Summary
holding "trial delays due to the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID[-]19 global pandemic" did not weigh against the State because "the orders were responding to a deadly and virulent illness over which the court had no control" and the administration of justice "required the courts to ensure the health and safety of its employees and clients"
Summary of this case from State v. CaudillOpinion
A20-1228
07-20-2022
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William Deshawn PAIGE, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, Saint Louis County Attorney, for respondent. Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, Saint Louis County Attorney, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
OPINION
McKEIG, Justice.
This case requires us to answer a question of first impression: Do trial delays caused by the judicial orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic weigh against the State in evaluating whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated? Appellant William Deshawn Paige demanded a speedy trial in February 2020. The district court found good cause to continue the trial, citing the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic. The trial was held in June of 2020, 105 days after Paige made his first speedy-trial demand. Paige was found guilty and received a presumptive sentence. On appeal, Paige claimed his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, arguing in part that the trial delays caused by the statewide orders should weigh against the State. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. Because the trial delays caused by the statewide orders do not weigh against the State and a careful balancing of the relevant factors shows that the State brought Paige to trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values protected by the constitutional right to a speedy trial, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 21, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged William Deshawn Paige with one count of threats of violence in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subd. 1 (2020). The complaint alleged that Paige verbally and physically threatened an apartment maintenance worker with a knife. At the time of the alleged offense, Paige was on intensive pretrial release. A pretrial release evaluation was completed that assigned Paige an extremely high score of 129. Based on these facts, the district court concluded that Paige was not a good candidate for pretrial release or intensive pretrial release, and set his bail at $60,000.
For context, a score of 0-11 is considered low, 12-25 is considered moderate, and anything above 26 is considered high.
On February 18, 2020, Paige waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed pro se, asked for release pending trial, and made a speedy-trial demand. The district court accepted Paige's waiver of his right to counsel, noted it would try to appoint advisory counsel, denied his request for release, and scheduled a jury trial for March 31 in response to the speedy-trial demand. On February 25, 2020, the State amended the complaint and added a charge of second-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2020). On March 3, 2020, Paige moved to dismiss the charges against him for lack of probable cause.
At the same time the district court was addressing pretrial issues in Paige's case, a new virus was rapidly spreading across the globe. In January 2020, the same month that Paige was charged, the World Health Organization labelled the novel coronavirus, otherwise known as COVID-19, a "public health emergency of international concern." Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., WHO Director-General's Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCov) (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-ihr-emergency-committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) [opinion attachment]. On March 11, 2020, nearly a week after Paige filed his motion to dismiss, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, citing over 100,000 cases in over 110 countries and territories worldwide. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., WHO Director-General's Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (March 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 [opinion attachment]. Two days following the pandemic declaration by the World Health Organization, on March 13, 2020, Governor Tim Walz issued Emergency Executive Order No. 20-01, which declared a peacetime emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-01, Declaring a Peacetime Emergency & Coordinating Minnesota's Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19 (Mar. 13, 2020). That same day, the Chief Justice issued an Order which generally suspended trials but omitted cases subject to a speedy-trial demand from the general suspension. See Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide Peacetime Declaration of Emergency, No. ADM20-8001, Order at 2 (Minn. filed Mar. 13, 2020).
Through the duration of the pandemic, the Minnesota Judicial Council held regular meetings to discuss its continuing response to the rapidly changing guidance related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Exactly one week later, on March 20, 2020, when the district court denied Paige's motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, the number of COVID-19 cases worldwide had risen to more than 200,000, with nearly 10,000 deaths, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., WHO Director-General's Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (March 20, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---20-march-2020 [opinion attachment], and the Chief Justice ordered that "[o]ther than for jury trials currently on-going, no new jury trials shall commence before April 22, 2020, or until further order of this court, whichever occurs first," Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide Peacetime Declaration of Emergency, No. ADM20-8001, Order at 3 (Minn. filed Mar. 20, 2020). The Chief Justice's March 20 Order, unlike the March 13 Order, contained no exception for cases subject to speedy-trial demands.
