Opinion
No. 5-847 / 04-1868
Filed December 7, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
Troy Parker appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated third offense, habitual offender, and eluding. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Greta Truman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Terry E. Rachels, County Attorney, and Doug Eichholz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Troy Parker appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated, third offense, habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003) and eluding in violation of Iowa Code section 321.279. He argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to (1) move to suppress his admission; (2) move to strike objectionable evidence and (3) object to evidence of prior bad acts. We affirm his conviction and preserve his claims for postconviction relief.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Troy Parker ran a stop sign in rural Marion County on February 13, 2004. When the trooper who watched him speed through the intersection signaled him to stop, Parker engaged him in a six-to-seven-mile high-speed chase. The chase ended when Parker crashed his car in a ditch. Parker left his car and ran into nearby timber. The trooper secured Parker's passenger, then pursued Parker. When he located Parker several minutes later, Parker was jittery and nervous. He told the trooper, "I'm here, you got me. I could have shot you." The trooper took Parker back to the car where at least one other police officer was waiting. They arrested Parker and read him his Miranda rights. At some point, officers asked Parker why he was running from police. Parker reported he was "too high to go to jail." It is unclear whether officers questioned Parker before or after giving him his Miranda rights.
The officers also searched Parker's car at the scene. They found a loaded syringe, which field-tested positive for methamphetamine. At the jail, officers told Parker about the syringe. He told them he'd been looking for the syringe all day.
Parker's complaints stem from the officers' testimony at trial. First, Parker agreed to stipulate to his prior convictions for operating while intoxicated. At trial, however, one of the officers stated that Parker was charged with "OWI third." Second, the officers testified as to both of Parker's incriminating statements. Third, the trooper who chased Parker testified that he had known Parker to be violent.
Parker's attorney objected to the answer containing Parker's real charge, "OWI third," but failed to request the answer be stricken from the record. He later moved for a mistrial based on the statement. When the court denied his motion, he did not want an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement. He feared it would call attention to Parker's prior offenses. The attorney failed to object to the admission of either of Parker's statements. He also failed to object to the characterization of Parker as previously violent.
Parker appeals his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. Standard of Review
Because they are based on constitutional violations, we review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
III. Merits
In order to show his counsel's performance was ineffective, Parker must show (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). Generally, we decline to decide ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002). Instead, we preserve them for postconviction relief proceedings. Id. This practice ensures both that an adequate record of the claim may be developed and that the attorney charged with ineffectiveness may have an opportunity to respond. Id. Generally, we only decide an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal in limited situations. For example, we will decide the claim if counsel's performance was so glaringly incompetent we are able to determine so based on the record before us. State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978). We will also decide the claim if the trial court has already addressed the issue. See State v. Poyner, 306 N.W.2d 716, 719-20 (Iowa 1981). Neither of those exceptions applies here, and we cannot decide on the prejudice prong.
Because Parker makes no other challenges to his conviction, we affirm the judgment of the district court. The record is inadequate, however, to decide his ineffective assistance claims. We therefore preserve those claims for any postconviction relief proceedings that might be commenced.