutorily prescribed penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000). Because Parker's sentence falls within the parameters of the penalty for second-offense OWI, we affirm.