At a pretrial hearing on March 26, 2020, Paige reiterated his speedy-trial demand, but offered to waive that demand if the district court would release him without monetary conditions pending trial. The district court stated that "given the unique circumstances today and by Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court, we're not going to have a trial within that time. And I'll find for good cause to extend those deadlines." The court noted that no jury trials were permitted before April 22, 2020, and therefore rescheduled Paige's trial for April 28, 2020. The district court also did not modify the conditions of Paige's release.
By Paige's next pretrial hearing on April 9, 2020, the number of COVID-19 cases worldwide had risen to more than 1.3 million, with almost 80,000 deaths. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., WHO Director-General's Opening Remarks at the Mission Briefing on COVID-19 (April 9, 2020), WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the Mission briefing on COVID-19 - 9 April 2020 [opinion attachment]. During the hearing, Paige argued that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated and again requested a reduction in his bail. On April 27, 2020, the court issued an order denying Paige's request for a bail reduction. The court also denied Paige's speedy-trial argument, stating:
WHEREAS, the Judicial Council has adopted recommendations that no jury trials should commence prior to June 1, 2020. It is not believed that jury trials can be conducted using remote means. There are significant concerns regarding the ability of the court to follow the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and Minnesota Department of Health
(MDH) recommendations for social distancing during a trial in the courtroom. It would be difficult if not impossible to space individuals, including court staff, parties, witnesses and jurors, 6 feet apart during a trial. Felony jury trials will always require groups in excess of 10 people to gather in one space. Also we do not have Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) such as masks and gloves available for jurors, court staff or parties. We anticipate it will be difficult to get a sufficient number of jurors willing and able to perform jury service given the recommendations that high risk people stay home, and in light of the ongoing public health risk from the pandemic, especially without the ability of the Court to guarantee that we can do it safely in accordance with CDC and MDH guidelines. The Court system is in the process of planning how to safely conduct jury trials in June....
WHEREAS, whether the 60 days was up on April 19 or May 19, the global COVID-19 pandemic and the Minnesota Statewide Declaration of a Peacetime Emergency is good cause to continue the trial outside of the 60 day period so the Court can ensure that the trial can be conducted safely under the guidelines as recommended by the CDC and MDH. A trial setting in June is not far outside of the 60 day period.
WHEREAS, the continuation of the jury trial being necessary and unavoidable, the Court finds that the delay of the trial does not constitute a violation of Defendant's constitutional rights ...
(Emphasis added.) Based on this analysis, the court continued petitioner's April 28, 2020, jury trial to June 2, 2020. The court also scheduled a pretrial hearing for May 14, 2020.
On June 2, 2020, the district court held a court trial. The apartment maintenance worker, a 911 Dispatcher, three officers, an investigator, and a forensic scientist testified at trial consistent with the facts alleged in the complaint. The State also submitted into evidence footage from body cameras worn by two of the officers. The testimony and evidence showed that Paige was bleeding from the hand when officers arrived. Paige told the officers that the knife belonged to the maintenance worker, he never possessed the knife, and that he injured his hand trying to open the door to get his phone from the maintenance worker. DNA testing of the knife revealed "a mixture of four or more individuals," including a "major male DNA profile" matching Paige. The district court found Paige guilty of both charges and sentenced Paige to 57 months with the Commissioner of Corrections for the second-degree assault conviction.
On May 15, 2020, a pilot program for jury trials was authorized. See Order Governing the Operations of the Minnesota Judicial Branch Under Emergency Executive Order Nos. 20-53, 20-56, ADM20-8001, Order at 2 (Minn. filed May 15, 2020). As part of the order, no criminal jury trial could be held prior to July 6, 2020, unless it fell within the scope of the pilot program. Id. at 2-3. Paige's case did not. Paige subsequently decided to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial.
Paige filed an appeal, arguing that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. As part of his argument, Paige asserted that the trial delays caused by the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic should be weighed against the State. The court of appeals disagreed and held that the delays were justified because the State was not responsible for those delays. State v. Paige , No. A20-1228, 2021 WL 3716663, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 23, 2021). After considering all the relevant factors, the court of appeals concluded that Paige's right to a speedy trial was not violated. Id. at *4.
