State v. Packer

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gall

    2016 Ohio 2748 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 2 times

    R.C. 2967.191 first took effect on October 20, 1965. State v. Packer, 16 Ohio App.2d 171, 178, 243 N.E.2d 115 (3d Dist.1969), citing 131 Ohio Laws 688. That version of the statute provided the following: The Adult Parole Authority upon proper certification by the trial judge of time served, in the journal entry of sentence and upon recommendation of the trial judge may reduce the minimum sentence of a prisoner by the number of days the prisoner was confined at the county jail or workhouse or confined at a state facility for a presentence examination * * * after a verdict or plea of guilty and before commitment.

  2. State v. Wilson

    No. CA2002-09-034 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2003)

    State v. Dickens (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 354. An individual's eligibility for parole is within the discretion of the adult parole authority. State v. Packer (1969), 16 Ohio App.2d 171. {ΒΆ 7} Quite simply, appellant is turning to the trial court because he is unhappy with the decisions of the adult parole authority.

  3. State v. Culp

    32 Ohio App. 2d 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 9 times
    In State v. Culp (1971), 32 Ohio App.2d 39, an affidavit which designated the statute under which the defendant was charged was held invalid because it failed to allege an element of the crime charged.

    We do not conceive, insofar as this case is concerned, that it matters whether we consider the judgment of conviction based on an affidavit (or indictment) which fails to allege a vital or material element is void, as held in the cases preceding Midling v. Perrini, Supt., 14 Ohio St.2d 106, or whether we adopt Chief Justice Taft's suggestion in the Midling case that it would be sufficient to consider such judgment as being merely voidable. See also State v. Packer, 16 Ohio App.2d 171. As pointed out in State v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 522 and reiterated in Midling v. Perrini, Supt.: "* * * However, after a judgment of conviction for the crime sought to be charged in such indictment such a collateral attack [by an action in habeas corpus] would no longer be effective because the judgment of conviction necessarily binds a defendant, where the court rendering it had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and also jurisdiction of the subject matter, i. e., jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime for which he was convicted.

  4. State v. Meeker

    251 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1969)

    Patton v. North Carolina, supra. I will order it, notwithstanding the opinion in State v. Packer, 16 Ohio App.2d 171, that there is no statutory or constitutional requirement that I do so. I believe Patton requires it and that the denial of it works a serious injustice to prisoners, restraining some who have legitimate constitutional complaints from voicing them.