Summary
In Parker, the supreme court simply reiterated that it had previously answered the same certified question in the affirmative in Gordon/89-Smith.
Summary of this case from St. Clair v. StateOpinion
No. 73140.
November 16, 1989.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal — Certified Great Public Importance Second District — Case Nos. 86-2296, 86-2443, 86-2510, 86-2596, 86-2597 and 87-312 (Collier).
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer and Stephen Krosschell, Asst. Public Defenders, Bartow, for respondents.
We review Parker v. State, 530 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), to answer a previously certified question of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answered the question in the affirmative in State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1989), wherein we held that our ruling in Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987), is applicable to crimes occurring before the effective date of chapter 88-131, section 7, Laws of Florida, but not to crimes occurring after that date. Accordingly, we approve the decision below for crimes occurring before July 1, 1988.
Gordon v. State, 528 So.2d 910, 915-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988):
IN APPLYING CARAWAN V. STATE, 515 So.2d 161 (FLA. 1987), TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, DO CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES FOR THE CRIMES OF SALE OF ONE ROCK OF COCAINE AND POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO SELL THAT SAME ROCK OF COCAINE VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS?
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent to State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 419 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
KOGAN, J., concurs.