We granted Paige's request for further review.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Paige renews his argument that the trial delays caused by the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic should be weighed against the State. He also argues that when all the relevant factors are carefully balanced, they demonstrate that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We disagree.
The federal and Minnesota constitutions protect a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 ; see also Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967) (stating that the right to a speedy trial is "fundamental"). The right to a speedy trial acts as a "safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." State v. Mikell , 960 N.W.2d 230, 244 (Minn. 2021) (quoting United States v. Ewell , 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966) ). The right to a speedy trial also benefits society as a whole by preventing backlogs in the judicial system, maximizing the potential for rehabilitation, and minimizing systemic costs of pretrial imprisonment. See Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 519-520, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
Minnesota courts consider the nonexclusive list of factors articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), to determine "whether the State brought the accused to trial quickly enough to avoid endangering the values that the right to a speedy trial protects." Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 245. The Barker factors are (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant. State v. Widell , 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ). Further, "[t]he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative." Beavers v. Haubert , 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905). Accordingly, the analysis of the right must be considered within the context of each case. See id.
A.
The first Barker factor (length of delay) can be viewed as a triggering mechanism in the sense that, until a delay is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to examine the other three Barker factors. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ; see also State v. Jones , 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986). Many states require that a trial occur within a specified period following a charge or indictment. United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307, 317-18, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). The Minnesota requirements are stated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provide that:
A defendant must be tried as soon as possible after entry of a plea other than guilty. On demand of any party after entry of such plea, the trial must start within 60 days unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date.
Unless exigent circumstances exist, if trial does not start within 120 days from the date the plea other than guilty is entered and the demand is made, the defendant must be released under any
nonmonetary conditions the court orders under Rule 6.01, subd. 1.
But a violation of Rule 11.09 is not a per se violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial; it only triggers further analysis as to whether a constitutional violation has occurred. State v. Friberg , 435 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1989) ("[D]elays greater than 60 days after a demand for speedy trial has been made are presumptively prejudicial and require further inquiry to determine whether there was good cause for the delay."); see also Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 244 ("[t]here is no fixed rule for all cases that defines how long is too long to wait for a trial."). Put differently, in Minnesota a trial delayed more than 60 days past a defendant's speedy-trial demand is "presumptively prejudicial," meaning consideration of the other three Barker factors is required. See Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (explaining that the term "presumptive prejudice," as used in the threshold context, "does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice," instead "it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry."); see also Friberg , 435 N.W.2d at 512.
Here, Paige made his speedy-trial demand on February 18, 2020. His trial began 105 days later. Because the trial occurred 105 days after Paige made his speedy-trial demand on February 18, 2020, which exceeded the 60-day limit that applies in Minnesota, the delay is presumptively prejudicial, and we must consider the other three Barker factors. See Minn. R. Crim. Pro. 11.09(b) ; Friberg , 435 N.W.2d at 512.
B.
Under the second Barker factor (the reason for delay), we must determine which party is responsible for the delay and the relative weight that should be assigned to this factor based on the reason for the delay. Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Here, the State and Paige agree that the delay is attributable to the State. The remaining question is what, if any, weight we should assign to the second Barker factor, the reason for delay. Deliberate delays intended to hinder the defense weigh heavily against the prosecution. Vermont v. Brillon , 556 U.S. 81, 90, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009). Delays for more neutral reasons, like negligence or overcrowded courts, weigh less heavily against the State, but are still considered because "the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, if a delay is justified, that delay will not be held against the State. Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 251.
Neither party claims that the delays due to the Chief Justice's COVID-19 pandemic orders were deliberate attempts to hamper the defense, but they dispute whether delays caused by the orders should weigh moderately against the State or not at all. Paige argues that the delays are most similar to systemic court-wide delays, which weigh moderately against the State. The State argues that delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic were outside of the government's control and are therefore more similar to delays due to an unavailable witness, which do not weigh against the State. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that trial delays due to the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic do not weigh against the State. Paige's attempt to draw a line between case-specific delays, which he argues do not weigh against the State, and systemic delays, which he argues weigh moderately against the State, is not supported by case law. It is true that some of the reasons that continuances are not held against the State involve circumstances specific to the particular case. See Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 251 (describing an unavailable witness as a delay that "will not be held against the State"); see, e.g., State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015) (holding that there was good cause for a continuance because a State's witness was unavailable and there was a conflict of interest between defendant's counsel and his co-defendant's counsel). It is also true that some of the reasons for a continuance that are held moderately against the State involve systemic delays, like court-created plans to reduce court congestion. See McIntosh v. Davis , 441 N.W.2d 115, 119-20 (Minn. 1989) ; see also State v. Jones , 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986) ("[t]he responsibility for an overburdened judicial system cannot, after all, rest with the defendant."). But we have also said that "in the event of the death of the trial judge or if the courthouse burned and there was no immediate space available, a trial court [would have good cause to] delay commencement of a trial." McIntosh , 441 N.W.2d at 120. Such delays apply to cases within a jurisdiction generally, regardless of the circumstances of a particular case. Consequently, our case law does not draw a line between case-specific and systemic reasons for delay. Instead, the line that emerges is between delays due to circumstances arising from internal factors (court congestion), which weigh moderately against the State, and those arising from external factors (the death of judge or a burned down courthouse), which are not weighed against that State.
When viewed in light of this internal and external distinction, Paige's argument that the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic are similar to the "blitz plan" at issue in McIntosh is unsound. 441 N.W.2d at 117. In McIntosh , the Fourth Judicial District implemented a "blitz plan" to reduce its backlog of criminal cases. Id. The appellants in McIntosh requested a speedy trial, but the request was denied because of the blitz plan. Id. at 117-18. We concluded that "the record is virtually devoid of specific information about why the demands for speedy trial could not be met." Id. at 120. The record specifically lacked any discussion of how accommodating the request for a speedy trial would have upset the blitz plan. Id. As a result, we held that the record did not support a finding of good cause. Id.
The "blitz plan" involved suspending most civil trials during January and February 1989 to maximize the number of judges available to handle criminal matters. McIntosh, 441 N.W.2d at 117. Criminal cases were scheduled for trial during this 2-month period based on a variety of factors, and rescheduling trial dates was discouraged. Id. McIntosh's trial was scheduled in late January, which was beyond the 60-day speedy-trial demand, but the court refused to reschedule on the basis of adhering to the blitz plan. Id.
According to Paige, there is no material distinction between the blitz plan and the statewide orders at issue here because they both involved "blanket polic[ies], not an individualized assessment." Paige's analogy is unpersuasive. First, in McIntosh we did not hold that the blitz plan could not qualify as good cause—only that the record on appeal did not support a finding of good cause. 441 N.W.2d at 120. Here, the district court made specific findings about the inability of the courthouse to accommodate jury trials while adhering to COVID-19 safety protocols. Second, the blitz plan in McIntosh reflected a policy decision prompted by an internal backlog. In contrast, the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic reflected a policy decision prompted by an external public health crisis. Because the statewide orders were prompted by an external factor, we conclude that the trial delays caused by the orders do not weigh against the State.
The State cites to an April 27, 2020, Order that details the reasons for continuing Paige's trial. Paige argues that it is improper to consider this order because the trial at that point had already been continued. The district court, in its first decision to continue Paige's trial, stated that "given the unique circumstances today and by Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court, we're not going to have a trial within that time. And I'll find for good cause to extend those deadlines." While the April 27, 2020, Order continuing Paige's trial was significantly more detailed, the district court's first order for a continuance is still clear that the reason for the delay was compliance with the orders of the Chief Justice.
Our conclusion is consistent with the decisions of other courts that have considered court delays due to large-scale public emergencies. For example, in Furlow v. United States , 644 F.2d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held that delays resulting from the eruption of Mount St. Helens were justified. And in United States v. Correa , 182 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the New York court held that following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the "larger interests of justice in the District—not to mention supervening necessity—surely required suspending proceedings in this case." The COVID-19 pandemic was an external global health emergency and is similar to the large-scale public emergencies in Furlow and Correa . Cf. United States v. Olsen , 21 F.4th 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2022) cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 2716, 212 L.Ed.2d 783 (2022) (holding that the COVID-19 pandemic "falls within such unique circumstances to permit a court to temporarily suspend jury trials in the interest of public health" without violating a defendant's right to a speedy trial).
Citing Carson v. Simon , 978 F.3d 1051, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020), Paige argues that "[t]here is no pandemic exception to the Constitution." This statement overlooks the drastic differences between the questions regarding the rules governing the counting of absentee ballots at issue in Carson and Sixth Amendment speedy-trial analyses, the latter of which specifically contemplates exceptions for good cause.
In sum, the orders of the Chief Justice were not addressing systemic issues within the court system itself; the orders were responding to a deadly and virulent illness over which the court had no control. The "practical administration of justice" required the courts to ensure the health and safety of its employees and clients. See Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 244 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the emergency prompting the COVID-19 orders was an external factor outside of the court's control, we conclude that the second Barker factor does not weigh against the State.
C.
Turning to the third Barker factor (the defendant's assertion of his right), we must assess the forcefulness of Paige's speedy-trial demand. See Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. "[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor [because] the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted." Friberg , 435 N.W.2d at 515 ; see also Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 252 (explaining that the defendant's assertion of a speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight when it evidences the defendant's belief that he will be harmed if the trial is delayed). Although we can "consider other signals in the case to assess whether a demand for a speedy trial is serious," such an assessment focuses on whether the speedy-trial demands are accompanied by actions that undermine the ability for the trial to occur. Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 252 ; see also United States v. Loud Hawk , 474 U.S. 302, 314-15, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986) (stating that a defendant who repeatedly filed frivolous petitions and motions delaying his trial undermined the seriousness of his speedy-trial right demands).
Here, Paige asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial on February 18, 2020, and he continued to demand a speedy trial and oppose delays throughout the proceedings. The State argues that these demands do not reflect a desire to "vindicat[e] his speedy trial rights," because when viewed in context, they reflect a desire to "hold on to the benefit of the bargain he had struck in his other cases." To be clear, the State is not alleging that Paige engaged in actions that undermined the ability for the trial to occur. Instead, the State is simply speculating as to the reasons why Paige wanted a speedy trial. The State's argument is unsound.
The right to a speedy trial is fundamental. Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). Requiring a defendant to justify why they exercised a fundamental right subverts the idea of a fundamental right. Cf. Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 244 (recognizing that the primary burden to vindicate a speedy trial right is on the State). The State has provided no justification as to why Paige's reasons for wanting a speedy trial matter, nor has it delineated which reasons would be legitimate and which would not—if such a line can even be drawn. We therefore reject the State's invitation to speculate as to Paige's motives for repeatedly demanding a speedy trial. Based on the frequency and force of Paige's speedy-trial demands, we conclude that the third Barker factor weighs in Paige's favor.
D.
Under the fourth and final Barker factor (prejudice to defendant), we consider the prejudice suffered by Paige because of the pretrial delay. See Barker , 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. We recognize three interests protected by a defendant's speedy trial right: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing a defendant's anxiety and concern; and (3) preventing possible impairment of the defense. State v. Windish , 590 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Minn. 1999). We evaluate each of these interests when determining the extent of prejudice suffered by a criminal defendant. Id. Evaluating prejudice suffered by a defendant does not present a binary question—did the defendant suffer prejudice or did he suffer no prejudice—but rather presents a question of degrees. See State v. Helenbolt , 334 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1983). Prejudice must be more than minimal to weigh in favor of a defendant. See Friberg , 435 N.W.2d at 515 (stating that the final Barker factor did not favor defendants when the record supported a conclusion that the defendants had not suffered "any serious prejudice" from the delay of trial); Barker , 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (balancing the final Barker factor against the defendant where the "prejudice was minimal"). Furthermore, "the prejudice a defendant suffers must be due to the delay." State v. Osorio , 891 N.W.2d 620, 631 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Before considering the specific arguments advanced by Paige, we reiterate that affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim. Doggett , 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686 ("consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable, and ... affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim."); see also Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 254. Although the importance of presumptive prejudice "increases with the length of delay," it "cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria." Doggett , 505 U.S. at 655-56, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Here, Paige experienced a 45-day delay. We have previously held that unfair prejudice did not result from delays that were significantly longer than 45 days. See State v. Corarito , 268 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. 1978) (stating a delay of 6 months did not result in "any unfair prejudice"); State v. Jones , 392 N.W.2d 224, 235-36 (Minn. 1986) (holding that unfair prejudice was not evident from a 7-month delay); see also Barker , 407 U.S. at 533-34, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (determining that prejudice resulting from a 4-year delay was "minimal"). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the 45-day delay in this case did not result in any unfair prejudice.
In connection with the fourth Barker factor, Paige affirmatively alleges prejudice under each of the three recognized types of prejudice listed above. Paige first argues that he suffered oppressive pretrial incarceration due to his incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic. He points out that he repeatedly requested release on nonmonetary conditions or reduction of bail. But the hardships cited by Paige—restrictions on visits, restraints on movement, and potential risk of infection—fall outside the scope of the fourth Barker factor because they were not hardships suffered due to the trial delay. See Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 631. Instead, the alleged hardships were caused by restrictions put in place to mitigate the effects of a global pandemic. On this record, to the extent that Paige is challenging the bail decisions of the district court, the minimal additional incarceration occurring here did not constitute a serious allegation of prejudice. See Helenbolt , 334 N.W.2d at 404-06 (stating that while "any pretrial incarceration is unfortunate," 14 months of pretrial incarceration does not constitute a "serious allegation of prejudice").
These hardships were not limited to prisons; individuals in long-term care facilities and hospitals were also subject to increased restrictions.
We note that Paige's pretrial release evaluation score of 129 is exceedingly high and that the crime alleged in this case was committed while he was out of custody on intensive pretrial release for a separate criminal offense. We also note that Paige is not challenging his bail determination on appeal.
Paige's second argument alleging prejudice is that he suffered anxiety and concern while awaiting trial. But "stress, anxiety and inconvenience experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial" is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. Friberg , 435 N.W.2d at 515. While Paige may have experienced anxiety and concern while waiting for his trial, and although that stress may have even been exacerbated by the pandemic, the anxiety and concern must be specifically related to the delay. See Osorio , 891 N.W.2d at 631. Paige's arguments would theoretically apply to anyone who is involved in a trial during the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore his anxiety-and-concern argument is unpersuasive. See id.
Paige's third argument alleging prejudice is that his defense was impaired by alleged discovery violations and his status as an incarcerated pro se litigant. We acknowledge that in connection with the fourth Barker factor, the most serious form of prejudice is impairment of defense. Windish , 590 N.W.2d at 318 ; Doggett , 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Impairment of defense typically involves "memory loss by witnesses or witness unavailability." Taylor , 869 N.W.2d at 20. Because impairment of defense can be difficult to prove, it "may be suggested by likely harm to a defendant's case." Windish , 590 N.W.2d at 318-19 (Minn. 1999). But the alleged prejudice and impairment of defense must still be attributable to the delay. See Osorio , 891 N.W.2d at 631. Here, the alleged discovery violations and his pro se status are not directly related to the delay at issue in the speedy-trial analysis. Because Paige offers no other explanation for why the trial delay itself hampered his defense, his impaired-defense argument lacks merit.
E.
Having considered all four Barker factors, we now balance the factors to determine whether the State brought Paige to trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects. See Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 245. Here, the trial was held after the expiration of the 60-day period required by Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.09(b), and the delay was therefore presumptively prejudicial. Paige suffered some prejudice because he was held for an additional 45 days before his trial. But he did not suffer any additional prejudice as a result of the trial delay. Paige repeatedly demanded a speedy trial and opposed delays throughout the proceedings. On the other hand, the delay was caused by the unprecedented risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. We do not weigh against the State the fact that the Minnesota judicial system responded to the then-unclear and largely unprecedented risks posed by COVID-19 by postponing jury trials. COVID-19 was an external factor clearly beyond the court's control. Having carefully balanced these factors, we conclude that the State brought Paige to trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
Attachment